LogJammer Sherlock Walkthrough

Solved LogJammer from Hack The Box!

Field Details
Case Reference HTB-SHRLCK-LOGJAMMER
Platform Hack The Box — Sherlock
Category DFIR — Windows Event Log Analysis
Difficulty —
Date Opened 2025-12-03
Severity High
Status Closed — training scenario
Host DESKTOP-887GK2L
Attack Date 2023-03-27
Stack .evtx logs (PowerShell-Operational, Security, System, Windows Defender-Operational, Windows Firewall-Firewall)
Tools Chainsaw, Hayabusa, jq, Splunk

Scenario: LogJammer — a technical assessment for a junior DFIR consultant role at Forela-Security. The user CyberJunkie logged in to his computer and may have taken malicious actions. Analyze the given event logs and report back.


1. Executive Summary

On 2023-03-27 the user CyberJunkie on DESKTOP-887GK2L logged in at 14:37:09 UTC and performed a series of malicious actions over ~25 minutes: downloaded SharpHound (quarantined by Defender), added a Windows Firewall rule “Metasploit C2 Bypass” (outbound port 4444), changed the audit policy to disable success auditing for Object Access Events, created a scheduled task \HTB-AUTOMATION (running Automation-HTB.ps1 with an email argument), computed the MD5 hash of the script, and cleared the Firewall event log to remove evidence. The entire chain was reconstructed by correlating Security, Firewall, Defender, PowerShell and System event logs.

1.1 Incident Summary

Field Details
Incident Type Defense evasion + persistence via scheduled task
Initial Access Valid account CyberJunkie
Discovery Blue team event log analysis
First Execution 2023-03-27 14:37:09 UTC (successful logon)
Persistence Scheduled task \HTB-AUTOMATION → Automation-HTB.ps1
Overall Severity High

1.2 Key Findings

  • CyberJunkie logged in at 14:37:09 UTC (two near-simultaneous 4624 events — Kerberos + NTLM).
  • SharpHound-v1.1.0.zip downloaded from GitHub and quarantined by Defender at 14:42:34 UTC.
  • Firewall rule “Metasploit C2 Bypass” added — outbound port 4444 (Metasploit default) — at 14:44:43 UTC.
  • Audit policy changed at 14:50:03 UTC: success auditing disabled for “Other Object Access Events”.
  • Scheduled task \HTB-AUTOMATION created at 14:51:21 UTC, running Automation-HTB.ps1 -A cyberjunkie@hackthebox.eu.
  • Get-FileHash -Algorithm md5 executed on Automation-HTB.ps1 at 14:58:33 UTC.
  • Firewall event log cleared at 15:01:56 UTC (EventID 104) by CyberJunkie.

2. Investigation Scope & Artifacts

2.1 Artifacts Analyzed

Artifact Format What it answers
all_logs.json JSON (Chainsaw dump of all EVTX) All questions Q1–Q12
logjammer.json Hayabusa JSON timeline Rule titles (Defender alert, log cleared)
chainsaw_dump.json JSON (exported EVTX) Splunk queries (Q11)

2.2 Tools & Methods

Tool Purpose
Chainsaw Dump EVTX to JSON (chainsaw dump … -j -o all_logs.json --skip-errors)
Hayabusa JSON timeline generation (hayabusa json-timeline -d … -U -o logjammer.json)
jq Parse and filter JSON log output
Splunk Query and correlate PowerShell and Hayabusa logs

2.3 Event ID Reference

Source ID Description
Windows Security 4624 Successful logon
Windows Security 4625 Failed logon
Windows Security 4698 Scheduled task created
Windows Security 4719 System audit policy changed
Windows Firewall 2004 Firewall rule added
Windows System 104 Log file cleared (with log name)
Windows System 102 Log clearing occurred (no details)
Windows Defender 1116 Threat detected
PowerShell 4104 Script Block Logging

3. Technical Analysis

3.1 Scenario

Windows event log analysis of a malicious session on DESKTOP-887GK2L. The user CyberJunkie logged in and performed a series of malicious actions over ~25 minutes: firewall tampering, audit policy change, scheduled-task persistence, SharpHound download (quarantined), hash computation, and targeted log clearing.

