Fruitzy Sherlock Walkthrough

Solved Fruitzy from Hack The Box!

Note: Sherlock Type Phishing / Malware / RMM Backdoor — a full end-to-end forensic methodology covering email analysis, browser forensics, execution artifacts, service persistence, and OSINT. Each question is answered step-by-step with the exact commands and artifacts used.

Field Details
Case Reference HTB-SHRLCK-FRUITZY
Platform Hack The Box — Sherlock
Category Phishing → RMM backdoor
Difficulty Easy
Date Opened 2026-03-04
Severity High
Status Closed — training scenario

1. Executive Summary

On 2026-03-04 a user at a small startup executed a phishing-delivered binary and, twelve seconds later, a legitimate remote-management service was installed on the host. The victim noticed the download, ran a manual antivirus scan and found nothing; the machine was later triaged with KAPE and handed over for analysis.

This report reconstructs the intrusion from six artifacts — one email, one browser history database, two registry hives and two event logs. It documents how the lure was delivered, how execution and persistence were established, how the attacker tried to hide the timeline, and what telemetry would have caught each step.

1.1 Incident Summary

Field Details
Incident Type Phishing → RMM backdoor
Initial Access Spearphishing link (T1566.002)
Discovery Victim noticed the download and ran a manual Defender scan
First Execution 2026-03-04 16:44:33 UTC
Persistence CentraStage (Datto RMM) service, Event ID 7045
Overall Severity High

1.2 Key Findings

  • The lure was an email titled Special Party Invitation from JANET CARNAHAN, redirecting to pomi.digital — a domain registered twelve days earlier.
  • The payload was premium.exe, SHA256 af240a2c…ea7e3, executed at 2026-03-04 16:44:33 UTC.
  • Persistence was a CentraStage service — Datto RMM, legitimate software repurposed as a backdoor.
  • The binaries were timestomped to 2026-02-09 07:56:40 UTC, eleven days before the domain they came from existed.
  • A manual Defender scan at 16:48:00 produced no detection event.
  • The entire chain is recoverable from standard Windows artifacts, with no specialist tooling beyond Chainsaw and RegRipper.

2. Investigation Scope & Artifacts

2.1 Artifacts Analyzed

Artifact Format What it answers
Special Party Invitation from JANET CARNAHAN.eml RFC 822 text Sender, subject, delivery time — Q1
Edge History SQLite Redirect chain and downloaded file — Q2, Q3
Amcache.hve Registry hive Execution time and MD5 — Q4, Q5
Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender%4Operational.evtx EVTX Defender scan start — Q6
System.evtx EVTX Service installation — Q7
SYSTEM hive Registry hive Shimcache / AppCompatCache timestamps — Q8
VirusTotal, WHOIS External Alternative names, domain age — Q9–Q11

2.2 Tools & Methods

Tool Purpose
Text editor / cat Parsing EML message headers
DB Browser for SQLite Analyzing Edge browser History and downloads
RegRipper (rip.exe) Parsing Amcache.hve and the SYSTEM hive (Shimcache)
Chainsaw Dumping and searching EVTX logs
jq Filtering and extracting JSON log data
VirusTotal Hash lookup / threat intelligence
GoDaddy WHOIS Domain registration research

3. Technical Analysis

3.1 Scenario

CyberJunkie started out as a junior QA Analyst at his friend’s startup. He called the CEO of the startup because he believed he had mistakenly downloaded something malicious. The CEO sought help from you, his friend in the cybersecurity field. You sent him a guide on collecting evidence from the machine using KAPE. Now you have been given the forensic image so you can analyze and help your friends, as they cannot afford to hire an MSSP.

The forensic triage was acquired with KAPE (Kroll Artifact Parser and Extractor), which is why we have direct access to key artifacts such as browser History, Amcache, Shimcache, and EVTX logs.

3.2 Q1 — Phishing Email Subject

Answer: Special Party Invitation from JANET CARNAHAN

Method — Read the EML file Special Party Invitation from JANET CARNAHAN.eml. All key metadata — From, To, Subject, Date, Message-ID — is stored in the plaintext email headers.

