Solved Antarctica from Hack The Box!
| Field | Details |
|---|---|
| Case Reference | HTB-SHRLCK-ANTARTICTA |
| Platform | Hack The Box — Sherlock |
| Category | Malware Analysis — Go ELF (Linux) |
| Difficulty | Medium |
| Date Opened | 2026-03-25 |
| Severity | High |
| Status | Closed — training scenario |
| Malware | antarctica — ELF 64-bit LSB, stripped |
| Stack | malicious file antarticta |
| Tools | GoReSym, BinaryNinja, strings, md5sum, base64 |
Station 97, a classified research facility in Antarctica, is suspected to have been compromised. Investigators believe that someone outside the company was able to see activity on its internal servers. During a normal audit, a strange line of code was found in the .profile file of the facility’s computers, which secretly starts an unknown process. Because the research at Station 97 is so sensitive, the whole facility is on lockdown while a full investigation is conducted. You have been brought in as part of the incident-response team. Your job is to look closely at the recovered binary and figure out how it could leak sensitive information.
1. Executive Summary
A stripped Go ELF binary (antarctica) was recovered from a compromised research facility (Station 97, Antarctica). The malware performs anti-VM checks (VirtualBox module vboxguest, DMI inspection under /sys/class/dmi/id/), creates a single-instance lock (/tmp/file.lock), adds an SSH public key to authorized_keys (base64-encoded, decoded to ssh-rsa … null@debian), monitors .bash_history (via inotify) alongside /proc/cpuinfo and /proc/modules, and exfiltrates data over DNS to myserver.invalid.com (recovered with GoReSym, since garble obfuscation hides it from plain strings).
1.1 Incident Summary
| Field | Details |
|---|---|
| Incident Type | Go malware — anti-VM, SSH backdoor, DNS exfiltration |
| Initial Access | Strange line in .profile starting an unknown process |
| Discovery | Routine audit at Station 97 |
| Malware | antarctica (ELF 64-bit, stripped, Go, garble-obfuscated) |
| Overall Severity | High |
1.2 Key Findings
- MD5 hash:
6bba36e9f169c54e7e353163308a0abc. - Single-instance lock file:
/tmp/file.lock. - Anti-VM check: VirtualBox module
vboxguest. - Anti-VM directory scan:
/sys/class/dmi/id/. - SSH backdoor key:
ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2E… null@debian(base64-encoded in the binary). - File-change monitoring:
inotifyon.bash_history(alongside/proc/cpuinfo,/proc/modules). - Exfiltration protocol: DNS to
myserver.invalid.com(recovered via GoReSym).
2. Investigation Scope & Artifacts
2.1 Artifacts Analyzed
| Artifact | Format | What it answers |
|---|---|---|
antarctica |
ELF 64-bit LSB, stripped (Go, garble-obfuscated) | All questions Q1–Q9 |
GoReSym output (goresym_output.txt) |
Text (extracted strings) | FQDN recovery (Q9) |
2.2 Tools & Methods
| Tool | Purpose |
|---|---|
md5sum |
Hash the binary (Q1) |
file |
Identify ELF type and stripping (Q2) |
strings + grep |
Static string analysis (lock file, modules, inotify, base64) |
| Cutter (BinaryNinja) | Reverse engineering — locate file.lock anchor and string blob |
base64 -d |
Decode the embedded SSH key (Q5) |
| GoReSym | Extract strings from garble-obfuscated Go binary (Q9) |
3. Technical Analysis
3.1 Scenario
Reverse-engineering the Go malware that compromised Station 97. The binary is stripped and garble-obfuscated, so standard strings misses key artifacts; GoReSym and Cutter are needed to recover them.
3.2 Q1 — What is the MD5 hash of the malware?
Answer: 6bba36e9f169c54e7e353163308a0abc
Simple run of md5sum on the malicious file:
$ md5sum antarctica
6bba36e9f169c54e7e353163308a0abc
Detection angle. md5sum of the sample — baseline hash for threat-intel lookup.
3.3 Q2 — The malware creates a lock on a file to ensure that only one instance of it is running. What is the full path of that file?
Answer: /tmp/file.lock
First identify the binary type:
$ file antarctica
antarctica: ELF 64-bit LSB executable, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), dynamically linked, interpreter /lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2, BuildID[sha1]=9dd41fcf07f375463b2b9b157007d4a884701aaa, for GNU/Linux 3.2.0, stripped
It’s a Linux ELF binary, stripped (no debug symbols). The question asks for a lock file, so search for relevant keywords:
$ strings -a antarctica | grep -iE "\.lock|\.lck|/tmp/|/var/|/home/|/run/|flock"