3.2 Q1 — When did the cyberjunkie user first successfully log into his computer? (UTC)

Answer: 2023-03-27 14:37:09

cat all_logs.json | jq '. [] | select(.Event.System.EventID == 4624 and .Event.EventData.TargetUserName == "CyberJunkie") | " \(.Event.EventData.TargetUserName) connect to  \(.Event.System.TimeCreated_attributes.SystemTime)"'

Output:

" CyberJunkie connect to  2023-03-27T14:37:09.879891Z"
" CyberJunkie connect to  2023-03-27T14:37:09.879940Z"
" CyberJunkie connect to  2023-03-27T14:38:32.937423Z"
" CyberJunkie connect to  2023-03-27T14:38:32.937458Z"

Notes: EventID 4624 = Successful logon, filtered by TargetUserName CyberJunkie. Two duplicate timestamps at 14:37:09 (879891Z and 879940Z) are normal — Windows logs one event for Kerberos and one for NTLM authentication simultaneously. The first timestamp is the answer: 2023-03-27 14:37:09 UTC.

MITRE ATT&CK: T1078 — Valid Accounts (Initial Access).

Detection angle. EID 4624 filtered by TargetUserName — first successful logon timestamp; duplicate Kerberos/NTLM events are normal.

3.3 Q2 — The user tampered with firewall settings. What is the Name of the firewall rule added?

Answer: Metasploit C2 Bypass

Step 1 — List all firewall rule names:

cat all_logs.json | jq '.[] | select(.Event.System.Channel=="Microsoft-Windows-Windows Firewall With Advanced Security/Firewall") | .Event.EventData.RuleName' | sort | uniq -c | sort -hr

Output:

1 "Network Discovery (NB-Datagram-In)"
1 "Metasploit C2 Bypass"
1 "Cloud Identity (TCP-Out)"

Step 2 — Get full details of the suspicious rule:

cat all_logs.json | jq '.[] | select(.Event.System.Channel=="Microsoft-Windows-Windows Firewall With Advanced Security/Firewall" and .Event.EventData.RuleName == "Metasploit C2 Bypass")'

Key fields:

{
  "EventID": 2004,
  "SystemTime": "2023-03-27T14:44:43.415702Z",
  "RuleName": "Metasploit C2 Bypass",
  "Direction": 2,
  "Protocol": 6,
  "RemotePorts": "4444",
  "Action": 3,
  "Active": 1,
  "ModifyingApplication": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\mmc.exe",
  "ModifyingUser": "S-1-5-21-3393683511-3463148672-371912004-1001"
}

Notes: EventID 2004 = Windows Firewall rule added. The rule name “Metasploit C2 Bypass” immediately stands out — Metasploit is the most widely used exploitation framework. Key fields: RemotePorts 4444 (Metasploit default reverse shell port), Direction 2 (Outbound), Action 3 (Allow), ModifyingApplication mmc.exe. Timestamp 14:44:43 UTC — 7 minutes after initial login.

MITRE ATT&CK: T1562.004 (Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify System Firewall), T1571 (Non-Standard Port).

Detection angle. EID 2004 with RuleName containing “Metasploit” or RemotePorts 4444 — firewall rule allowing Metasploit C2.

3.4 Q3 — What’s the direction of the firewall rule?

Answer: outbound

Identified from the same EventID 2004 event in Q2. Direction field mapping: 1 = Inbound, 2 = Outbound (this rule). Direction 2 = Outbound means the victim machine initiates the connection TO the attacker’s C2 server on port 4444 — a classic reverse shell pattern (Metasploit’s meterpreter or shell/reverse_tcp).

MITRE ATT&CK: T1071 (Application Layer Protocol).

Detection angle. EID 2004 Direction=2 (outbound) to port 4444 — reverse shell firewall allowance.

3.5 Q4 — The user changed audit policy of the computer. What’s the Subcategory of this changed policy?

Answer: Other Object Access Events

cat all_logs.json | jq '.[] | select(.Event.System.EventID == 4719)'

Key fields:

{
  "EventID": 4719,
  "SystemTime": "2023-03-27T14:50:03.721835Z",
  "SubjectUserName": "DESKTOP-887GK2L$",
  "SubjectLogonId": "0x3e7",
  "CategoryId": "%%8274",
  "SubcategoryId": "%%12804",
  "SubcategoryGuid": "0CCE9227-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030",
  "AuditPolicyChanges": "%%8449"
}

image.png

Notes: EventID 4719 = System Audit Policy Changed. The subcategory is identified by SubcategoryGuid, not the %% codes (which can be misleading): 0CCE9227-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030 → “Other Object Access Events”. AuditPolicyChanges %%8449 = Success auditing removed. The attacker disabled success auditing for Object Access Events, blinding the SIEM to successful file/object access operations. This occurred at 14:50:03 — 6 minutes after the firewall rule was added — confirming systematic defense evasion.

