Trojan Sherlock Walkthrough

Solved Trojan from Hack The Box!

Field Details
Case Reference HTB-SHRLCK-TROJAN
Platform Hack The Box — Sherlock
Category Malware Analysis — Trojanized Software
Difficulty —
Date Opened 2023-05-30
Severity High
Status Closed — training scenario
Host DESKTOP-38NVPD0 · 192.168.116.133
Memory Dump memory capture/memory.vmem (Windows 10 build 19041)
Disk Artifact disk_artifacts.ad1
Network Capture packet capture/network.pcapng

1. Executive Summary

On 2023-05-30 a user named John on workstation DESKTOP-38NVPD0 (Windows 10 build 19041) downloaded Data_Recovery.zip from a free hosting site (praetorial-gears.000webhostapp.com). The ZIP contained Recovery_Setup.exe — a trojanized version of the legitimate FinalRecovery v3.0.7.0325 data recovery software, packaged as an Inno Setup installer. Upon execution the malware installed to C:\Program Files (x86)\FLSCover\Rec528\ and established C2 communication with multiple servers in the 45.12.253.x range via PHP endpoints (stuk.php, puk.php), which served additional binary payloads. The C2 infrastructure was confirmed via VirusTotal (4 of 8 contacted URLs flagged malicious).

This report reconstructs the intrusion using three evidence sources — memory (memory.vmem), disk (disk_artifacts.ad1) and network (network.pcapng) — analyzed with Volatility 3, Wireshark/tshark, PECmd, pyad1, exiftool, innoextract, Joe Sandbox and VirusTotal.

1.1 Incident Summary

Field Details
Incident Type Trojanized software (FinalRecovery) with C2 payload delivery
Initial Access User download of Data_Recovery.zip from a free hosting site
Discovery Multi-source forensic triage (memory + disk + network)
First Execution 2023-05-30 02:06:29 UTC (Prefetch)
Persistence Inno Setup installer dropped to C:\Program Files (x86)\FLSCover\Rec528\
Overall Severity High

1.2 Key Findings

  • The lure was Data_Recovery.zip hosted on praetorial-gears.000webhostapp.com (000webhostapp, a free hosting platform).
  • The installer masqueraded as FinalRecovery v3.0.7.0325; the true product identity survived only in help/temp files.
  • Recovery_Setup.exe (SHA-256 c34601c5…4b3193) was executed twice (run count 2).
  • The malware installed to C:\Program Files (x86)\FLSCover\Rec528\ and spawned Rec528.exe via is-NJBAT.tmp.
  • C2 communication to 45.12.253.72 (stuk.php / puk.php) polled repeatedly; puk.php served a binary payload.
  • 4 of 8 contacted URLs were flagged malicious on VirusTotal; the rest were legitimate Sectigo/Microsoft certificate endpoints.

2. Investigation Scope & Artifacts

2.1 Artifacts Analyzed

Artifact Format What it answers
memory capture/memory.vmem Raw memory dump (Windows 10 build 19041) OS info, hostname, process tree, command lines — Q1, Q2, Q5, Q6
disk_artifacts.ad1 AccessData AD1 image Recovery_Setup.exe for hashing, Prefetch, Inno Setup temp files — Q7, Q8, Q9, Q10, Q13
packet capture/network.pcapng PCAP Download URL, C2 communication — Q3, Q4, Q12
VirusTotal record for SHA-256 c34601c5…4b3193 Web Contacted URLs, behavioral analysis — Q11, Q12
Joe Sandbox report Web Impersonated product version (v3.0.7.0325) — Q13

2.2 Tools & Methods

Tool Purpose
Volatility 3 (windows.info, windows.envars, windows.pslist, windows.pstree, windows.cmdline) Memory analysis
Wireshark / tshark Network capture analysis
PECmd (Eric Zimmerman) Prefetch parsing
pyad1 AD1 image extraction on Linux
exiftool PE metadata inspection
innoextract Inno Setup installer extraction
Joe Sandbox Behavioral analysis of the sample
VirusTotal Hash reputation and contacted URLs

3. Technical Analysis

3.1 Scenario

Multi-source forensic investigation of a trojanized FinalRecovery installer. Evidence spans memory (memory.vmem), disk (disk_artifacts.ad1) and network (network.pcapng). Objective: reconstruct the full intrusion — download, execution, C2 communication, payload delivery, and the impersonated software identity.