Tip: In an .eml file, all important metadata lives in the headers at the top of the plaintext body. This is always the best starting point for email-based phishing analysis.

Q1.png

Detection angle. Mail-gateway or Exchange message-trace logs keyed on the subject line; a display name that does not match the envelope From is the tell.

3.3 Q2 — Malicious URI Redirect

Answer: https://pomi.digital/premium/windows_download.php

Method — Analyze the Edge browser history. The history database lives at:

C:\Users\CyberJunkie\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\Default\History

Open it with DB Browser for SQLite and search the urls table. The user clicked the link in the phishing email → the browser navigated to the final download page → this navigation was recorded in the history table. This gives us the malicious redirect target (pomi.digital).

Q2.png

Detection angle. DNS or proxy logs for pomi.digital — a domain first seen 12 days before the click is the strongest single signal in this incident.

3.4 Q3 — Downloaded File Name

Answer: premium.exe

Method — In the same History database, downloads are recorded in the downloads_url_chains (or downloads) table. This is where we find the dropped file name premium.exe together with the URL it was downloaded from.

Tip: The downloads_url_chains table ties each download to its originating URL. The actual file name is stored in the target_path / current_path fields.

Q3.png

Detection angle. Sysmon EID 15 (FileCreateStreamHash) on Zone.Identifier for an .exe written under Downloads — catches browser-delivered executables with Mark-of-the-Web still attached.

3.5 Q4 — Malware Execution Time (Amcache)

Answer: 2026-03-04 16:44:33 UTC

Method — The Amcache.hve hive records program executions. I parsed it with RegRipper; the output shows the timestamp in epoch format 1772642673. Converting it yields 2026-03-04 16:44:33 UTC.

1772642673 → 2026-03-04 16:44:33 UTC

Q4.png

Note: Amcache is one of the most reliable sources for establishing when a binary actually executed on the system — a critical anchor for the attack timeline.

Detection angle. Amcache is post-hoc evidence. The live equivalent is Sysmon EID 1 with an Image ending in \Downloads\premium.exe.

3.6 Q5 — Malware SHA256 Hash

Answer: af240a2c2a4b42e3a130f47ccaab9aa2e20a1a586bc959ee9efd7475055ea7e3

Method — Amcache provides the MD5 hash (405481d3d5529445c546d4429b72c5827ebde840). Feed this MD5 into VirusTotal and you will easily recover the corresponding SHA256.

Q5.png

Tip: Amcache stores MD5 hashes. When a binary is known to VirusTotal, one hash fully identifies the family — so always pivot between hash formats.

Detection angle. Push the hash to EDR telemetry — a single match scopes every host that ever ran the sample.

3.7 Q6 — Microsoft Defender Scan Start Time

Answer: 2026-03-04T16:48:00

Method:

  1. First I checked C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Support — nothing relevant there.
  2. Then I dumped the Defender operational log with Chainsaw:
chainsaw dump "C:\Windows\System32\winevt\Logs\Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender Operational.evtx" > defender.json
  1. Filter for Event ID 1000 (scan start):
cat ../Defender.json | jq '.[] | select(.Event.System.EventID == 1000)' | grep premium.exe -B 40

Event ID 1000 showed that the scan for premium.exe began at 2026-03-04T16:48:00. The user executed the file, nothing visibly happened, so they ran a manual Defender scan via the “Scan” button — this was captured as Event ID 1000.

Q6.png

Detection angle. EID 1116/1117 would have fired on a detection. A 1000/1001 pair with no 1116 means the scan found nothing — that absence is itself the finding.

3.8 Q7 — RMM Backdoor Service Name

Answer: CentraStage

Method — Windows records every installation of a new service in System.evtx with Event ID 7045. Dump the log with Chainsaw and filter:

chainsaw dump "C:\Windows\System32\winevt\Logs\System.evtx" > system.json

jq -r '.[] | select(.Event.System.EventID == 7045) |
  [(.Event.System.TimeCreated_attributes.SystemTime), (.Event.EventData.ServiceName), (.Event.EventData.ImagePath)] |
  join(" ---> ")' system.json | grep "2026-03-04"

Q7.png

Note: CentraStage is a well-known RMM (Remote Monitoring & Management) tool — frequently leveraged by attackers as a backdoor for persistent remote access.