MITRE ATT&CK: T1562.002 (Impair Defenses: Disable Windows Event Logging).

Detection angle. EID 4719 with SubcategoryGuid 0CCE9227-… and AuditPolicyChanges %%8449 — disabling success auditing for Object Access.

3.6 Q5 — The user “cyberjunkie” created a scheduled task. What’s the name of this task?

Answer: \\HTB-AUTOMATION

cat all_logs.json | jq '.[] | select(.Event.System.EventID == 4698)'

image.png

Notes: EventID 4698 = Scheduled Task Created, logged in Security.evtx. Task created at 2023-03-27 14:51:21 UTC by CyberJunkie. TaskName: \\HTB-AUTOMATION. The TaskContent XML contains the full command and arguments. SubjectUserSid confirms this was created by the CyberJunkie account.

MITRE ATT&CK: T1053.005 (Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task), T1053 (Scheduled Task/Job).

Detection angle. EID 4698 — scheduled task creation by a non-system account.

3.7 Q6 — What’s the full path of the file which was scheduled for the task?

Answer: C:\Users\CyberJunkie\Desktop\Automation-HTB.ps1

Extracted from the TaskContent XML field in the same EventID 4698 event from Q5. The TaskContent contains the full XML definition of the scheduled task including the command to execute: C:\Users\CyberJunkie\Desktop\Automation-HTB.ps1. The file is a PowerShell script located on the user’s Desktop — not hidden in AppData or system directories.

Detection angle. EID 4698 TaskContent XML → <Command> field reveals the scheduled executable path.

3.8 Q7 — What are the arguments of the command?

Answer: -A cyberjunkie@hackthebox.eu

Extracted from the TaskContent XML field in EventID 4698 (Q5). Full command: C:\Users\CyberJunkie\Desktop\Automation-HTB.ps1 -A cyberjunkie@hackthebox.eu. The -A flag with an email address suggests the script accepts an email parameter — likely for sending results or notifications. Combined with the GetFileHash command (Q11), the attacker likely computed a hash of the script and emailed the result — a simple data exfiltration or integrity verification mechanism.

MITRE ATT&CK: T1048 (Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol).

Detection angle. EID 4698 TaskContent XML → <Arguments> field reveals command-line arguments.

3.9 Q8 — The antivirus running on the system identified a threat and performed actions on it. Which tool was identified as malware by antivirus?

Answer: SharpHound

cat logjammer.json | jq 'select(.RuleTitle == "Defender Alert (High)")'

image.png

Notes: Defender EventID 1116 = Threat detected. Two simultaneous detections at 14:42:34 UTC:

  1. HackTool:PowerShell/SharpHound.B → SharpHound.ps1
  2. HackTool:MSIL/SharpHound!MSR → SharpHound.exe

Both detected inside SharpHound-v1.1.0.zip downloaded directly from GitHub (Origin: Internet, Source: Downloads and attachments). SharpHound is the data collector component of BloodHound — an Active Directory attack path analysis tool. It enumerates all users, groups, computers, GPOs, ACLs, session data, and trust relationships. The collected data is fed into BloodHound to visualise attack paths from any user to Domain Admin — indicating the attacker was planning full Active Directory compromise.

MITRE ATT&CK: T1069.002 (Permission Groups Discovery: Domain Groups), T1087.002 (Account Discovery: Domain Account), T1005 (Data from Local System).

Detection angle. Hayabusa Defender Alert (High) rule on EID 1116 — Defender threat detection for SharpHound.

3.10 Q9 — What’s the full path of the malware which raised the alert?

Answer: C:\Users\CyberJunkie\Downloads\SharpHound-v1.1.0.zip

Extracted from the Path field of Defender EventID 1116 in Q8. Full path from the event: containerfile: C:\Users\CyberJunkie\Downloads\SharpHound-v1.1.0.zip. The “containerfile:” prefix indicates Defender detected the threat inside a ZIP archive before extraction. The file was downloaded directly to the Downloads folder from https://objects.githubusercontent.com/github-production-release-asset-2e65be/385323486/… — the official BloodHound GitHub release. The attacker downloaded the tool directly from its public repository rather than using a custom or obfuscated version.