3.2 Q1 — What is the build version of the operating system?

Answer: 19041

We used the windows.info plugin to retrieve system metadata from the memory dump:

$ vol3 -f memory\ capture/memory.vmem windows.info

q1_windows_info.png

Key indicators:

  • The Major/Minor field shows 15.19041 — the minor version 19041 is the OS build number
  • This corresponds to Windows 10 version 2004 (May 2020 Update), also known as 20H1
  • Build 19041 is the base build for Windows 10 2004/20H1/20H2/21H1/21H2
  • Additional useful info: 64-bit system, 2 processors, SystemTime 2023-05-30 02:09:03 UTC, system root at C:\Windows

Detection angle. windows.info Major/Minor field reveals the OS build (19041) — anchors all subsequent timeline correlation.

3.3 Q2 — What is the computer hostname?

Answer: DESKTOP-38NVPD0

We used the windows.envars plugin to extract environment variables from all running processes and filtered for the COMPUTERNAME variable:

$ vol3 -f memory\ capture/memory.vmem windows.envars | grep -i "ComputerName" | head -10

q2_computername.png

Key indicators:

  • The COMPUTERNAME environment variable consistently shows DESKTOP-38NVPD0 across all processes (smss, winlogon, services, lsass, svchost, etc.)
  • The DESKTOP-XXXXXXX naming convention is the default Windows 10 auto-generated hostname
  • This hostname is useful for correlating events across different evidence sources

Alternative approach: The hostname can also be retrieved from the registry in memory:

$ vol3 -f memory\ capture/memory.vmem windows.registry.printkey --key "ControlSet001\Control\ComputerName\ComputerName"

Detection angle. windows.envars filtered on COMPUTERNAME — hostname correlation across evidence sources.

3.4 Q3 — What is the name of the downloaded ZIP file?

Answer: Data_Recovery.zip

We analyzed the network capture using tshark, filtering HTTP requests containing .zip in the URI:

$ tshark -r packet\ capture/network.pcapng -Y "http.request.uri contains\".zip\"" -T fields -e frame.time -e ip.src -e ip.dst -e http.request.full_uri

q3_zip_tshark.png

The output reveals two HTTP requests for the same ZIP file:

  • 2023-05-30 09:56:04 EEST — 192.168.116.133 → 145.14.144.155 (initial GET request)
  • 2023-05-30 09:56:17 EEST — 145.14.144.155 → 192.168.116.133 (follow-up request, likely a redirect or retry)

For deeper inspection, we examined the HTTP request in Wireshark with a display filter of http and searched packet bytes for the string .zip:

q3_zip_wireshark.png

Key indicators:

  • The full download URL is http://praetorial-gears.000webhostapp.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/Data_Recovery.zip
  • The file is hosted on 000webhostapp.com — a free web hosting service commonly abused by threat actors
  • The URL path contains /wp-content/uploads/ — indicating a WordPress site, possibly compromised
  • The User-Agent shows Chrome/92.0.4515.131 — the victim was using Google Chrome
  • Source IP 192.168.116.133 is our victim machine; 145.14.144.155 is the hosting server

Detection angle. tshark HTTP filter for .zip URIs — identifies the downloaded lure and its hosting domain.

3.5 Q4 — What is the domain of the website (including the third-level domain) from which the file was downloaded?

Answer: praetorial-gears.000webhostapp.com

This was already identified in Q3 from the full request URI in the HTTP GET request:

http://praetorial-gears.000webhostapp.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/Data_Recovery.zip

Key indicators:

  • Third-level domain (subdomain): praetorial-gears — the attacker-controlled subdomain
  • Second-level domain: 000webhostapp.com — a free hosting platform by Hostinger, frequently abused for phishing and malware delivery
  • Free hosting services like this are attractive to threat actors because they require minimal identity verification

Detection angle. Free hosting domains (000webhostapp.com) serving executables/archives — proxy/DNS alerting on first-seen free-hosting domains.

3.6 Q5 — The user then executed the suspicious application found in the ZIP archive. What is the process PID?

Answer: 484

Since we know the downloaded file was Data_Recovery.zip, we searched for a process with a related name using windows.pslist:

$ vol3 -f memory\ capture/memory.vmem windows.pslist | grep -i "recovery" | column -t

q5_recovery_setup_pid.png

Key indicators:

  • PID 484 — Recovery_Setup process, correlated with the downloaded Data_Recovery.zip
  • The process was created at 2023-05-30 02:07:59 UTC
  • PPID 60 — parent process ID (likely explorer.exe if the user double-clicked it)
  • The naming convention Recovery_Setup inside Data_Recovery.zip is a classic social engineering lure

We confirmed this with windows.pstree to see the full process hierarchy:

q5_pstree.png

The process tree reveals:

  • PID 60 (explorer.exe, PPID 4084) → PID 484 (Recovery_Setup) — user double-clicked
  • PID 484 (Recovery_Setup) → PID 5956 (is-NJBAT.tmp) → PID 4012 (Rec528.exe) — multi-stage payload

We also used windows.cmdline to confirm the full executable paths:

q5_cmdline.png

  • PID 484: "C:\Users\John\Downloads\Data_Recovery\Recovery_Setup.exe"
  • PID 5956: "C:\Users\John\AppData\Local\Temp\is-VIBV9.tmp\is-NJBAT.tmp"

Detection angle. windows.pslist/pstree showing Recovery_Setup.exe spawning is-NJBAT.tmp → Rec528.exe — installer-based multi-stage payload.

