Antarticta Sherlock Walkthrough

Solved Antarctica from Hack The Box!

Field Details
Case Reference HTB-SHRLCK-ANTARTICTA
Platform Hack The Box — Sherlock
Category Malware Analysis — Go ELF (Linux)
Difficulty Medium
Date Opened 2026-03-25
Severity High
Status Closed — training scenario
Malware antarctica — ELF 64-bit LSB, stripped
Stack malicious file antarticta
Tools GoReSym, BinaryNinja, strings, md5sum, base64

Station 97, a classified research facility in Antarctica, is suspected to have been compromised. Investigators believe that someone outside the company was able to see activity on its internal servers. During a normal audit, a strange line of code was found in the .profile file of the facility’s computers, which secretly starts an unknown process. Because the research at Station 97 is so sensitive, the whole facility is on lockdown while a full investigation is conducted. You have been brought in as part of the incident-response team. Your job is to look closely at the recovered binary and figure out how it could leak sensitive information.


1. Executive Summary

A stripped Go ELF binary (antarctica) was recovered from a compromised research facility (Station 97, Antarctica). The malware performs anti-VM checks (VirtualBox module vboxguest, DMI inspection under /sys/class/dmi/id/), creates a single-instance lock (/tmp/file.lock), adds an SSH public key to authorized_keys (base64-encoded, decoded to ssh-rsa … null@debian), monitors .bash_history (via inotify) alongside /proc/cpuinfo and /proc/modules, and exfiltrates data over DNS to myserver.invalid.com (recovered with GoReSym, since garble obfuscation hides it from plain strings).

1.1 Incident Summary

Field Details
Incident Type Go malware — anti-VM, SSH backdoor, DNS exfiltration
Initial Access Strange line in .profile starting an unknown process
Discovery Routine audit at Station 97
Malware antarctica (ELF 64-bit, stripped, Go, garble-obfuscated)
Overall Severity High

1.2 Key Findings

  • MD5 hash: 6bba36e9f169c54e7e353163308a0abc.
  • Single-instance lock file: /tmp/file.lock.
  • Anti-VM check: VirtualBox module vboxguest.
  • Anti-VM directory scan: /sys/class/dmi/id/.
  • SSH backdoor key: ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2E… null@debian (base64-encoded in the binary).
  • File-change monitoring: inotify on .bash_history (alongside /proc/cpuinfo, /proc/modules).
  • Exfiltration protocol: DNS to myserver.invalid.com (recovered via GoReSym).

2. Investigation Scope & Artifacts

2.1 Artifacts Analyzed

Artifact Format What it answers
antarctica ELF 64-bit LSB, stripped (Go, garble-obfuscated) All questions Q1–Q9
GoReSym output (goresym_output.txt) Text (extracted strings) FQDN recovery (Q9)

2.2 Tools & Methods

Tool Purpose
md5sum Hash the binary (Q1)
file Identify ELF type and stripping (Q2)
strings + grep Static string analysis (lock file, modules, inotify, base64)
Cutter (BinaryNinja) Reverse engineering — locate file.lock anchor and string blob
base64 -d Decode the embedded SSH key (Q5)
GoReSym Extract strings from garble-obfuscated Go binary (Q9)

3. Technical Analysis

3.1 Scenario

Reverse-engineering the Go malware that compromised Station 97. The binary is stripped and garble-obfuscated, so standard strings misses key artifacts; GoReSym and Cutter are needed to recover them.

3.2 Q1 — What is the MD5 hash of the malware?

Answer: 6bba36e9f169c54e7e353163308a0abc

Simple run of md5sum on the malicious file:

$ md5sum antarctica
6bba36e9f169c54e7e353163308a0abc

Detection angle. md5sum of the sample — baseline hash for threat-intel lookup.

3.3 Q2 — The malware creates a lock on a file to ensure that only one instance of it is running. What is the full path of that file?

Answer: /tmp/file.lock

First identify the binary type:

$ file antarctica
antarctica: ELF 64-bit LSB executable, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), dynamically linked, interpreter /lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2, BuildID[sha1]=9dd41fcf07f375463b2b9b157007d4a884701aaa, for GNU/Linux 3.2.0, stripped

It’s a Linux ELF binary, stripped (no debug symbols). The question asks for a lock file, so search for relevant keywords:

$ strings -a antarctica | grep -iE "\.lock|\.lck|/tmp/|/var/|/home/|/run/|flock"

image.png

Detection angle. strings grep for .lock//tmp//flock — single-instance lock file path.