Detection angle. Defender EID 1116 Path field with containerfile: prefix — threat inside a ZIP archive.

3.11 Q10 — What action was taken by the antivirus?

Answer: Quarantine

image.png

Notes: Identified from the State field in Defender EventID 1116 (Q8). Windows Defender State field mapping: 0 = Unknown, 1 = Quarantined (this event), 2 = Removed, 3 = Allowed, 4 = No Action. State: 1 = Quarantined — Defender successfully quarantined SharpHound before it could be executed. Important distinction: Action ID 9 = “Not Applicable” refers to the remediation action TYPE, not the outcome. The actual result is always in the State field. Both SharpHound.ps1 and SharpHound.exe were quarantined simultaneously at 14:42:34 UTC inside the ZIP archive.

Detection angle. Defender EID 1116 State field = 1 (Quarantined) — threat contained before execution.

3.12 Q11 — The user used PowerShell to execute commands. What command was executed by the user?

Answer: Get-FileHash -Algorithm md5 .\Desktop\Automation-HTB.ps1

Splunk query:

source="all_logs.json" host="parrot" sourcetype="_json" "Event.System.Channel"="Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational"
| spath input=_raw output=Timestamp path="Event.System.TimeCreated_attributes.SystemTime"
| spath input=_raw output=EventID path="Event.System.EventID"
| spath input=_raw output=Command path="Event.EventData.ScriptBlockText"
| where Timestamp>"2023-03-27 14:37*"
| search "Event.System.EventID"=4104
| table Timestamp, EventID, Command

image.png

Notes: Splunk used here instead of jq because PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventID 4104) generates many events and Splunk’s tabular output makes it easier to read ScriptBlockText. Filtered by Channel Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational, EventID 4104, Timestamp after initial login at 14:37. Two commands found: 1. “prompt” (benign), 2. Get-FileHash -Algorithm md5 .\Desktop\Automation-HTB.ps1. Get-FileHash computes the MD5 hash of the scheduled task script. Combined with the email argument in Q7, the attacker likely computed the hash and emailed it — either as verification or as simple data exfiltration. Executed at 2023-03-27 14:58:33 UTC.

MITRE ATT&CK: T1059.001 (Command & Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell), T1074 (Data Staged).

Detection angle. EID 4104 ScriptBlockText containing Get-FileHash on a scheduled-task script — hash computation for verification/exfiltration.

3.13 Q12 — We suspect the user deleted some event logs. Which Event log file was cleared?

Answer: Microsoft-Windows-Windows Firewall With Advanced Security/Firewall

Splunk Query 1 (check all RuleTitles):

source="logjammer.json" host="parrot" sourcetype="_json" | stats count by RuleTitle

image.png

Splunk Query 2:

source="logjammer.json" host="parrot" sourcetype="_json" RuleTitle="Log File Cleared"

Result:

{
    "Timestamp": "2023-03-27 15:01:56.515 +00:00",
    "RuleTitle": "Log File Cleared",
    "Level": "med",
    "Computer": "DESKTOP-887GK2L",
    "Channel": "Sys",
    "EventID": 104,
    "RecordID": 2186,
    "Details": {
        "Log": "Microsoft-Windows-Windows Firewall With Advanced Security/Firewall",
        "User": "CyberJunkie"
    },
    "ExtraFieldInfo": {
        "BackupPath": "",
        "SubjectDomainName": "DESKTOP-887GK2L"
    }
}

Notes: Two relevant EventIDs for log clearing: EventID 102 = Log clearing occurred (no details on which log); EventID 104 = Log file cleared WITH the specific log name. Used EventID 104 which provides the Log field containing the exact log file cleared. The attacker specifically cleared the Firewall log at 15:01:56 — the same log that contained evidence of the “Metasploit C2 Bypass” rule addition (14:44:43). This is targeted, deliberate log clearing to remove specific evidence of firewall tampering, not a blanket wipe of all logs.

MITRE ATT&CK: T1070.001 (Indicator Removal: Clear Windows Event Logs).

Detection angle. EID 104 (not 102) provides the specific log name cleared — targeted anti-forensics.


