Liberty Sherlock Walkthrough

Solved Liberty from Hack The Box!

Field Details
Case Reference HTB-SHRLCK-LIBERTY
Platform Hack The Box — Sherlock
Category DFIR — Password Spraying & Forced Authentication
Difficulty Medium
Date Opened 2025-06-11
Severity High
Status Closed — training scenario
Host LIBERYSV08
Stack KAPE FILES, Windows Event Logs, Sysmon
Tools chainsaw, hayabusa, splunk, MFTcmd, regripper

Liberty launched a massive project with a budget exceeding $100 million, with the goal of granting true freedom to humanity. One day, a system administrator discovered a shared folder configured with “Full Control” permissions granted to “Everyone”, raising concerns about a potential security incident. You have been tasked with investigating evidence collected from the affected endpoint. Threat Intelligence previously identified that an employee’s credentials were harvested by a RedLine Stealer, suspected to have been used for initial access.

Before the investigation, the EVTX files were exported to a single JSON format and a Hayabusa CSV timeline was generated:

$ chainsaw dump --extension evtx --skip-errors ../Windows/System32/winevt/logs/ -j -o chainsaw_dump.json
$ hayabusa csv-timeline -d ../Windows/System32/winevt/logs/ -U -o hayabusa_timeline.csv

1. Executive Summary

On 2025-06-11 an attacker conducted a password spraying attack against LIBERYSV08 from 192.168.189.129, identifying v.hunter as a valid credential. Using forced NTLM authentication via a crafted Proposal.url file (UNC path \\192.168.189.129\%USERNAME%.icon), the attacker captured the Net-NTLMv2 hash, then established an RDP session as v.hunter. They discovered C:\ProjectArk, archived it as arkproj.zip (~783 KB), uploaded it to yourc2filemanager.cn, and created a backdoor account t.minami with PowerShell Web Access (PSWA) over WinRM (port 5985) for persistent browser-based access.

This report reconstructs the intrusion from KAPE triage artifacts, Windows Event Logs, MFT/USN journal, SYSTEM/SAM hives and browser history.

1.1 Incident Summary

Field Details
Incident Type Password spraying → forced authentication → data exfiltration → backdoor persistence
Initial Access Password spraying (5 attempts) identifying v.hunter
Discovery System administrator noticed a share with “Full Control” for “Everyone”
First Execution 2025-06-11 14:35:56 UTC (password spray burst)
Persistence Backdoor account t.minami in “Remote Management Users” + PSWA over WinRM
Overall Severity High

1.2 Key Findings

  • 5 failed logon attempts in one second from 192.168.189.129 (password spraying), then a successful logon as v.hunter.
  • A crafted Proposal.url file in the Proposal share forced NTLM authentication to \\192.168.189.129\%USERNAME%.icon, capturing a Net-NTLMv2 hash (T1187).
  • The attacker established an RDP session as v.hunter at 14:44:48 UTC.
  • C:\ProjectArk was archived as arkproj.zip (783,907 bytes) and uploaded to yourc2filemanager.cn.
  • A backdoor account t.minami was created and added to “Remote Management Users”; PSWA access confirmed at 14:54:55 UTC over WinRM port 5985.
  • The ProjectArk share was created by the attacker at the system root for data staging.

2. Investigation Scope & Artifacts

2.1 Artifacts Analyzed

Artifact Format What it answers
chainsaw_dump.json JSON (exported EVTX) All Windows events (4624/4625/4634/4732/4738) — Q1, Q2, Q9, Q14, Q17
hayabusa_timeline.csv CSV timeline Quick-win detection timeline
$MFT Master File Table File creation in Proposal/ProjectArk, arkproj.zip — Q4, Q10, Q11, Q12, Q20
$J (USN Journal) USN journal arkproj.zip creation — Q11
SYSTEM hive Registry hive Shares (Proposal/Users/ProjectArk) — Q3, Q20
SAM hive Registry hive Full names of user accounts — Q8
Edge History (k.texus) SQLite Upload URL yourc2filemanager.cn — Q13
PowerShell ConsoleHost_history.txt (k.texus) Text Full attacker command chain — Q14, Q15
Microsoft-Windows-PowerShellWebAccess/Operational log EVTX PSWA session events (784/769/770) — Q17, Q18, Q19

2.2 Tools & Methods

Tool Purpose
chainsaw Dump EVTX to JSON
hayabusa CSV timeline generation
splunk Querying chainsaw_dump.json
MFTECmd / MFTcmd Parse $MFT and $J (USN journal)
Timeline Explorer Filter MFT/USN output
regripper Parse SYSTEM (shares) and SAM (user names) hives
strings Extract URLs from Edge History
jq Filter JSON event data

3. Technical Analysis

3.1 Scenario

Password spraying leading to backdoor access on LIBERYSV08. An employee’s credentials were harvested by a RedLine Stealer and used for initial access. The threat actor conducted password spraying, forced NTLM authentication via a crafted .url file, established RDP, exfiltrated ProjectArk data, and created a PSWA backdoor account.