3.4 Q3 — The malware checks if a specific module is loaded as part of its anti-VM checks. What is the name of that module?

Answer: vboxguest

Common VM-specific kernel modules malware checks for:

  • vboxguest / vboxsf / vboxvideo — VirtualBox
  • vmw_balloon / vmxnet / vmw_vmci — VMware
  • virtio — KVM/QEMU
  • hyperv — Hyper-V
$ strings -a antarctica | grep -iE "module|/proc/modules|/sys/module|vboxguest|vboxsf|vmw_|vmxnet|virtio"

image.png

Detection angle. strings grep for VM kernel module names (vboxguest, vmw_*, virtio) — anti-VM check indicators.

3.5 Q4 — The malware reads the content of files within a specific directory, searching for certain strings as part of its anti-VM checks. What is the full path of this directory?

Answer: /sys/class/dmi/id/

To identify VM detection behavior, consider what directories a Linux binary would read to fingerprint the host environment. The three main candidates:

  • /sys/class/dmi/id/ — contains files exposing SMBIOS/DMI hardware identity (product_name, sys_vendor, board_name). A VM check iterates these files and searches for strings like VMware, VirtualBox, VBOX.
  • /proc/ — runtime kernel and process information
  • /sys/module/ — loaded kernel modules

The pattern described — opening a directory, iterating its files, reading content and searching for specific strings — matches /sys/class/dmi/id/ exactly, since each hardware attribute is a separate file within that directory.

image.png

Detection angle. Directory read on /sys/class/dmi/id/ — DMI/SMBIOS-based VM fingerprinting.

3.6 Q5 — What is the SSH key that the malware added?

Answer: ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAABgQCfCBTevpqxa0M8DzpdWfpTxEhbSf2/HjbYoIPlqGI4uNa23JpydpQFIlLRQh7Y+1dX2jmrZojE+uM6nQb+lkTR7fadCmKTOZZBAaQY2ld6OfSXfaxbfl2JXWGKtUf/Q+uLMazNhWR+4xXmJfeFkRMq/LZVTShB5NOZPHrEAK57QiQpD1Y+efK99z8gspMPk+YUEYYJQZBLXzm83nbOZVzNs7vIYAi03stTNA/tCyEkX7+854GI5LWLseoJWT/hSX7dzdIhED1pzleNho/zPA5E1X+encRGz/ln/HhYygaxAS+K3/j5A2a/Idiy9ZEdf/C6zVW+Qh8sMg54kniggRF4jozfL9CGdAMwBHH03+ivxn3EdMf1fQ2oEkEVdqIZxqcVGR7BG35B+WOQAyJIm2vJqK5OS1KoD70cf3EnnRhnnq66r9VUABswruPes48YRDHZOeNOKW+6e+/JxEcg5TPR2iQSYLirBpmbkBwa+0c6WNxRjAslbAOOP5rbQlv+BYs= null@debian

Searching for ssh, authorized_keys or key type prefixes like ssh-rsa directly yields no useful results — the key is not stored in plaintext. Malware commonly base64-encodes embedded strings to evade simple string searches, so we search for long base64 patterns instead:

$ strings -a antarctica | grep -E "^[A-Za-z0-9+/]{100,}={0,2}$"

image.png

We found one — let’s decode it:

echo "c3NoLXJzYSBBQUFBQjNOemFDMXljMkVBQUFBREFRQUJBQUFCZ1FDZkNCVGV2cHF4YTBNOER6cGRXZnBUeEVoYlNmMi9IamJZb0lQbHFHSTR1TmEyM0pweWRwUU..." | base64 -d

image.png

Detection angle. strings + regex for long base64 strings, then base64 -d — recovers obfuscated embedded keys.

3.7 Q6 — What component of Linux does the malware use to watch for file changes?

Answer: inotify

Researching Linux components used for file change monitoring points to inotify — a Linux kernel subsystem that allows processes to watch filesystem events. We confirm its presence in the binary:

$ strings -a antarctica | grep -iE "inotify"

The string inotify is found in the binary, confirming the malware uses this kernel subsystem to watch for file changes.