Detection angle. EID 7045 whose ImagePath sits under Program Files (x86) and belongs to no Microsoft product; correlate with 7036 for the service start.

3.9 Q8 — Modified Timestamp of RMM Executables (Timestamp Stomping)

Answer: 2026-02-09 07:56:40 UTC

Method — The Shimcache / AppCompatCache (stored in the SYSTEM hive) keeps execution-related timestamps. I analyzed the SYSTEM hive with RegRipper:

regripper -r Windows/System32/config/SYSTEM -aT | grep -i "centra"
1770623800|REG|||M... AppCompatCache - C:\Program Files (x86)\CentraStage\Gui.exe
1770623800|REG|||M... AppCompatCache - C:\Program Files (x86)\CentraStage\CagService.exe
1772644583|BAM|||\Device\HarddiskVolume3\Program Files (x86)\CentraStage\CagService.exe (S-1-5-18)

The epoch 1770623800 converts to 2026-02-09 07:56:40.

Q8.png

Warning: Timestamp stomping — The service was installed on 04/03, yet the modified timestamp reads 09/02 — three weeks earlier! The attacker backdated the files to look old and legitimate, obscuring the malware’s placement within the timeline. This timestamp inconsistency between install time and modified time is the key red flag.

Detection angle. Sysmon EID 2 (file creation time changed) is the direct signal. Without it, compare $STANDARD_INFORMATION against $FILE_NAME timestamps in the MFT — a mismatch is the tell.

3.10 Q9 — RMM Tool Company

Answer: Datto

Method — A simple web search. CentraStage is a product of Datto (Datto acquired CentraStage). Today it is also referred to as “Datto RMM”.

Tip: Common RMM tools abused in attacks include AnyDesk, TeamViewer, ScreenConnect, Atera, Splashtop, LogMeIn, and CentraStage/Datto RMM.

Detection angle. Inventory installed software: flag any RMM tool that is not on the approved list — Datto RMM, AnyDesk, ScreenConnect, Atera, Splashtop.

3.11 Q10 — Domain Registration Date

Answer: 2026-02-20 01:06:05

Method — WHOIS lookup for pomi.digital (GoDaddy WHOIS). The domain was registered ~2 weeks before the phishing campaign (04/03).

https://ie.godaddy.com/whois/results.aspx?domain=pomi.digital

Q10.png

Warning: Freshly registered, low-reputation domains are a red flag — they are often bulk-created for phishing and fast-flux infrastructure, and they make excellent indicators of compromise (IOCs).

Detection angle. Enrich every first-seen domain with registration age and alert below 30 days at the mail gateway and the proxy.

3.12 Q11 — Malware Alternative Name

Answer: 5bxrx.exe

Method — On the VirusTotal details page for SHA256 af240a2c2a..., the “Names” section lists every file name under which the malware has been observed. 5bxrx.exe is one of those.

Tip: Malware samples accumulate many names from different sources (sandboxes, AV vendors, other campaigns). Every one of them is a valid IOC for hunting across your environment.

Detection angle. Push every known alias to EDR filename telemetry and re-check the AV exclusion list for the same names.