3.2 Q1 — You suspect that a threat actor might conduct password spraying attack on this server. How many failed logon attempts identified before successfully identifying the correct pair of the credential?

Answer: 5

A password spraying attack involves trying a single password against multiple usernames to avoid account lockouts. We filtered for EventID 4625 (failed logon) and looked for a burst of attempts in a short timeframe from the same source IP.

$ cat chainsaw_dump.json | jq -r '.[] | select(.Event.System.EventID==4625) | "\(.Event.System.TimeCreated_attributes.SystemTime) --> \(.Event.EventData.TargetUserName) --> \(.Event.EventData.IpAddress)"'

The output reveals 5 failed logon attempts at 2025-06-11 14:35:56 originating from 192.168.189.129, each targeting a different username (t.miami, a.kimaga, y.wsasua, k.tasaga, n.nokoda) within the same second — a clear indicator of password spraying.

image.png

MITRE ATT&CK: T1110.003 — Brute Force: Password Spraying

Adversaries use a single or small list of commonly used passwords against many different accounts to acquire valid credentials without triggering account lockouts.

Detection angle. Burst of EID 4625 from one IP targeting multiple usernames within the same second — password spraying.

3.3 Q2 — What is the user that was identified by the threat actor?

Answer: v.hunter

Following the failed attempts, we filtered for EventID 4624 (successful logon) excluding noise accounts (SYSTEM), looking for a success event close to the spray timestamp.

cat chainsaw_dump.json | jq -r '.[] | select(.Event.System.EventID==4624 and .Event.EventData.TargetUserName!="SYSTEM") | "\(.Event.System.TimeCreated_attributes.SystemTime) --> \(.Event.EventData.TargetUserName) --> \(.Event.EventData.IpAddress)"'

image.png

The output shows v.hunter successfully authenticated from 192.168.189.129 at 2025-06-11T14:35:56, immediately following the spray burst — confirming this was the valid credential pair identified by the attacker.

MITRE ATT&CK: T1078 — Valid Accounts

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts to gain initial access, persistence, privilege escalation, or defense evasion.

Detection angle. EID 4624 success immediately following a spray burst from the same IP — compromised valid account.

3.4 Q3 — There is a shared folder that can be accessed by all users. What is the name of this shared folder?

Answer: Proposal

Since EventID 5140/5142/5143 (network share events) were absent, we pivoted to the SYSTEM registry hive where Windows stores share definitions under ControlSet001\Services\LanmanServer\Shares. We parsed it using regripper:

$ regripper -r Windows/System32/config/SYSTEM -p shares
  Proposal
    MaxUses=5
    Permissions=9
    Remark=This share is used to store project proposal and allow anyone on this computer to put a file to it and Texus will review them

  Users
    MaxUses=4294967295
    Permissions=0

  ProjectArk
    MaxUses=4294967295
    Permissions=0

The output revealed three shares: Proposal, Users, ProjectArk. The Proposal share is accessible by all users based on its remark. Permissions=9 means read-only for everyone; MaxUses=5 limits concurrent connections.

MITRE ATT&CK: T1135 — Network Share Discovery

Adversaries may look for folders and drives shared on remote systems to identify sources of information and potential systems of interest for lateral movement.

Detection angle. regripper shares plugin on the SYSTEM hive — enumerate shares even when share events are absent.

3.5 Q4 — The threat actor uploaded several files to the previously identified shared folder. One of these files can be used to capture the hash of a user who opens it. What is the name of that file?

Answer: Proposal.url

To find files uploaded to the Proposal share, we parsed the $MFT using MFTECmd and Timeline Explorer:

& 'C:\Tools\Eric Zimmerman\net9\MFTECmd.exe' -f '.\$MFT' --csv

image.png

The MFT revealed proposal.url (type DowWindows) created on 2025-06-11 14:39:14 inside the Proposal share. A .url file is a Windows Internet Shortcut — when crafted with a UNC path pointing to an attacker-controlled server, it forces the victim’s machine to automatically attempt NTLM authentication upon opening, capturing the NTLM hash.

