Solved Jinkies from Hack The Box!
| Field | Details |
|---|---|
| Case Reference | HTB-SHRLCK-JINKIES |
| Platform | Hack The Box — Sherlock |
| Category | DFIR — Shared-Folder Abuse & Data Exfiltration |
| Difficulty | — |
| Date Opened | 2023-10-06 |
| Severity | High |
| Status | Closed — training scenario |
| Host | Velma’s workstation (VELMAD100) |
| Evidence | Registry hives (SYSTEM, SAM, NTUSER.DAT), $MFT, Chrome History |
| Tools | RegRipper, impacket-secretsdump, MFT Explorer, chainsaw, Splunk, strings |
1. Executive Summary
On 2023-10-06 an attacker gained access to Velma’s workstation (VELMAD100) via RDP from 192.168.157.151, using credentials recovered from a MySQL .ibd file (bk_db.ibd) containing 216 user records. The attacker’s password (peakTwins2023fc) matched Velma’s NT hash (967452709ae89eaeef4e2c951c3882ce), confirming password reuse. The attacker enumerated accounts, opened a Python file in VSCode, visited pastes.io (likely data exfiltration), and created learn.txt containing the handle pwnmaster12 before deleting it (recovered via MFT). The shared folders C:\Users and C:\Users\Velma\Documents (with “Everyone” full control) enabled the initial access. The entire chain was reconstructed from registry hives, MFT, and Chrome History.
1.1 Incident Summary
| Field | Details |
|---|---|
| Incident Type | Shared-folder abuse → credential theft → RDP access → data exfiltration |
| Initial Access | Credentials from bk_db.ibd (MySQL InnoDB tablespace) — password reuse |
| Discovery | Registry/MFT/Chrome History forensics |
| First Execution | 2023-10-06 17:15:56 UTC (first network logon) |
| Persistence | None observed |
| Overall Severity | High |
1.2 Key Findings
- Shared folders:
C:\UsersandC:\Users\Velma\Documents(Permissions 0 = Everyone full access). - Credentials leaked via
bk_db.ibd(MySQL InnoDB) — 216 user records. - Velma’s password
peakTwins2023fcmatched her NT hash967452709ae89eaeef4e2c951c3882ce(hashcat-confirmed). - Attacker RDP’d from
192.168.157.151at 17:17:23 UTC (first interactive logon). - First command:
whoamiat 17:17:45 UTC. - VSCode opened
Version-1.0.1 - TERMINAL LOGIN.py; Chrome visitedpastes.io. - Deleted file
learn.txtrecovered via MFT — contained handlepwnmaster12.
2. Investigation Scope & Artifacts
2.1 Artifacts Analyzed
| Artifact | Format | What it answers |
|---|---|---|
| SYSTEM hive | Registry hive | Shared folders (LanmanServer\Shares) — Q1 |
| NTUSER.DAT (Velma) | Registry hive | RecentDocs (recently accessed .ibd files) — Q2 |
bk_db.ibd |
MySQL InnoDB tablespace | 216 user credentials — Q3/Q5 |
| SAM hive | Registry hive | NT hashes (Velma: 96745270…) — Q4 |
| Security Event Log | EVTX | Logon events (4624, LogonType 3/10) — Q6 |
| Sysmon Event Log | EVTX | Process creation (Event ID 1) — Q7/Q8 |
| Chrome History | SQLite | pastes.io visit — Q9 |
$MFT |
Master File Table | Deleted learn.txt recovery — Q10 |
2.2 Tools & Methods
| Tool | Purpose |
|---|---|
RegRipper (shares, recentdocs plugins) |
Registry hive analysis |
| impacket-secretsdump | Offline SAM hash extraction |
| hashcat | NT hash verification |
strings, grep, regex |
Credential extraction from .ibd |
| chainsaw | EVTX parsing |
| Splunk | Process creation queries (Sysmon ID 1) |
| MFT Explorer | Deleted file recovery |
| sqlite3 | Chrome History analysis |
3. Technical Analysis
3.1 Scenario
Investigation of shared-folder abuse and data exfiltration. Credentials were leaked via a MySQL .ibd file, enabling RDP access to Velma’s workstation. The attacker enumerated accounts, opened files in VSCode, visited pastes.io, and created/deleted learn.txt (handle pwnmaster12).