4. Challenge Q&A Log

# Question Answer Method
1 Phishing email subject Special Party Invitation from JANET CARNAHAN EML headers
2 Malicious URI redirect https://pomi.digital/premium/windows_download.php Edge History → urls
3 Downloaded file name premium.exe Edge History → downloads_url_chains
4 Malware execution time (Amcache) 2026-03-04 16:44:33 UTC Amcache.hve via RegRipper
5 Malware SHA256 hash af240a2c2a4b42e3a130f47ccaab9aa2e20a1a586bc959ee9efd7475055ea7e3 MD5 from Amcache → VirusTotal
6 Defender scan start time 2026-03-04T16:48:00 Defender Operational EID 1000
7 RMM backdoor service name CentraStage System.evtx EID 7045
8 Modified timestamp (timestomping) 2026-02-09 07:56:40 UTC Shimcache / AppCompatCache
9 RMM tool company Datto OSINT
10 Domain registration date 2026-02-20 01:06:05 GoDaddy WHOIS
11 Malware alternative name 5bxrx.exe VirusTotal names

5. Incident Narrative

The intrusion started twelve days before the victim saw anything. On 2026-02-20 at 01:06 UTC someone registered pomi.digital through GoDaddy — a domain with no history, no content and no purpose other than to host the next step.

On 2026-03-04 at 14:48 UTC an email titled Special Party Invitation from JANET CARNAHAN arrived in CyberJunkie’s inbox. The display name promised a party; the link went to https://pomi.digital/premium/windows_download.php. Edge’s history shows the click, the redirect and the download that followed: premium.exe, saved to the Downloads folder.

For almost two hours nothing happened. Then at 16:44:33 UTC the binary executed — recorded in Amcache, which is how the moment can be pinned to the second. Twelve seconds later, at 16:44:45, Windows logged Event ID 7045: a new service called CentraStage had been installed from C:\Program Files (x86)\CentraStage\. CentraStage is Datto RMM — legitimate remote-management software, repurposed as a backdoor. From that point the attacker had a persistent remote channel into the host that would survive a reboot and blend into a software inventory.

At 16:48:00, just over three minutes after the service was installed, the victim ran a manual Defender scan. The operational log shows a scan start and a scan finish, but no detection event: the malware was already resident and the scan had nothing to match against.

What the attacker left behind was an attempt at cover. The CentraStage binaries carry a modified timestamp of 2026-02-09 07:56:40 UTC — three weeks before the service was installed, and eleven days before pomi.digital was even registered. A file cannot be older than the infrastructure it arrived from. That single inconsistency is what turns a routine “suspicious download” into a deliberate timestomping case.

The host was then triaged with KAPE and handed over. Everything above was reconstructed from six artifacts: one email, one SQLite database, two registry hives and two event logs.


6. Attack Timeline

Timestamp (UTC) Event Artifact ATT&CK
2026-02-09 07:56:40 (stomped) modified timestamp on CentraStage binaries Shimcache T1070.006
2026-02-20 01:06:05 pomi.digital domain registered WHOIS T1583.001
2026-03-04 14:48 Phishing email sent EML headers T1566.002
2026-03-04 ~14:48 User clicks link → redirect Edge History T1566.002
2026-03-04 ~14:48 premium.exe downloaded Edge downloads T1105
2026-03-04 16:44:33 premium.exe executed Amcache T1204.002
2026-03-04 16:44:45 CentraStage service installed System.evtx (7045) T1543.003
2026-03-04 16:48:00 Defender manual scan starts Defender Operational (1000) —

Note: Note on the timeline: register the domain (02/20) → stomp timestamps (02/09) → phish (03/04) → execute (03/04) → persist (03/04) → scan (03/04). The sequence of events is consistent with a pre-staged C2 domain and an attacker who actively tried to hide their persistence.


7. Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

7.1 File IOCs

Type Value Context
SHA256 af240a2c2a4b42e3a130f47ccaab9aa2e20a1a586bc959ee9efd7475055ea7e3 premium.exe — Q5
MD5 405481d3d5529445c546d4429b72c5827ebde840 Amcache record for premium.exe — Q5
File Name premium.exe Dropper downloaded from the phishing link — Q3
File Name 5bxrx.exe Alternative name observed on VirusTotal — Q11
File Path C:\Program Files (x86)\CentraStage\ Persistence directory, timestomped — Q8

7.2 Network IOCs

Type Value Context
Domain pomi.digital Redirect and payload host, registered 2026-02-20 — Q2, Q10
URL https://pomi.digital/premium/windows_download.php Payload delivery — Q2