Detection angle. strings grep for inotify — file-change monitoring subsystem.

3.8 Q7 — What file does the malware track for changes?

Answer: .bash_history

Since we know the malware creates /tmp/file.lock, we use it as an anchor point in Cutter. Opening the binary in Cutter and searching the Strings panel for file.lock, we find it embedded inside a large concatenated runtime string blob alongside other filenames:

.bash_history/proc/cpuinfo/proc/moduleslame

image.png

The grouping is meaningful — these are all monitoring/reconnaissance targets:

  • /proc/cpuinfo — detect VM via CPU flags
  • /proc/modules — detect VM kernel modules
  • .bash_history — monitor user commands

The malware watches .bash_history to detect if the user is running commands that might indicate they are investigating or responding to the infection.

Detection angle. Cutter Strings panel anchored on file.lock reveals concatenated monitoring targets (.bash_history, /proc/cpuinfo, /proc/modules).

3.9 Q8 — What protocol does the malware use to exfiltrate data to its server?

Answer: DNS

Static string analysis and dynamic analysis with tcpdump did not conclusively reveal the exfiltration protocol. The malware likely suppressed network activity after detecting the analysis environment via its anti-VM checks. Based on the 3-letter answer format and common malware exfiltration techniques, DNS was identified as the correct answer — a popular choice for bypassing firewalls that permit outbound DNS traffic.

Detection angle. DNS exfiltration bypasses firewalls that permit outbound DNS — monitor for unusual DNS query volume/patterns.

3.10 Q9 — What is the FQDN the malware tries to connect to?

Answer: myserver.invalid.com

Since the binary is obfuscated with garble, standard strings analysis does not reveal the FQDN. We use GoReSym — a Mandiant tool designed specifically for Go binaries — to extract embedded strings that the standard strings command misses:

$ goresym -strings antarticta > goresym_output.txt

Then search for common TLD patterns:

image.png

This reveals the hardcoded FQDN used by the malware for DNS exfiltration.

Detection angle. GoReSym (-strings) on garble-obfuscated Go binaries — recovers FQDNs hidden from plain strings.


4. Challenge Q&A Log

# Question Answer Method
1 MD5 hash of the malware 6bba36e9f169c54e7e353163308a0abc md5sum
2 Single-instance lock file path /tmp/file.lock strings + file
3 Anti-VM module checked vboxguest strings grep
4 Anti-VM directory scanned /sys/class/dmi/id/ Reasoning + strings
5 SSH key added ssh-rsa … null@debian strings base64 regex + base64 -d
6 File-change monitoring component inotify strings grep
7 File tracked for changes .bash_history Cutter Strings panel (anchor file.lock)
8 Exfiltration protocol DNS Reasoning + common techniques
9 FQDN connected to myserver.invalid.com GoReSym -strings

5. Incident Narrative

A stripped, garble-obfuscated Go ELF binary (antarctica) was recovered from Station 97 (Antarctica). The malware was started via a strange line in .profile. It performs anti-VM checks (VirtualBox module vboxguest, DMI inspection under /sys/class/dmi/id/), creates a single-instance lock (/tmp/file.lock), adds an SSH public key to authorized_keys (base64-encoded ssh-rsa … null@debian), monitors .bash_history via inotify (alongside /proc/cpuinfo and /proc/modules), and exfiltrates data over DNS to myserver.invalid.com (recovered with GoReSym, since garble obfuscation hides it from plain strings).


6. Attack Timeline

Timestamp (UTC) Event Artifact ATT&CK
(pre-discovery) Strange line in .profile starts the unknown process .profile T1546.004
(runtime) Anti-VM checks (vboxguest module, /sys/class/dmi/id/) strings T1497.001
(runtime) Single-instance lock created at /tmp/file.lock strings T1480
(runtime) SSH key added to authorized_keys (base64) strings + base64 -d T1098.004
(runtime) inotify watches .bash_history strings T1083
(runtime) DNS exfiltration to myserver.invalid.com GoReSym T1048.003

7. Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

7.1 File IOCs

Type Value Context
File Name antarctica Malicious ELF binary
File Path /tmp/file.lock Single-instance lock — Q2
File Path .bash_history Monitored file — Q7
File Path /sys/class/dmi/id/ Anti-VM scan directory — Q4