3.2 Q1 — Which folders were shared on the host?
Answer: C:\Users, C:\Users\Velma\Documents
Using RegRipper shares plugin on the SYSTEM hive:
$ regripper -r Jinkies_KAPE_output/TriageData/C/Windows/system32/config/SYSTEM -p shares
RegRipper shares output:
- Permissions 0 = Everyone (full access) — CRITICAL exposure
- Permissions 9 = Read + Full Control — exposes all files in Documents
MITRE ATT&CK: T1135 (Network Share Discovery).
Detection angle. RegRipper shares plugin on SYSTEM hive — enumerates shared folders even when share events (5140/5142/5143) are absent.
3.3 Q2 — What was the file that gave the attacker access to the user’s account?
Answer: bh_db.ibd
Using RegRipper’s recentdocs plugin on Velma’s NTUSER.DAT:
$ regripper -r NTUSER.DAT -p recentdocs
The output shows recently accessed .ibd files (MySQL InnoDB tablespace):
.ibd
LastWrite Time: 2023-09-20 13:05:17Z
MRUListEx = 1,0
1 = bk_db.ibd
0 = login.ibd
The Most Recently Used List Extended order shows bk_db.ibd as the most recently accessed, containing user credentials. (Note: Q2 asks for bh_db.ibd but the recentdocs output references bk_db.ibd and login.ibd.)
Detection angle. RegRipper recentdocs plugin on NTUSER.DAT — reveals recently accessed .ibd files.
3.4 Q3 — How many user credentials were found in the file?
Answer: 216
Use strings to extract readable text from the binary .ibd file, then count email addresses using regex:
$ strings bk_db.ibd | grep -cE '[a-zA-Z0-9._%+-]+@[a-zA-Z0-9.-]+\.[a-zA-Z]{2,}'
216
Detection angle. strings + email regex on a .ibd file — counts leaked credentials.
3.5 Q4 — What is the NT Hash of the user’s password?
Answer: 967452709ae89eaeef4e2c951c3882ce
NT hashes (NTLM hashes) are stored in the SAM (Security Account Manager) registry hive, protected by the SYSTEM hive. To extract them offline, we need both the SAM and SYSTEM hives (and optionally SECURITY).
Locate the registry hives in the triage data:
TriageData/C/Windows/system32/config/SYSTEM
TriageData/C/Windows/system32/config/SAM
TriageData/C/Windows/system32/config/SECURITY
Extract hashes using impacket-secretsdump:
$ sudo impacket-secretsdump \
-system TriageData/C/Windows/system32/config/SYSTEM \
-sam TriageData/C/Windows/system32/config/SAM \
-security TriageData/C/Windows/system32/config/SECURITY \
LOCAL
From the output, all local accounts are listed. The NT hash for Velma (RID 1002) is: 967452709ae89eaeef4e2c951c3882ce.
Detection angle. impacket-secretsdump on SAM+SYSTEM hives — offline NT hash extraction.
3.6 Q5 — Is the user’s computer password the same as the password found in the .ibd file?
Answer: Yes
Step 1 — Extract Velma’s credentials from the .ibd file:
$ strings bk_db.ibd | grep gmail | grep velma
The output reveals Velma’s record from the logon website database:
peakTwins2023fc velma.dinkley@gmail.com velmavelma dinkley
The password stored in the database is: peakTwins2023fc.
Step 2 — Verify against the NT hash using hashcat:
# hashes.txt contains: 967452709ae89eaeef4e2c951c3882ce
# password_Test.txt contains: peakTwins2023fc
$ hashcat hashes.txt password_Test.txt
Hashcat confirms the match:
967452709ae89eaeef4e2c951c3882ce:peakTwins2023fc
Status: Cracked
The password reuse confirms that the credentials leaked via the .ibd file were used for local account access.
Detection angle. hashcat verification of extracted password against NT hash — confirms password reuse.
3.7 Q6 — What was the time the attacker first interactively logged on to our user’s host?
Answer: 2023-10-06 17:17:23 UTC
To determine when the attacker first interactively logged on, we analyzed Windows Security Event Log Event ID 4624 (Successful Logon). The key field is LogonType: 2 = Interactive (local console), 3 = Network, 10 = RemoteInteractive (RDP), 5 = Service.
Extract Security Event 4624 logs and filter for user Velma with LogonType 3 or 10. Looking at Velma’s logon events:
17:15:56— LogonType 3 from 192.168.157.151 (network logon, likely SMB share access)17:16:09— LogonType 3 from 192.168.157.15117:17:23— LogonType 3 from local (no IP) — first interactive logon17:17:24— LogonType 10 (RDP) from 192.168.157.151
The first interactive logon occurs at 2023-10-06 17:17:23 UTC.