7.3 Behavioral IOCs

Type Value Context
Service CentraStage RMM backdoor installed as a Windows service — Q7
Email Subject Special Party Invitation from JANET CARNAHAN Phishing lure — Q1
Timestamp Anomaly Modified time 2026-02-09 on files installed 2026-03-04 Timestomping — Q8
Log Absence Defender scan at 16:48:00 with no detection event Evasion success — Q6

8. Detection Opportunities

Source What to look for Why it matters
Proxy / DNS Resolutions to domains registered in the last 30 days pomi.digital was 12 days old at delivery
Sysmon EID 1 / Security 4688 premium.exe executed from \Downloads\ Execution of the dropper
Sysmon EID 15 .exe written with Zone.Identifier under Downloads Browser-delivered payload with MOTW
System.evtx EID 7045 New service with ImagePath under Program Files (x86) RMM persistence
Sysmon EID 13 / registry HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\CentraStage Service registration
Sysmon EID 2 File creation time changed Timestomping
Defender Operational EID 1000/1001 Scan started and finished with no 1116 Manual scan that found nothing
Software inventory Unapproved RMM (Datto RMM, AnyDesk, ScreenConnect, Atera) Dual-use tooling

9. MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

TTP ID Tactic Technique Evidence
T1583.001 Resource Development Acquire Infrastructure: Domains pomi.digital registered 2026-02-20
T1566.002 Initial Access Phishing: Spearphishing Link Email with a redirect to pomi.digital
T1204.002 Execution User Execution: Malicious File premium.exe executed 2026-03-04 16:44:33
T1543.003 Persistence Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service CentraStage service, EID 7045
T1070.006 Defense Evasion Indicator Removal: Timestomp Modified time three weeks before install
T1105 Command and Control Ingress Tool Transfer premium.exe downloaded from pomi.digital
T1219 Command and Control Remote Access Software Datto RMM / CentraStage

10. Conclusions & Recommendations

10.1 Incident Summary

What Happened A user executed a phishing-delivered binary, which installed Datto RMM as a Windows service within twelve seconds, giving the attacker a persistent remote channel.
Root Cause Spearphishing link leading to user execution of premium.exe from the Downloads folder; no application control or reputation check intercepted it.
Impact Assessment Confidentiality: High — RMM gives remote access to the host and the logged-on user’s context. Integrity: High — the binaries were modified on disk to backdate their timestamps. Availability: Medium — no destructive action observed, but remote control permits it.

10.2 Recommendations

Priority Timeframe Recommendation
Immediate Within 24h Block pomi.digital at DNS and proxy; hunt the SHA256, premium.exe and 5bxrx.exe across the estate
High Within 7 days Remove the CentraStage service from any host that should not have it; audit the RMM inventory
Medium Within 30 days Alert on EID 7045 for services outside an approved list; enable Sysmon EID 2 to catch timestomping
Low Within 90 days Enforce Mark-of-the-Web handling for browser downloads; phishing awareness for the delivery pattern
Strategic Ongoing Build detection content for RMM abuse and timestamp inconsistency, not just file hashes

11. Analyst Notes & Learning

11.1 What I Did Well

Anchored every stage of the attack to a specific artifact before drawing a conclusion, so the timeline is reproducible rather than remembered.

11.2 Key Takeaways

  1. Follow the natural attack flow: email → browser → execution → persistence. Anchoring each stage to an artifact builds a solid timeline.
  2. Amcache for execution evidence, Shimcache/AppCompatCache for timestamps.
  3. Event ID 7045 = new service → always check for RMM tools when you see it.
  4. Timestamp inconsistencies (modified earlier than install/created) = red flag for timestomping.
  5. Freshly registered domains (< 30 days old) are suspicious infrastructure.
  6. VirusTotal provides all hashes and alternative file names for a sample — pivot to it early.

11.3 New Techniques

Pivoting MD5 from Amcache to SHA256 through VirusTotal, and using WHOIS registration age as a first-class triage signal.


12. References