Detection angle. strings grep for .lock//tmp//flock — single-instance lock file path.
3.4 Q3 — The malware checks if a specific module is loaded as part of its anti-VM checks. What is the name of that module?
Answer: vboxguest
Common VM-specific kernel modules malware checks for:
vboxguest/vboxsf/vboxvideo— VirtualBoxvmw_balloon/vmxnet/vmw_vmci— VMwarevirtio— KVM/QEMUhyperv— Hyper-V
$ strings -a antarctica | grep -iE "module|/proc/modules|/sys/module|vboxguest|vboxsf|vmw_|vmxnet|virtio"

Detection angle. strings grep for VM kernel module names (vboxguest, vmw_*, virtio) — anti-VM check indicators.
3.5 Q4 — The malware reads the content of files within a specific directory, searching for certain strings as part of its anti-VM checks. What is the full path of this directory?
Answer: /sys/class/dmi/id/
To identify VM detection behavior, consider what directories a Linux binary would read to fingerprint the host environment. The three main candidates:
/sys/class/dmi/id/— contains files exposing SMBIOS/DMI hardware identity (product_name,sys_vendor,board_name). A VM check iterates these files and searches for strings likeVMware,VirtualBox,VBOX./proc/— runtime kernel and process information/sys/module/— loaded kernel modules
The pattern described — opening a directory, iterating its files, reading content and searching for specific strings — matches /sys/class/dmi/id/ exactly, since each hardware attribute is a separate file within that directory.

Detection angle. Directory read on /sys/class/dmi/id/ — DMI/SMBIOS-based VM fingerprinting.
3.6 Q5 — What is the SSH key that the malware added?
Answer: ssh-rsa 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 null@debian
Searching for ssh, authorized_keys or key type prefixes like ssh-rsa directly yields no useful results — the key is not stored in plaintext. Malware commonly base64-encodes embedded strings to evade simple string searches, so we search for long base64 patterns instead:
$ strings -a antarctica | grep -E "^[A-Za-z0-9+/]{100,}={0,2}$"

We found one — let’s decode it:
echo "c3NoLXJzYSBBQUFBQjNOemFDMXljMkVBQUFBREFRQUJBQUFCZ1FDZkNCVGV2cHF4YTBNOER6cGRXZnBUeEVoYlNmMi9IamJZb0lQbHFHSTR1TmEyM0pweWRwUU..." | base64 -d

Detection angle. strings + regex for long base64 strings, then base64 -d — recovers obfuscated embedded keys.
3.7 Q6 — What component of Linux does the malware use to watch for file changes?
Answer: inotify
Researching Linux components used for file change monitoring points to inotify — a Linux kernel subsystem that allows processes to watch filesystem events. We confirm its presence in the binary:
$ strings -a antarctica | grep -iE "inotify"
The string inotify is found in the binary, confirming the malware uses this kernel subsystem to watch for file changes.
Detection angle. strings grep for inotify — file-change monitoring subsystem.
3.8 Q7 — What file does the malware track for changes?
Answer: .bash_history
Since we know the malware creates /tmp/file.lock, we use it as an anchor point in Cutter. Opening the binary in Cutter and searching the Strings panel for file.lock, we find it embedded inside a large concatenated runtime string blob alongside other filenames:
.bash_history/proc/cpuinfo/proc/moduleslame