MITRE ATT&CK: T1187 — Forced Authentication

Adversaries may gather credential material by invoking or forcing a user to automatically provide authentication information through a mechanism in which they can intercept it.

Detection angle. $MFT entries for .url files in a shared folder — forced-authentication lure.

3.6 Q5 — What is the full URL used by threat actor to mimic the fake proposal of the project?

Answer: http://argonaut.ark/proposal.html

We extracted the content of proposal.url from the $MFT using strings:

$ strings -a \$MFT | grep -A 5 -B 5 -i "proposal"

image.png

The URL field points to a legitimate-looking webpage as a decoy. However the malicious part is the IconFile field — it points to a UNC path on the attacker’s machine at 192.168.189.129. When any user opens the .url file, Windows automatically attempts to load the icon by authenticating to \\192.168.189.129 via NTLM, sending the user’s hash to the attacker without any interaction beyond opening the file. The %USERNAME% variable identifies which user opened it.

MITRE ATT&CK: T1187 — Forced Authentication

Adversaries use UNC path injection via crafted files to force NTLM authentication to attacker-controlled infrastructure.

Detection angle. .url file with IconFile pointing to a UNC path (\\IP\…) — forced-authentication lure.

3.7 Q6 — What is the full UNC path of the network share that the threat actor used to capture hash of the victim?

Answer: \\192.168.189.129\%USERNAME%.icon

As identified in Q5, the proposal.url file contained a crafted IconFile field pointing to:

\\192.168.189.129\%USERNAME%.icon

When any user opens the file, Windows automatically attempts to load the icon resource from this UNC path, triggering an NTLM authentication request to the attacker’s machine at 192.168.189.129. The %USERNAME% variable dynamically resolves to the victim’s username.

MITRE ATT&CK: T1187 — Forced Authentication

Adversaries craft files containing UNC paths to attacker-controlled infrastructure to silently capture NTLM hashes.

Detection angle. UNC path \\192.168.x.x\%USERNAME%.* in a .url file’s IconFile — forced NTLM capture.

3.8 Q7 — What is the format of the hash that the threat actor captured via this method?

Answer: Net-NTLMv2

When a user opens the proposal.url file, Windows authenticates to the UNC path \\192.168.189.129\%USERNAME%.icon using the Net-NTLMv2 challenge-response protocol. The attacker’s machine (acting as a rogue SMB server, typically via Responder) intercepts this and captures the Net-NTLMv2 hash:

username::domain:challenge:HMAC-MD5:blob

This hash can then be:

  • Cracked offline using Hashcat with mode -m 5600
  • Relayed to other systems using ntlmrelayx

MITRE ATT&CK: T1187 — Forced Authentication

The captured Net-NTLMv2 hash can be used for offline password cracking or NTLM relay attacks.

Detection angle. Rogue SMB server (Responder) capturing Net-NTLMv2 — alert on inbound SMB auth from workstations to non-domain IPs.

3.9 Q8 — What is the full name of the second compromised user?

Answer: Kuneo Texus

We parsed the SAM registry hive using regripper:

regripper -r ../Windows/System32/config/SAM -p samparse | grep "Full Name"
Full Name       : Tiana Miami
Full Name       : Kuneo Texus
Full Name       : Ninomae Nodoka
Full Name       : Virakuya Hunter

The SAM hive stores local user account information including full names. Cross-referencing with earlier findings — the Proposal share remark mentioned “Texus will review them” — confirming Kuneo Texus (k.texus) is the victim who would open files placed in the Proposal share. This also aligns with the earlier EventID 4625 failed logon attempts targeting k.texus.

MITRE ATT&CK: T1589.003 — Gather Victim Identity Information: Employee Names

Adversaries may gather employee names for further reconnaissance or attack.

Detection angle. regripper samparse on SAM hive — enumerate local accounts and full names.