4. Challenge Q&A Log

# Question Answer Method
1 First successful logon time 2023-03-27 14:37:09 EID 4624 (CyberJunkie)
2 Firewall rule name added Metasploit C2 Bypass EID 2004 (Firewall)
3 Firewall rule direction outbound EID 2004 Direction=2
4 Audit policy subcategory changed Other Object Access Events EID 4719 SubcategoryGuid
5 Scheduled task name \\HTB-AUTOMATION EID 4698
6 Scheduled task file path C:\Users\CyberJunkie\Desktop\Automation-HTB.ps1 EID 4698 TaskContent
7 Command arguments -A cyberjunkie@hackthebox.eu EID 4698 TaskContent
8 Malware tool identified by AV SharpHound Hayabusa Defender Alert (High)
9 Full path of quarantined malware C:\Users\CyberJunkie\Downloads\SharpHound-v1.1.0.zip Defender EID 1116 Path
10 Antivirus action taken Quarantine Defender EID 1116 State=1
11 PowerShell command executed Get-FileHash -Algorithm md5 .\Desktop\Automation-HTB.ps1 EID 4104 ScriptBlockText
12 Event log file cleared Microsoft-Windows-Windows Firewall With Advanced Security/Firewall EID 104

5. Incident Narrative

On 2023-03-27 the user CyberJunkie on DESKTOP-887GK2L logged in at 14:37:09 UTC and performed a series of malicious actions over ~25 minutes. After logging in, the user downloaded SharpHound (quarantined by Defender at 14:42:34). Despite this, the attacker proceeded to add a Windows Firewall rule “Metasploit C2 Bypass” to allow outbound traffic on port 4444 (14:44:43), then disabled audit logging for Object Access Events (14:50:03) to reduce visibility. A persistence mechanism was established via a scheduled task \HTB-AUTOMATION running Automation-HTB.ps1 with an email argument (14:51:21). The attacker computed the MD5 hash of the script (14:58:33), likely to verify or exfiltrate it. In a final anti-forensics step, the attacker cleared the Firewall event log (15:01:56) to remove evidence of the malicious rule. The entire attack chain was reconstructed through correlation of Security, Firewall, Defender, PowerShell and System event logs.


6. Attack Timeline

Timestamp (UTC) Event Evidence
2023-03-27 14:37:09 CyberJunkie successfully logged in EID 4624 — Security.evtx
2023-03-27 14:42:34 SharpHound-v1.1.0.zip downloaded and quarantined by Defender EID 1116 — Defender log
2023-03-27 14:44:43 Firewall rule “Metasploit C2 Bypass” added — port 4444 outbound EID 2004 — Firewall log
2023-03-27 14:50:03 Audit policy changed — success auditing disabled for Object Access EID 4719 — Security.evtx
2023-03-27 14:51:21 Scheduled task \HTB-AUTOMATION created EID 4698 — Security.evtx
2023-03-27 14:58:33 PowerShell Get-FileHash executed on Automation-HTB.ps1 EID 4104 — PowerShell log
2023-03-27 15:01:56 Firewall event log cleared to remove evidence EID 104 — System log

7. Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

7.1 File IOCs

Type Value Context
File Name SharpHound-v1.1.0.zip AD enumeration tool (quarantined) — Q8/Q9
File Name Automation-HTB.ps1 Scheduled task payload on Desktop — Q6/Q7
File Path C:\Users\CyberJunkie\Desktop\Automation-HTB.ps1 Script location — Q6
File Path C:\Users\CyberJunkie\Downloads\SharpHound-v1.1.0.zip Download location — Q9

7.2 Network IOCs

Type Value Context
Port 4444 Metasploit default reverse shell port — Q2/Q3
Domain objects.githubusercontent.com SharpHound download source — Q9

7.3 Behavioral IOCs

Type Value Context
Account CyberJunkie Compromised user account
Host DESKTOP-887GK2L Affected workstation
Firewall Rule Metasploit C2 Bypass Outbound allow on port 4444 — Q2
Scheduled Task \HTB-AUTOMATION Persistence — Q5
Command Get-FileHash -Algorithm md5 .\Desktop\Automation-HTB.ps1 Hash computation — Q11
Audit Change Subcategory Other Object Access Events, success auditing removed EID 4719 — Q4
Log Clearing Firewall log cleared (EID 104) at 15:01:56 Targeted anti-forensics — Q12