Detection angle. EID 4624 LogonType 3 (local, no IP) followed by LogonType 10 (RDP) — interactive logon identification.
3.8 Q7 — What’s the first command the attacker issues into the Command Line?
Answer: whoami
Identify attacker logon time (17:17:23 from Q6), then search Sysmon Event ID 1 for processes after that time, filtering by user VELMAD100\Velma and parent cmd.exe. Sort by timestamp — first entry is the answer.
Output: 2023-10-06T17:17:45.697Z: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe --> C:\Windows\System32\whoami.exe. The attacker ran whoami at 17:17:45 to verify their user context.
Detection angle. Sysmon EID 1 after the interactive logon, filtered by cmd.exe parent — first attacker command.
3.9 Q8 — What is the name of the file that the attacker opens in VSCode shortly before launching the web browser?
Answer: Version-1.0.1 - TERMINAL LOGIN.py
Using Splunk to search the chainsaw JSON output for VSCode process creation (Event ID 1, user Velma, parent VSCode). The result shows VSCode was launched with the file Version-1.0.1 - TERMINAL LOGIN.py as an argument.
Detection angle. Sysmon EID 1 with parent Code.exe — file opened in VSCode.
3.10 Q9 — What’s the domain name of the location the attacker likely exfiltrated the file to?
Answer: pastes.io
Since no DNS events (Sysmon Event ID 22) were captured, we turn to Chrome browsing history to identify where data was exfiltrated:
$ sqlite3 History "SELECT url, last_visit_time FROM urls WHERE url LIKE '%paste%' ORDER BY last_visit_time DESC;"
Chrome history shows a visit to pastes.io at 17:19:35 UTC. pastes.io is a paste site commonly used for sharing text anonymously. Attackers leverage such services to exfiltrate stolen data without requiring authentication or leaving traces on their own infrastructure. This maps to MITRE ATT&CK T1567 (Exfiltration Over Web Service).
Detection angle. Chrome History SQLite query for %paste% URLs — exfiltration via paste site.
3.11 Q10 — What is the handle of the attacker?
Answer: pwnmaster12
Step 1 — Identify suspicious files via RecentDocs: RegRipper recentdocs plugin on Velma’s NTUSER.DAT shows learn.txt at 17:23:50 UTC — created shortly after the attacker gained access.
Step 2 — Locate the deleted file via MFT Explorer: Since learn.txt does not appear in the TriageData file system (deleted by the attacker), use MFT Explorer to scan the MFT for the file record. The file was located at C:\Users\Velma\Pictures\learn.txt.
Step 3 — Read file contents from MFT: MFT Explorer reveals the contents of the deleted file: pwnmaster12.
Detection angle. MFT recovery of deleted learn.txt — attacker handle pwnmaster12.
4. Challenge Q&A Log
| # | Question | Answer | Method |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Shared folders on the host | C:\Users, C:\Users\Velma\Documents |
RegRipper shares |
| 2 | File giving attacker access | bh_db.ibd (MySQL InnoDB) |
RegRipper recentdocs |
| 3 | User credentials in the file | 216 |
strings + email regex |
| 4 | NT Hash of the user’s password | 967452709ae89eaeef4e2c951c3882ce |
impacket-secretsdump |
| 5 | Computer password same as .ibd password? |
Yes (peakTwins2023fc) |
hashcat verification |
| 6 | First interactive logon time (UTC) | 2023-10-06 17:17:23 |
EID 4624 (LogonType 3/10) |
| 7 | First command issued | whoami |
Sysmon EID 1 |
| 8 | File opened in VSCode | Version-1.0.1 - TERMINAL LOGIN.py |
Splunk (Sysmon EID 1) |
| 9 | Exfiltration domain | pastes.io |
Chrome History (sqlite3) |
| 10 | Attacker handle | pwnmaster12 |
MFT recovery of learn.txt |
5. Incident Narrative
On 2023-10-06 an attacker gained access to Velma’s workstation (VELMAD100) via RDP from 192.168.157.151, using credentials recovered from a MySQL .ibd file (bk_db.ibd) containing 216 user records. The attacker’s password (peakTwins2023fc) matched Velma’s NT hash (967452709ae89eaeef4e2c951c3882ce), confirming password reuse. The attacker enumerated accounts, opened a Python file in VSCode, visited pastes.io (likely data exfiltration), and created learn.txt containing the handle pwnmaster12 before deleting it (recovered via MFT). The shared folders C:\Users and C:\Users\Velma\Documents (with “Everyone” full control) enabled the initial access. The entire chain was reconstructed from registry hives, MFT, and Chrome History.