3.10 Q9 — When was the time that the threat actor connected to the server via RDP in UTC?

Answer: 2025-06-11 14:44:48

RDP logons are recorded as EventID 4624 with LogonType 10 (RemoteInteractive). We filtered in Splunk after the known attack timestamp:

index="main" source="chainsaw_dump.json"
| spath input=_raw output=EventID path="Event.System.EventID"
| spath input=_raw output=Timestamp path="Event.System.TimeCreated_attributes.SystemTime"
| spath input=_raw output=Username path="Event.EventData.TargetUserName"
| spath input=_raw output=Domain path="Event.EventData.TargetDomainName"
| spath input=_raw output=LogonType path="Event.EventData.LogonType"
| search EventID=4624 OR EventID=4625
| where Timestamp > "2025-06-11T14:34:00"
| where Domain="LIBERYSV08" AND LogonType=10
| where NOT match(Username, "DWM|UMFD|SYSTEM|ANONYMOUS|user")
| table Timestamp, Username, EventID, Domain, LogonType
| sort Timestamp

image.png

The results show the threat actor established an RDP session at 2025-06-11 14:44:48 UTC using the compromised v.hunter credentials — approximately 9 minutes after the initial password spray and successful logon at 14:35:56.

MITRE ATT&CK: T1021.001 — Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol

Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to log into a computer using RDP for lateral movement or further compromise.

Detection angle. EID 4624 LogonType 10 (RDP) with a non-system username after a spray — RDP access with compromised creds.

3.11 Q10 — The threat actor discovered a folder that stores files about the project. What is the full path of this folder?

Answer: C:\ProjectArk

We extracted folder names from the $MFT using strings, looking for project-related directory names:

strings -a '$MFT' | grep -iE "(project|ark)" | sort -u | head -30

The $MFT revealed C:\ProjectArk as a directory. This aligns with the earlier SYSTEM hive finding of a share named ProjectArk — confirming this is the local folder behind that share and the project folder the threat actor discovered and browsed after establishing RDP at 14:44:48.

MITRE ATT&CK: T1083 — File and Directory Discovery

Adversaries may enumerate files and directories to further their objectives after gaining access.

Detection angle. strings on $MFT for project-related directory names — file/directory discovery.

3.12 Q11 — The threat actor created an archive file containing all files of the previously identified folder. What is the name of this archive file?

Answer: arkproj.zip

Since no prefetch files were available and PowerShell logs didn’t capture the command, we pivoted to the USN Journal ($J) which tracks all file system operations including file creation:

MFTECmd.exe -f '$J' --csv C:\output --csvf journal_output.csv

Then opened journal_output.csv in Timeline Explorer and filtered for ark and zip, revealing arkproj.zip as a newly created archive file after the RDP session at 14:44:48. The filename arkproj references ProjectArk.

image.png

MITRE ATT&CK: T1560.001 — Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility

Adversaries may use utilities like zip to compress collected data prior to exfiltration.

Detection angle. USN Journal ($J) entries for .zip creation in a project folder — data staging.

3.13 Q12 — What is the total bytes of all files on that folder which were compressed into the previously identified archive file? (not including Zone Identifier)

Answer: 783907

To find the file sizes of all files in C:\ProjectArk, we parsed the $MFT using MFTECmd and opened the output in Timeline Explorer, filtering the ParentPath column for ProjectArk and excluding Zone.Identifier entries (NTFS ADS storing download origin metadata).

image.png

File Size (bytes)
diagram.png 286347
Project Ark Scope and Planing.docx 16395
Project Ark Scope and Planing.pdf 255143
Project Ark Present to board.pptx 74110
Strakeholders.xlsx 5380
Full timeline GANTT.xlsx 132675
Allocated Budget planning.xlsx 13857
Total 783907

MITRE ATT&CK: T1560.001 — Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility

Adversaries compress and archive collected data prior to exfiltration.

Detection angle. Sum of file sizes in $MFT for a project folder — quantifies exfiltration scope.

3.14 Q13 — The threat actor uploaded the previously identified file to a C2 website. What is the domain of this website?

Answer: yourc2filemanager.cn

Since the threat actor had an active RDP session, we investigated browser artifacts. We located the Microsoft Edge browser history file from the KAPE artifacts and extracted URLs using strings:

strings -a ../Users/k.texus/AppData/Local/Microsoft/Edge/User\ Data/Default/History | grep -iE "http://"

image.png

The output revealed the URL yourc2filemanager.cn — a domain consistent with a C2 file manager used for exfiltrating data. The threat actor used the compromised v.hunter RDP session to upload arkproj.zip to their C2 infrastructure via the Edge browser — blending exfiltration with normal web traffic.

MITRE ATT&CK: T1567 — Exfiltration Over Web Service

Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external web service to exfiltrate data rather than their primary C2 channel.

Detection angle. Edge History strings for upload-related domains — exfiltration over web service.