3.7 Q6 — What is the full path of the suspicious process?

Answer: C:\Users\John\Downloads\Data_Recovery\Recovery_Setup.exe

This was already identified in Q5 using the windows.cmdline plugin, which revealed PID 484’s full executable path.

Detection angle. windows.cmdline full path confirms the drop location under the user’s Downloads folder.

3.8 Q7 — What is the SHA-256 hash of the suspicious executable?

Answer: c34601c5da3501f6ee0efce18de7e6145153ecfac2ce2019ec52e1535a4b3193

To get the correct hash, we needed the original on-disk file rather than a memory dump (dumping from memory produces files that may differ due to page alignment/relocation). We extracted the file from the disk artifact (disk_artifacts.ad1) using pyad1:

$ python3 extract_ad1.py "disk artifacts/disk_artifacts.ad1" "Recovery_Setup"
$ sha256sum exported_files/Recovery_Setup.exe

q7_sha256.png

Key indicators:

  • The SHA-256 hash uniquely identifies this malware sample
  • This hash can be searched on threat intelligence platforms (VirusTotal, MalwareBazaar)
  • Why not dump from memory? windows.dumpfiles reconstructs files from ImageSectionObject/DataSectionObject, which may not be byte-identical to the on-disk binary

Note: When a question asks for a file hash, always prefer the disk artifact over memory dumps. Memory-reconstructed files are useful for behavioral analysis but unreliable for hash matching.

Detection angle. Disk-artifact hashing (pyad1) over memory dumping — reliable hash for threat intel lookup.

3.9 Q8 — When was the malicious program first executed?

Answer: 2023-05-30 02:06:29

We extracted the Windows Prefetch file for Recovery_Setup.exe from the disk artifact and parsed it using PECmd:

$ PECmd.exe -f RECOVERY_SETUP.EXE-A808CDAB.pf

q8_prefetch.png

Key indicators:

  • Run count: 2 — the executable was run twice
  • Last run: 2023-05-30 02:07:59 — the second (most recent) execution (PID 484, Q5)
  • Other run times: 2023-05-30 02:06:29 — the first execution
  • The ~90-second gap suggests the user ran the installer once, then again (common when malware disguised as legitimate software shows no visible result)

Important distinction: Windows Prefetch tracks up to 8 historical timestamps. “Last run” is always the most recent, while “Other run times” contains previous executions in reverse chronological order. When investigating “first execution,” check the oldest entry in “Other run times.”

Detection angle. PECmd Prefetch parsing — distinguish “Last run” from “Other run times” for first-execution determination.

3.10 Q9 — How many times in total has the malicious application been executed?

Answer: 2

This was already identified in Q8 from the Prefetch analysis. The Run count: 2 field in the parsed RECOVERY_SETUP.EXE-A808CDAB.pf confirms exactly two executions:

  1. 2023-05-30 02:06:29 — first execution
  2. 2023-05-30 02:07:59 — second execution

Detection angle. Prefetch Run count field — confirms execution frequency.

3.11 Q10 — The malicious application references two .TMP files, one is IS-NJBAT.TMP, which is the other?

Answer: IS-R7RFP.TMP

From the PECmd Prefetch analysis, we examined the Resources loaded section which lists all files referenced during execution:

q10_tmp_files.png

Key indicators:

  • Line 57: \USERS\JOHN\APPDATA\LOCAL\TEMP\IS-VIBV9.TMP\IS-NJBAT.TMP (Keyword: True)
  • Line 61: \USERS\JOHN\APPDATA\LOCAL\TEMP\IS-T97VD.TMP\IS-R7RFP.TMP (Keyword: True)
  • Both flagged with Keyword: True (matched PECmd’s keyword list for suspicious/notable references)
  • The two .TMP files reside in different parent temp directories — aligning with the two separate executions (Q8/Q9), as Inno Setup creates a unique temp directory per run
  • Characteristic of Inno Setup installer temporary files — the malware was packaged as a fake Inno Setup installer

Detection angle. Prefetch “Resources loaded” with Inno Setup temp files (IS-*.TMP) — installer-based staging.