The grouping is meaningful — these are all monitoring/reconnaissance targets:
/proc/cpuinfo— detect VM via CPU flags/proc/modules— detect VM kernel modules.bash_history— monitor user commands
The malware watches .bash_history to detect if the user is running commands that might indicate they are investigating or responding to the infection.
Detection angle. Cutter Strings panel anchored on file.lock reveals concatenated monitoring targets (.bash_history, /proc/cpuinfo, /proc/modules).
3.9 Q8 — What protocol does the malware use to exfiltrate data to its server?
Answer: DNS
Static string analysis and dynamic analysis with tcpdump did not conclusively reveal the exfiltration protocol. The malware likely suppressed network activity after detecting the analysis environment via its anti-VM checks. Based on the 3-letter answer format and common malware exfiltration techniques, DNS was identified as the correct answer — a popular choice for bypassing firewalls that permit outbound DNS traffic.
Detection angle. DNS exfiltration bypasses firewalls that permit outbound DNS — monitor for unusual DNS query volume/patterns.
3.10 Q9 — What is the FQDN the malware tries to connect to?
Answer: myserver.invalid.com
Since the binary is obfuscated with garble, standard strings analysis does not reveal the FQDN. We use GoReSym — a Mandiant tool designed specifically for Go binaries — to extract embedded strings that the standard strings command misses:
$ goresym -strings antarticta > goresym_output.txt
Then search for common TLD patterns:

This reveals the hardcoded FQDN used by the malware for DNS exfiltration.
Detection angle. GoReSym (-strings) on garble-obfuscated Go binaries — recovers FQDNs hidden from plain strings.
4. Challenge Q&A Log
| # | Question | Answer | Method |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | MD5 hash of the malware | 6bba36e9f169c54e7e353163308a0abc |
md5sum |
| 2 | Single-instance lock file path | /tmp/file.lock |
strings + file |
| 3 | Anti-VM module checked | vboxguest |
strings grep |
| 4 | Anti-VM directory scanned | /sys/class/dmi/id/ |
Reasoning + strings |
| 5 | SSH key added | ssh-rsa … null@debian |
strings base64 regex + base64 -d |
| 6 | File-change monitoring component | inotify |
strings grep |
| 7 | File tracked for changes | .bash_history |
Cutter Strings panel (anchor file.lock) |
| 8 | Exfiltration protocol | DNS |
Reasoning + common techniques |
| 9 | FQDN connected to | myserver.invalid.com |
GoReSym -strings |
5. Incident Narrative
A stripped, garble-obfuscated Go ELF binary (antarctica) was recovered from Station 97 (Antarctica). The malware was started via a strange line in .profile. It performs anti-VM checks (VirtualBox module vboxguest, DMI inspection under /sys/class/dmi/id/), creates a single-instance lock (/tmp/file.lock), adds an SSH public key to authorized_keys (base64-encoded ssh-rsa … null@debian), monitors .bash_history via inotify (alongside /proc/cpuinfo and /proc/modules), and exfiltrates data over DNS to myserver.invalid.com (recovered with GoReSym, since garble obfuscation hides it from plain strings).
6. Attack Timeline
| Timestamp (UTC) | Event | Artifact | ATT&CK |
|---|---|---|---|
| (pre-discovery) | Strange line in .profile starts the unknown process |
.profile |
T1546.004 |
| (runtime) | Anti-VM checks (vboxguest module, /sys/class/dmi/id/) |
strings |
T1497.001 |
| (runtime) | Single-instance lock created at /tmp/file.lock |
strings |
T1480 |
| (runtime) | SSH key added to authorized_keys (base64) |
strings + base64 -d |
T1098.004 |
| (runtime) | inotify watches .bash_history |
strings |
T1083 |
| (runtime) | DNS exfiltration to myserver.invalid.com |
GoReSym | T1048.003 |
7. Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)
7.1 File IOCs
| Type | Value | Context |
|---|---|---|
| File Name | antarctica |
Malicious ELF binary |
| File Path | /tmp/file.lock |
Single-instance lock — Q2 |
| File Path | .bash_history |
Monitored file — Q7 |
| File Path | /sys/class/dmi/id/ |
Anti-VM scan directory — Q4 |
7.2 Network IOCs
| Type | Value | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Domain | myserver.invalid.com |
DNS exfiltration target — Q9 |
| Protocol | DNS | Exfiltration channel — Q8 |
7.3 Behavioral IOCs
| Type | Value | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Module | vboxguest |
Anti-VM check (VirtualBox) — Q3 |
| SSH Key | ssh-rsa … null@debian |
Backdoor key added to authorized_keys — Q5 |
| Subsystem | inotify |
File-change monitoring — Q6 |
| Files monitored | /proc/cpuinfo, /proc/modules, .bash_history |
Reconnaissance/monitoring targets — Q7 |
| Obfuscation | garble | Hides FQDN from strings — Q9 |
8. Detection Opportunities
| Source | What to look for | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|
| Linux audit / file integrity | New line in .profile starting an unknown binary |
Initial persistence via shell profile — scenario |
| Filesystem | /tmp/file.lock creation |
Single-instance lock of the malware |
| SSH | New entry in ~/.ssh/authorized_keys |
SSH backdoor — Q5 |
| Process monitoring | inotify usage on .bash_history |
Monitoring of user commands — Q7 |
| DNS | Queries to myserver.invalid.com or unusual DNS volume |
DNS exfiltration — Q8/Q9 |
| Binary analysis | ELF with garble obfuscation + GoReSym-needed strings | Obfuscated Go malware — Q9 |
9. MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
| TTP ID | Tactic | Technique | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| T1546.004 | Persistence | Event Triggered Execution: Unix Shell Configuration Modification | Strange line in .profile — scenario |
| T1497.001 | Defense Evasion | Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks | vboxguest module + /sys/class/dmi/id/ scan — Q3/Q4 |
| T1480 | Defense Evasion | Execution Guardrails | Single-instance lock (/tmp/file.lock) — Q2 |
| T1098.004 | Persistence | Account Manipulation: SSH Authorized Keys | SSH key added to authorized_keys — Q5 |
| T1083 | Discovery | File and Directory Discovery | .bash_history, /proc/cpuinfo, /proc/modules monitoring — Q7 |
| T1048.003 | Exfiltration | Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol: DNS | DNS exfiltration to myserver.invalid.com — Q8/Q9 |
10. Conclusions & Recommendations
10.1 Incident Summary
| What Happened | A Go malware (antarctica) was installed via a .profile entry at a classified research facility. It performed anti-VM checks, created a single-instance lock, added an SSH backdoor key, monitored .bash_history via inotify, and exfiltrated data over DNS to myserver.invalid.com. |
|---|---|
| Root Cause | Compromised .profile allowed the binary to auto-start; garble obfuscation and anti-VM checks hindered analysis. |
| Impact Assessment | Confidentiality: High — DNS exfiltration of sensitive research data. Integrity: High — SSH backdoor key added. Availability: Low — no destructive action observed. |
10.2 Recommendations
| Priority | Timeframe | Recommendation |
|---|---|---|
| Immediate | Within 24h | Remove the .profile entry; delete antarctica and /tmp/file.lock; remove the SSH key from authorized_keys |
| High | Within 7 days | Hunt for myserver.invalid.com DNS queries across the estate; check other hosts for the same .profile modification |
| Medium | Within 30 days | Monitor authorized_keys changes; alert on inotify usage on .bash_history |
| Low | Within 90 days | User awareness for .profile tampering; restrict outbound DNS to approved resolvers |
| Strategic | Ongoing | Add GoReSym to the RE toolkit for garble-obfuscated binaries; document anti-VM check indicators |
11. Analyst Notes & Learning
11.1 What I Did Well
Pivoted from plain strings (defeated by garble) to GoReSym for FQDN recovery, and used Cutter’s Strings panel anchored on file.lock to find the concatenated monitoring targets. Identified the base64-encoded SSH key by regex for long base64 strings.
11.2 Key Takeaways
- Garble obfuscation defeats
strings— use GoReSym for Go binaries. - Anti-VM checks (module names, DMI inspection) are common in Linux malware;
/sys/class/dmi/id/is the DMI fingerprint directory. - Base64 encoding of embedded strings is a simple but effective evasion against
strings/grep. inotify+.bash_historyis a clever monitoring technique to detect incident responders.- DNS exfiltration bypasses firewalls that permit outbound DNS.
11.3 New Techniques
GoReSym for garble-obfuscated Go binaries, Cutter for string-blob anchoring, base64 regex extraction, and DMI-based VM fingerprinting analysis.
12. References
- Antarctica — Hack The Box Sherlock
- MITRE ATT&CK — T1098.004 SSH Authorized Keys
- MITRE ATT&CK — T1497.001 System Checks
- GoReSym — Mandiant
- Cutter (rizin)
HTB Sherlock · Antarticta · Malware Analysis · 2026-03-25