3.15 Q14 — While reviewing users on this server, you found a suspicious user. What is the name of this user?

Answer: t.minami

After establishing the RDP session, the threat actor used k.texus’s account to run PowerShell commands. We found the PowerShell Console History file:

cat ../Users/k.texus/AppData/Roaming/Microsoft/Windows/PowerShell/PSReadline/ConsoleHost_history.txt

The output revealed the full attack chain:

Install-WindowsFeature -Name WindowsPowerShellWebAccess -IncludeManagementTools
Install-PswaWebApplication -UseTestCertificate
Add-PswaAuthorizationRule -UserName * -ComputerName * -ConfigurationName *
Enable-PSRemoting -Force
Test-WSMan
Get-Service -Name WinRM
net localgroup "remote management users" t.minami /add
net user t.minami

image.png

The attacker:

  1. Installed PowerShell Web Access — enabling browser-based remote PowerShell access
  2. Enabled PSRemoting — allowing remote PowerShell sessions
  3. At 2025-06-11 14:53:33 (per EventID 4732) added t.minami to the Remote Management Users group — establishing a backdoor account

MITRE ATT&CK: T1136.001 — Create Account: Local Account

Adversaries may create a local account to maintain access without deploying remote access tools.

MITRE ATT&CK: T1078.003 — Valid Accounts: Local Accounts

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a local account to maintain persistent access.

Detection angle. ConsoleHost_history.txt revealing net user/net localgroup commands — backdoor account creation.

3.16 Q15 — The threat actor installed a web-based gateway as a backdoor to the server. What is the full command used to install this feature?

Answer: Install-WindowsFeature -Name WindowsPowerShellWebAccess -IncludeManagementTools

As identified in Q14, the PowerShell Console History revealed this was the first command the threat actor executed after gaining access. PowerShell Web Access (PSWA) is a legitimate Windows feature providing a web-based PowerShell console accessible through a browser. The threat actor installed it as a backdoor to maintain persistent remote access without needing traditional RDP, blending in with legitimate Windows features.

MITRE ATT&CK: T1505.004 — Server Software Component: IIS Components

Adversaries may install components on servers to establish persistent access using built-in features like PSWA.

MITRE ATT&CK: T1021.006 — Remote Services: Windows Remote Management

Adversaries may use WinRM to execute commands on remote systems.

Detection angle. ConsoleHost_history.txt containing Install-WindowsFeature -Name WindowsPowerShellWebAccess — PSWA backdoor installation.

3.17 Q16 — Which protocol has to be enabled to use this feature?

Answer: WinRM

As seen in the PowerShell Console History, the threat actor explicitly enabled and verified WinRM after installing PowerShell Web Access:

Enable-PSRemoting -Force
Test-WSMan
Get-Service -Name WinRM

WinRM (Windows Remote Management) is Microsoft’s implementation of the WS-Management protocol. It is a prerequisite for PowerShell Web Access as it handles the underlying remote communication. Enable-PSRemoting -Force configures and starts the WinRM service; Test-WSMan verifies the connection.

MITRE ATT&CK: T1021.006 — Remote Services: Windows Remote Management

Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to interact with remote systems using WinRM.

Detection angle. Enable-PSRemoting / Test-WSMan in console history — WinRM enablement for remote access.

3.18 Q17 — Provide the UTC timestamp when the threat actor confirmed successful backdoor access through the previously identified user account.

Answer: 2025-06-11 14:54:55

After adding t.minami to the Remote Management Users group at 14:53:33, the threat actor navigated to the PSWA web portal and authenticated as the backdoor user. The confirmation is captured in the Microsoft-Windows-PowerShellWebAccess/Operational log:

  • Event ID 784 (14:54:52) — PSWA authentication request for LIBERYSV08\t.minami
  • Event ID 769 (14:54:55) — Session successfully established
  • Event ID 770 (14:55:40) — Session closed via “User Signoff”
SessionId:    LIBERYSV08\t.minami.250611.075455
UserName:     LIBERYSV08\t.minami
OriginIP:     192.168.189.129
TargetNode:   localhost
Port:         5985
Config:       Microsoft.PowerShell

The short session (~45 seconds) and “User Signoff” end type indicate the threat actor logged in, verified access was working, and signed out — a classic access validation pattern. Standard 4624 logon events were insufficient because PSWA proxied the connection through IIS (w3wp.exe), resulting in Type 3 network logons with no remote IP; the true source IP (192.168.189.129) was only recorded in the PSWA operational log.

MITRE ATT&CK: T1078.003 — Valid Accounts: Local Accounts

The threat actor leveraged the backdoor account t.minami to confirm remote access through PSWA.

Detection angle. PSWA operational log Events 784/769/770 — PSWA authentication and session establishment.