8. Detection Opportunities

Source What to look for Why it matters
Windows Security (EID 4624) Successful logon for a user account at an unusual time Initial access — Q1
Windows Firewall (EID 2004) Rule with RemotePorts=4444 or suspicious RuleName Metasploit C2 allowance — Q2/Q3
Windows Security (EID 4719) Audit policy change disabling success auditing Defense evasion — Q4
Windows Security (EID 4698) Scheduled task creation by a non-system user Persistence — Q5
Windows Defender (EID 1116) Threat detection for SharpHound/HackTool AD enumeration tool — Q8
PowerShell (EID 4104) Get-FileHash on a scheduled-task script Hash computation/exfiltration — Q11
Windows System (EID 104) Log file cleared with specific log name Targeted anti-forensics — Q12

9. MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

TTP ID Tactic Technique Evidence
T1078 Initial Access Valid Accounts CyberJunkie logged in — Q1
T1562.004 Defense Evasion Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify System Firewall “Metasploit C2 Bypass” rule, port 4444 — Q2/Q3
T1571 Command & Control Non-Standard Port Port 4444 outbound — Q2
T1071 Command & Control Application Layer Protocol Metasploit C2 — Q3
T1562.002 Defense Evasion Impair Defenses: Disable Windows Event Logging Audit policy change — Q4
T1053.005 Persistence Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task \HTB-AUTOMATION — Q5
T1053 Execution Scheduled Task/Job Scheduled task execution — Q5
T1059.001 Execution Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell Get-FileHash via PowerShell — Q11
T1074 Collection Data Staged Hash computation of script — Q11
T1069.002 Discovery Permission Groups Discovery: Domain Groups SharpHound — Q8
T1087.002 Discovery Account Discovery: Domain Account SharpHound — Q8
T1005 Collection Data from Local System SharpHound enumeration — Q8
T1070.001 Defense Evasion Indicator Removal: Clear Windows Event Logs Firewall log cleared — Q12

10. Conclusions & Recommendations

10.1 Incident Summary

What Happened The user CyberJunkie logged in and performed a chain of malicious actions over ~25 minutes: downloaded SharpHound (quarantined), added a firewall rule for Metasploit C2 on port 4444, disabled audit logging, created a scheduled task for persistence, computed a hash of the script, and cleared the Firewall log.
Root Cause A valid user account was used for malicious activity; no account lockout or MFA; Defender quarantined SharpHound but the attacker proceeded with other actions.
Impact Assessment Confidentiality: High — SharpHound AD enumeration attempted. Integrity: High — firewall tampering, audit policy change, scheduled task persistence. Availability: Medium — targeted log clearing.

10.2 Recommendations

Priority Timeframe Recommendation
Immediate Within 24h Disable CyberJunkie account; remove \HTB-AUTOMATION task and Automation-HTB.ps1; block port 4444 outbound
High Within 7 days Restore Firewall log from backup; review all audit policy changes; check for additional persistence
Medium Within 30 days Alert on EID 4719 (audit policy change), EID 4698 (task creation by non-system), EID 2004 (firewall rule with port 4444), EID 104 (log clearing)
Low Within 90 days User awareness; restrict “Everyone” share permissions; implement MFA
Strategic Ongoing Baseline firewall rules and audit policies; monitor for SharpHound/BloodHound downloads

11. Analyst Notes & Learning

11.1 What I Did Well

Correlated five different log sources (Security, Firewall, Defender, PowerShell, System) to reconstruct a 25-minute attack chain. Distinguished EventID 102 (log clearing, no details) from EventID 104 (log cleared with specific log name) to identify the targeted anti-forensics.

11.2 Key Takeaways

  • Absent event logs ≠ absent evidence: even when logs are cleared, other sources (Defender, PowerShell, System) retain evidence.
  • Targeted log clearing (only the Firewall log) is more suspicious than a blanket wipe — it indicates the attacker knew exactly what to hide.
  • EventID 104 vs 102: 104 provides the specific log name; 102 does not. Always prefer 104 for attribution.
  • SubcategoryGuid, not %% codes: for EID 4719, the SubcategoryGuid maps to the actual subcategory name.
  • SharpHound quarantine didn’t stop the attacker — they pivoted to firewall tampering and persistence.

11.3 New Techniques

Multi-source log correlation (Security/Firewall/Defender/PowerShell/System), EventID 104 vs 102 distinction for log clearing, SubcategoryGuid mapping for audit policy changes, Hayabusa Defender Alert (High) rule for threat detection, and Splunk spath for JSON field extraction.


12. References

Walkthrough by Akenaton · HTB CDSA Portfolio · LogJammer Sherlock