6. Attack Timeline
| Timestamp (UTC) | Event | Artifact | ATT&CK |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2023-09-20 10:28:14 | Shared folders configured (Users, Documents) | Registry: LanmanServer\Shares | T1135 |
| 2023-09-20 13:05:17 | Velma accesses .ibd database files |
RecentDocs | T1083 |
| 2023-10-06 17:15:56 | First network logon from 192.168.157.151 (LogonType 3) | Security Event 4624 | T1078 |
| 2023-10-06 17:16:09 | Second network logon | Security Event 4624 | T1078 |
| 2023-10-06 17:17:23 | Interactive logon (LogonType 3) — LogonId: 0x3e4 | Security Event 4624 | T1021.001 |
| 2023-10-06 17:17:24 | RDP session established (LogonType 10) — LogonId: 0x20f48f7 | Security Event 4624 | T1021.001 |
| 2023-10-06 17:17:25 | Windows session initialization (explorer.exe, userinit.exe) | Sysmon Event 1 | — |
| 2023-10-06 17:17:43 | Attacker opens cmd.exe | Sysmon Event 1 | T1059.003 |
| 2023-10-06 17:17:45 | First command: whoami |
Sysmon Event 1 | T1033 |
| 2023-10-06 17:17:52 | Account enumeration: net group |
Sysmon Event 1 | T1087 |
| 2023-10-06 17:17:56 | User enumeration: net users |
Sysmon Event 1 | T1087 |
| 2023-10-06 17:18:26 | Opens VSCode with Version-1.0.1 - TERMINAL LOGIN.py |
Sysmon Event 1 | T1083 |
| 2023-10-06 17:18:41 | Launches Chrome browser | Sysmon Event 1 | — |
| 2023-10-06 17:19:35 | Visits pastes.io (data exfiltration) |
Chrome History | T1567 |
| 2023-10-06 17:21:44 | Accesses Version-1.0.1 - TERMINAL LOGIN.py again |
RecentDocs (.py) | T1083 |
| 2023-10-06 17:23:50 | Creates learn.txt containing handle pwnmaster12 |
RecentDocs (.txt) | T1083 |
| 2023-10-06 17:37:33 | Last RecentDocs timestamp | NTUSER.DAT | — |
| (post-attack) | Attacker deletes learn.txt to cover tracks |
MFT recovery | T1070.004 |
7. Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)
7.1 File IOCs
| Type | Value | Context |
|---|---|---|
| File Name | bk_db.ibd |
MySQL InnoDB tablespace with 216 credentials — Q2/Q3 |
| File Name | learn.txt |
Deleted file containing attacker handle pwnmaster12 — Q10 |
| File Path | C:\Users\Velma\Pictures\learn.txt |
Deleted file location — Q10 |
| File Name | Version-1.0.1 - TERMINAL LOGIN.py |
File opened in VSCode — Q8 |
7.2 Network IOCs
| Type | Value | Context |
|---|---|---|
| IP Address | 192.168.157.151 |
Attacker IP (RDP source) — Q6 |
| Domain | pastes.io |
Exfiltration destination — Q9 |
7.3 Behavioral IOCs
| Type | Value | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Account | Velma |
Compromised account (password reuse) |
| NT Hash | 967452709ae89eaeef4e2c951c3882ce |
Velma’s NT hash — Q4 |
| Password | peakTwins2023fc |
Velma’s password (from .ibd file) — Q5 |
| Handle | pwnmaster12 |
Attacker’s handle — Q10 |
| Share | C:\Users, C:\Users\Velma\Documents |
Shared folders with “Everyone” full control — Q1 |
| LogonType | 3 (Network) then 10 (RDP) | Interactive logon pattern — Q6 |
8. Detection Opportunities
| Source | What to look for | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|
| Registry (SYSTEM hive) | Shares under LanmanServer\Shares with Permissions=0 (Everyone full control) |
Overly permissive shares — Q1 |
| Registry (NTUSER.DAT) | RegRipper recentdocs showing .ibd file access |
Credential database access — Q2 |
| SAM hive (secretsdump) | NT hashes for local accounts — cross-check against leaked passwords | Password reuse detection — Q4/Q5 |
| Windows Security (EID 4624) | LogonType 3 (network) followed by LogonType 10 (RDP) from external IP | Interactive logon pattern — Q6 |
| Sysmon EID 1 | whoami, net group, net users after RDP logon |
Post-exploitation enumeration — Q7 |
| Chrome History | Visits to paste sites (pastes.io) |
Data exfiltration — Q9 |
| MFT | Deleted files (learn.txt) recovered from MFT |
Anti-forensics (file deletion) — Q10 |
9. MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
| TTP ID | Tactic | Technique | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| T1135 | Discovery | Network Share Discovery | Shared folders enumerated via registry — Q1 |
| T1083 | Discovery | File and Directory Discovery | .ibd file access via RecentDocs — Q2 |
| T1078 | Defense Evasion | Valid Accounts | Password reuse (Velma’s creds from .ibd) — Q5 |
| T1021.001 | Lateral Movement | Remote Services: RDP | RDP session from 192.168.157.151 — Q6 |
| T1033 | Discovery | System Owner/User Discovery | whoami — Q7 |
| T1087 | Discovery | Account Discovery | net group, net users — Q7 |
| T1567 | Exfiltration | Exfiltration Over Web Service | pastes.io visit — Q9 |
| T1070.004 | Defense Evasion | Indicator Removal: File Deletion | learn.txt deleted (recovered via MFT) — Q10 |
10. Conclusions & Recommendations
10.1 Incident Summary
| What Happened | An attacker exploited shared folders with “Everyone” full control to access a MySQL .ibd file containing 216 credentials. Velma’s password (peakTwins2023fc) was reused for her local account, enabling RDP access. The attacker enumerated accounts, opened files in VSCode, visited pastes.io (likely exfiltration), and created/deleted learn.txt (handle pwnmaster12). |
|---|---|
| Root Cause | Overly permissive shared folders (Everyone full control) exposed credential databases; password reuse between the .ibd file and the local account. |
| Impact Assessment | Confidentiality: High — 216 credentials leaked, Velma’s account compromised. Integrity: Medium — learn.txt created/deleted. Availability: Low — no service disruption. |
10.2 Recommendations
| Priority | Timeframe | Recommendation |
|---|---|---|
| Immediate | Within 24h | Disable Velma’s account; remove “Everyone” full control from shared folders; block 192.168.157.151 |
| High | Within 7 days | Reset all 216 passwords from the .ibd file; review .ibd file access; check for data exfiltration to pastes.io |
| Medium | Within 30 days | Alert on EID 4624 LogonType 3/10 from external IPs; alert on MFT recovery of deleted files; monitor Chrome for paste-site visits |
| Low | Within 90 days | User awareness for password reuse; restrict shared folder permissions |
| Strategic | Ongoing | File integrity monitoring on shared folders; centralized log collection for registry/MFT events |
11. Analyst Notes & Learning
11.1 What I Did Well
Correlated registry hives (SYSTEM shares, NTUSER.DAT RecentDocs, SAM) with MFT recovery and Chrome History to reconstruct the full attack chain. Used hashcat to confirm password reuse between the .ibd file and the local account.
11.2 Key Takeaways
- Overly permissive shares (“Everyone” full control) are a critical exposure — they allow access to credential databases.
- Password reuse between application databases and OS accounts enables lateral movement.
- MFT recovery can retrieve deleted files even when they don’t appear in the file system.
- Chrome History is a valuable artifact for identifying exfiltration destinations when DNS events are absent.
- RecentDocs in NTUSER.DAT reveals recently accessed files, including
.ibddatabase files.
11.3 New Techniques
RegRipper shares/recentdocs plugins, impacket-secretsdump for offline SAM hash extraction, hashcat NT hash verification, MFT Explorer for deleted file recovery, and Chrome History SQLite analysis for exfiltration destinations.
12. References
- Jinkies — Hack The Box Sherlock
- MITRE ATT&CK — T1135 Network Share Discovery
- MITRE ATT&CK — T1078 Valid Accounts
- MITRE ATT&CK — T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service
- MITRE ATT&CK — T1070.004 File Deletion
- RegRipper
- impacket-secretsdump
- MFT Explorer (Eric Zimmerman)
HTB Sherlock · Jinkies · DFIR · 2023-10-06