3.19 Q18 — What is the Session ID of this connection?

Answer: LIBERYSV08\t.minami.250611.075455

The Session ID was recorded in PowerShell Web Access Event ID 769 at 2025-06-11 14:54:55. PSWA generates session identifiers using the format <Computer>\<Username>.<Date>.<Time>:

  • Computer: LIBERYSV08
  • User: t.minami (the backdoor account)
  • Date/Time: 250611.075455 (June 11, 2025 — reflects the server’s local time zone offset from UTC)

The same Session ID appears in Event ID 770 at 14:55:40 when the session was terminated via “User Signoff,” confirming the full lifecycle.

MITRE ATT&CK: T1021.006 — Remote Services: Windows Remote Management

The PSWA session operated over WinRM (port 5985). Tracking PSWA Session IDs enables correlation of authentication, command execution, and session termination events.

Detection angle. PSWA Session ID in Events 769/770 — correlate auth + termination for backdoor access.

3.20 Q19 — Provide the UTC timestamp when was this session terminated by the threat actor.

Answer: 2025-06-11 14:55:40

The session termination was captured in PowerShell Web Access Event ID 770:

SessionId:  LIBERYSV08\t.minami.250611.075455
EndType:    User Signoff

Short-lived sessions using newly created accounts are a common indicator of access testing during persistence establishment. The brief “connect and verify” pattern helps threat actors confirm their backdoor is operational while reducing the detection window.

MITRE ATT&CK: T1078.003 — Valid Accounts: Local Accounts

Detection angle. PSWA Event 770 with EndType: User Signoff — short-lived backdoor validation session.

3.21 Q20 — What is the name of the shared folder that was created by the threat actor during the invasion?

Answer: ProjectArk

The shared folder was identified through the SYSTEM registry hive at ControlSet\Services\LanmanServer\Shares using RegRipper’s shares plugin. Three shares were registered:

image.png

  • Users — default Windows share, not attacker-created
  • Proposal — has a legitimate business remark mentioning k.texus; limited to 5 connections; attacker-accessed
  • ProjectArk — no remark, unlimited connections, at C:\ root (unusual); suspicious

image.png

ProjectArk was mapped to C:\ProjectArk at the root of the system drive — an unusual location. Cross-referencing with the $MFT, the folder contained sensitive business documents. The MFT LastRecordChange timestamps for all files within ProjectArk were updated to 2025-06-11 14:56:25 — during the active intrusion — confirming the threat actor interacted with this share. The absence of a descriptive remark, root-level placement, and concentration of high-value business documents are consistent with a data staging share created for exfiltration.

MITRE ATT&CK: T1039 — Data from Network Shared Drive

Adversaries may search network shares on compromised computers to find files of interest. The threat actor created a dedicated shared folder named ProjectArk to consolidate and stage sensitive business documents.

Detection angle. regripper shares plugin — share with no remark at C:\ root with unlimited connections is suspicious.


4. Challenge Q&A Log

# Question Answer Method
1 Failed logon attempts before success 5 EID 4625 burst
2 User identified by attacker v.hunter EID 4624 success
3 Shared folder accessible by all users Proposal regripper shares
4 File capturing hash on open Proposal.url $MFT
5 Full URL mimicking fake proposal http://argonaut.ark/proposal.html strings on $MFT
6 UNC path for hash capture \\192.168.189.129\%USERNAME%.icon proposal.url content
7 Hash format captured Net-NTLMv2 Forced authentication
8 Full name of second compromised user Kuneo Texus regripper samparse
9 RDP connection time (UTC) 2025-06-11 14:44:48 EID 4624 LogonType 10
10 Project folder full path C:\ProjectArk strings on $MFT
11 Archive file name arkproj.zip USN Journal ($J)
12 Total bytes archived 783907 $MFT file sizes
13 C2 upload domain yourc2filemanager.cn Edge History strings
14 Suspicious backdoor user t.minami PowerShell Console History
15 Full command to install PSWA Install-WindowsFeature -Name WindowsPowerShellWebAccess -IncludeManagementTools Console History
16 Protocol required for PSWA WinRM Console History
17 PSWA backdoor access timestamp 2025-06-11 14:54:55 PSWA Operational log (EID 769)
18 PSWA Session ID LIBERYSV08\t.minami.250611.075455 PSWA Operational log
19 Session termination timestamp 2025-06-11 14:55:40 PSWA Operational log (EID 770)
20 Shared folder created by attacker ProjectArk regripper shares

5. Incident Narrative

On 2025-06-11 the threat actor conducted a password spray from 192.168.189.129 against LIBERYSV08: 5 failed logons in one second, then a successful authentication as v.hunter at 14:35:56. They then planted a crafted Proposal.url file in the Proposal share (accessible by all users) whose IconFile pointed to \\192.168.189.129\%USERNAME%.icon, forcing NTLM authentication and capturing a Net-NTLMv2 hash when any user opened it.