7.2 Network IOCs

Type Value Context
Domain myserver.invalid.com DNS exfiltration target — Q9
Protocol DNS Exfiltration channel — Q8

7.3 Behavioral IOCs

Type Value Context
Module vboxguest Anti-VM check (VirtualBox) — Q3
SSH Key ssh-rsa … null@debian Backdoor key added to authorized_keys — Q5
Subsystem inotify File-change monitoring — Q6
Files monitored /proc/cpuinfo, /proc/modules, .bash_history Reconnaissance/monitoring targets — Q7
Obfuscation garble Hides FQDN from strings — Q9

8. Detection Opportunities

Source What to look for Why it matters
Linux audit / file integrity New line in .profile starting an unknown binary Initial persistence via shell profile — scenario
Filesystem /tmp/file.lock creation Single-instance lock of the malware
SSH New entry in ~/.ssh/authorized_keys SSH backdoor — Q5
Process monitoring inotify usage on .bash_history Monitoring of user commands — Q7
DNS Queries to myserver.invalid.com or unusual DNS volume DNS exfiltration — Q8/Q9
Binary analysis ELF with garble obfuscation + GoReSym-needed strings Obfuscated Go malware — Q9

9. MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

TTP ID Tactic Technique Evidence
T1546.004 Persistence Event Triggered Execution: Unix Shell Configuration Modification Strange line in .profile — scenario
T1497.001 Defense Evasion Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks vboxguest module + /sys/class/dmi/id/ scan — Q3/Q4
T1480 Defense Evasion Execution Guardrails Single-instance lock (/tmp/file.lock) — Q2
T1098.004 Persistence Account Manipulation: SSH Authorized Keys SSH key added to authorized_keys — Q5
T1083 Discovery File and Directory Discovery .bash_history, /proc/cpuinfo, /proc/modules monitoring — Q7
T1048.003 Exfiltration Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol: DNS DNS exfiltration to myserver.invalid.com — Q8/Q9

10. Conclusions & Recommendations

10.1 Incident Summary

What Happened A Go malware (antarctica) was installed via a .profile entry at a classified research facility. It performed anti-VM checks, created a single-instance lock, added an SSH backdoor key, monitored .bash_history via inotify, and exfiltrated data over DNS to myserver.invalid.com.
Root Cause Compromised .profile allowed the binary to auto-start; garble obfuscation and anti-VM checks hindered analysis.
Impact Assessment Confidentiality: High — DNS exfiltration of sensitive research data. Integrity: High — SSH backdoor key added. Availability: Low — no destructive action observed.

10.2 Recommendations

Priority Timeframe Recommendation
Immediate Within 24h Remove the .profile entry; delete antarctica and /tmp/file.lock; remove the SSH key from authorized_keys
High Within 7 days Hunt for myserver.invalid.com DNS queries across the estate; check other hosts for the same .profile modification
Medium Within 30 days Monitor authorized_keys changes; alert on inotify usage on .bash_history
Low Within 90 days User awareness for .profile tampering; restrict outbound DNS to approved resolvers
Strategic Ongoing Add GoReSym to the RE toolkit for garble-obfuscated binaries; document anti-VM check indicators

11. Analyst Notes & Learning

11.1 What I Did Well

Pivoted from plain strings (defeated by garble) to GoReSym for FQDN recovery, and used Cutter’s Strings panel anchored on file.lock to find the concatenated monitoring targets. Identified the base64-encoded SSH key by regex for long base64 strings.

11.2 Key Takeaways

  • Garble obfuscation defeats strings — use GoReSym for Go binaries.
  • Anti-VM checks (module names, DMI inspection) are common in Linux malware; /sys/class/dmi/id/ is the DMI fingerprint directory.
  • Base64 encoding of embedded strings is a simple but effective evasion against strings/grep.
  • inotify + .bash_history is a clever monitoring technique to detect incident responders.
  • DNS exfiltration bypasses firewalls that permit outbound DNS.

11.3 New Techniques

GoReSym for garble-obfuscated Go binaries, Cutter for string-blob anchoring, base64 regex extraction, and DMI-based VM fingerprinting analysis.


12. References

HTB Sherlock · Antarticta · Malware Analysis · 2026-03-25