At 14:44:48 the attacker established an RDP session as v.hunter, discovered C:\ProjectArk, archived its contents (783,907 bytes) as arkproj.zip, and uploaded it to yourc2filemanager.cn via Edge. They then installed PowerShell Web Access, enabled WinRM, and created a backdoor account t.minami (added to “Remote Management Users”). Backdoor access was validated via PSWA at 14:54:55 (session LIBERYSV08\t.minami.250611.075455) and terminated at 14:55:40. The ProjectArk share (no remark, unlimited connections, at C:\ root) was created by the attacker for data staging.


6. Attack Timeline

Timestamp (UTC) Event Artifact ATT&CK
2025-06-11 14:35:56 Password spray (5 failed) + successful logon as v.hunter EID 4624/4625 T1110.003
2025-06-11 14:39:14 Proposal.url created in Proposal share (forced auth lure) $MFT T1187
2025-06-11 14:44:48 RDP session as v.hunter EID 4624 (LogonType 10) T1021.001
2025-06-11 14:46:06 arkproj.zip created from ProjectArk USN Journal ($J) T1560.001
2025-06-11 14:46:44 arkproj.zip uploaded to yourc2filemanager.cn Edge History T1567
2025-06-11 14:53:33 t.minami added to “Remote Management Users” EID 4732 T1136.001
2025-06-11 14:54:55 PSWA backdoor access validated (session established) PSWA Operational (EID 769) T1078.003
2025-06-11 14:55:40 PSWA session terminated (User Signoff) PSWA Operational (EID 770) T1078.003
2025-06-11 14:56:25 ProjectArk files touched (MFT LastRecordChange) $MFT T1039

7. Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

7.1 File IOCs

Type Value Context
File Name Proposal.url Forced-authentication lure in Proposal share — Q4
File Name arkproj.zip Archive of ProjectArk — Q11
File Path C:\ProjectArk\ Attacker-created staging share — Q10/Q20
File Path C:\Users\k.texus\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\PSReadline\ConsoleHost_history.txt Attacker command history — Q14

7.2 Network IOCs

Type Value Context
IP Address 192.168.189.129 Attacker IP (spray, RDP, PSWA) — Q1/Q9/Q17
IP Address 192.168.189.129 UNC target for forced NTLM (%USERNAME%.icon) — Q6
Domain yourc2filemanager.cn Exfiltration destination — Q13
URL http://argonaut.ark/proposal.html Decoy URL in Proposal.url — Q5

7.3 Behavioral IOCs

Type Value Context
Account v.hunter Compromised account (RedLine Stealer creds) — Q2
Account t.minami Backdoor account created by attacker — Q14
Account k.texus User whose share/files were targeted — Q8
Share ProjectArk Attacker-created share (no remark, root-level) — Q20
Command Install-WindowsFeature -Name WindowsPowerShellWebAccess -IncludeManagementTools PSWA backdoor install — Q15
Command net localgroup "remote management users" t.minami /add Backdoor group membership — Q14
Hash format Net-NTLMv2 Captured via forced authentication — Q7
Session ID LIBERYSV08\t.minami.250611.075455 PSWA backdoor session — Q18

8. Detection Opportunities

Source What to look for Why it matters
Windows Security (EID 4625) Burst of failed logons from one IP targeting multiple usernames in one second Password spraying — Q1
Windows Security (EID 4624) Successful logon immediately after a spray burst from the same IP Compromised valid account — Q2
Windows Security (EID 4624, LogonType 10) RDP logon with a non-system username after suspicious activity RDP access with compromised creds — Q9
SYSTEM hive (regripper shares) Share with no remark at C:\ root with unlimited connections Attacker-created staging share — Q20
$MFT .url files in shared folders with IconFile pointing to a UNC path Forced-authentication lure — Q4/Q5
USN Journal ($J) Creation of .zip archives in project folders Data staging for exfiltration — Q11
Edge History Uploads to unknown domains (e.g. yourc2filemanager.cn) Exfiltration over web service — Q13
PowerShell Console History Install-WindowsFeature -Name WindowsPowerShellWebAccess, net user, net localgroup PSWA backdoor installation — Q14/Q15
PSWA Operational log (EID 784/769/770) Authentication + session establishment + signoff from new accounts Backdoor access validation — Q17/Q18/Q19

9. MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

TTP ID Tactic Technique Evidence
T1110.003 Credential Access Brute Force: Password Spraying 5 failed logons in one second — Q1
T1078 Defense Evasion Valid Accounts v.hunter used for RDP/PSWA — Q2/Q9/Q17
T1135 Discovery Network Share Discovery Shares enumerated via registry — Q3
T1187 Credential Access Forced Authentication Proposal.url with UNC IconFile — Q4/Q5/Q6
T1021.001 Lateral Movement Remote Services: RDP RDP session as v.hunter — Q9
T1083 Discovery File and Directory Discovery C:\ProjectArk discovered — Q10
T1560.001 Collection Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility arkproj.zip (783,907 bytes) — Q11/Q12
T1567 Exfiltration Exfiltration Over Web Service Upload to yourc2filemanager.cn — Q13
T1136.001 Persistence Create Account: Local Account t.minami created — Q14
T1078.003 Persistence Valid Accounts: Local Accounts t.minami used for PSWA — Q14/Q17
T1505.004 Persistence Server Software Component: IIS Components PSWA installed as backdoor — Q15
T1021.006 Lateral Movement Remote Services: WinRM PSWA over WinRM port 5985 — Q16
T1589.003 Reconnaissance Gather Victim Identity Information: Employee Names Full names from SAM hive — Q8
T1039 Collection Data from Network Shared Drive ProjectArk share created for staging — Q20

10. Conclusions & Recommendations

10.1 Incident Summary

What Happened An attacker sprayed passwords to gain v.hunter credentials, forced NTLM authentication via a crafted .url file to capture a Net-NTLMv2 hash, established RDP, archived and exfiltrated ProjectArk (783 KB) to a C2, and installed a PowerShell Web Access backdoor account (t.minami) over WinRM.
Root Cause A shared folder (Proposal) with “Full Control” for “Everyone” allowed the attacker to plant a forced-authentication lure; no account lockout or MFA slowed the spray; WinRM/PSWA were installable by the compromised user.
Impact Assessment Confidentiality: High — ProjectArk (budgets, stakeholder lists, board presentations) exfiltrated. Integrity: High — backdoor account and PSWA installed. Availability: Medium — Proposal share accessible to all users.

10.2 Recommendations

Priority Timeframe Recommendation
Immediate Within 24h Disable t.minami account; remove PSWA (Uninstall-WindowsFeature WindowsPowerShellWebAccess); block yourc2filemanager.cn and 192.168.189.129
High Within 7 days Reset v.hunter and k.texus passwords; revoke arkproj.zip exposure; remove ProjectArk share; review Proposal share permissions
Medium Within 30 days Implement account lockout + MFA; restrict WinRM to admin hosts; alert on EventID 4732 (group membership changes) and PSWA install
Low Within 90 days User awareness for .url/forced-authentication lures; restrict “Everyone” share permissions
Strategic Ongoing Baseline shares/registry; monitor $MFT/USN for archive creation in project folders; deploy EDR with SMB/WinRM monitoring

11. Analyst Notes & Learning

11.1 What I Did Well

Pivoted from absent share events (5140/5142/5143) to the SYSTEM registry hive (regripper shares), and from missing prefetch/PowerShell logs to the USN Journal ($J) for arkproj.zip creation. Cross-referenced the Proposal share remark with SAM full names to identify Kuneo Texus.

11.2 Key Takeaways

  • Absent event logs ≠ absent evidence: the SYSTEM hive and $MFT/$J retain share and file activity even when EVTX events are missing.
  • Forced authentication via .url files (T1187) is a silent credential-capture technique requiring only “open file” interaction.
  • PSWA as a backdoor blends into legitimate Windows features; the PSWA operational log is the only place the true source IP appears (IIS proxies the connection).
  • Short-lived “connect and verify” sessions (~45s) are a classic access-validation pattern.
  • USN Journal fills gaps when prefetch and PowerShell logs are unavailable.

11.3 New Techniques

MFT/USN journal analysis (MFTECmd + Timeline Explorer), regripper shares/samparse plugins, forced-authentication lure analysis (.url IconFile UNC path), PowerShell Web Access forensics (Events 784/769/770), and Edge History string extraction for exfiltration URLs.


12. References

HTB Sherlock · Liberty · DFIR · 2025-06-11