3.12 Q11 — How many of the URLs contacted by the malicious application were detected as malicious by VirusTotal?

Answer: 4

We searched the SHA-256 hash from Q7 (c34601c5da…4b3193) on VirusTotal and examined the Relations tab under Contacted URLs:

q11_virustotal_urls.png

Out of 8 contacted URLs, 4 had detections (non-zero detection count):

Detections URL Analysis
10 / 98 http://45.12.253.72/default/puk.php Malicious C2 endpoint
12 / 97 http://45.12.253.75/dll.php Malicious — likely serves a DLL payload
11 / 98 http://45.12.253.72/default/stuk.php Malicious C2 endpoint
10 / 98 http://45.12.253.56/advertising/plus.php?s=NOSUB&str=mixtwo&substr=mixinte Malicious C2 with parameters

The remaining 4 URLs with 0 detections are legitimate:

  • microsoft.com — certificate downloads (code signing, timestamp)
  • crt.sectigo.com — Sectigo CA certificate chain files

Key indicators:

  • All malicious URLs point to bare IP addresses (45.12.253.x) rather than domain names
  • The .php endpoints suggest a web-based C2 panel
  • The IPs are in the 45.12.253.0/24 range — multiple C2 servers in the same subnet
  • The legitimate URLs are related to code signing certificates (Sectigo)

Detection angle. VirusTotal “Contacted URLs” tab — distinguishes malicious C2 (bare IPs, .php) from legitimate certificate endpoints.

3.13 Q12 — The malicious application downloaded a binary file from one of the C2 URLs, what is the name of the file?

Answer: puk.php

From the VirusTotal analysis in Q11, two PHP endpoints on the C2 server 45.12.253.72 stood out: puk.php and stuk.php. VirusTotal’s behavioral analysis indicated that puk.php served a binary download.

We confirmed the C2 communication in the network capture using Wireshark with the filter:

http.request.method == GET && ip.addr == 45.12.253.72

q12_c2_wireshark.png

Key indicators:

  • The victim machine (192.168.116.133) made multiple HTTP GET requests to 45.12.253.72:
    • /default/stuk.php — at 06:58:43 and 06:59:53
    • /default/puk.php — at 06:58:44 and 06:59:53
  • The requests are paired and repeated, suggesting a polling pattern
  • puk.php is the endpoint that served a binary payload; stuk.php likely handles status/check-in
  • Both endpoints use the /default/ path prefix, consistent with a structured C2 web panel

Detection angle. Wireshark filter http.request.method == GET && ip.addr == 45.12.253.72 — paired stuk.php/puk.php polling pattern.

3.14 Q13 — Can you find any indication of the actual name and version of the program that the malware is pretending to be?

Answer: FinalRecovery v3.0.7.0325

This required multiple steps. First, we gathered clues from existing analysis:

  1. exiftool on Recovery_Setup.exe showed File Description: FLSCover and File Version: 1.0.5.28 — but this is the Inno Setup installer metadata, not the actual impersonated program
  2. innoextract revealed the installer contained finalrecovery.chm (a help file) and Rec528.exe — hinting the program name is FinalRecovery
  3. strings on the memory dump confirmed the installation path C:\Program Files (x86)\FLSCover\Rec528\ and references to finalrecovery.chm

However, the exact version v3.0.7.0325 was not directly visible in memory strings or PE metadata. It was found by submitting the sample to Joe Sandbox, which revealed the content of a temporary file (is-AOCSC.tmp) dropped during installation:

q13_finalrecovery_version.png

The file at C:\Program Files (x86)\FLSCover\Rec528\is-AOCSC.tmp contains:

FinalRecovery
v3.0.7.0325
Overview
========FinalRecovery is a powerful and easy-to-use file recovery software...

Key indicators:

  • FinalRecovery is a legitimate data recovery application — the attacker trojanized it or repackaged it with malware
  • The version v3.0.7.0325 is the version of the legitimate software being impersonated
  • The installer brand name FLSCover and internal name Cov 1.0.5.28 appear to be the attacker’s modified metadata, while the original product identity was preserved in help/readme files
  • This is a classic trojanized software technique — bundling malware with a legitimate application

Note: When identifying impersonated software, check temporary files, help files (.chm), readme files, and sandbox reports — the PE metadata is often modified by the attacker, but auxiliary files may retain the original product information.

Detection angle. Cross-reference PE metadata, innoextract output, memory strings and sandbox reports to recover the impersonated product identity.


4. Challenge Q&A Log

# Question Answer Method
1 OS build version 19041 windows.info
2 Computer hostname DESKTOP-38NVPD0 windows.envars
3 Downloaded ZIP file name Data_Recovery.zip tshark HTTP filter
4 Download domain (with subdomain) praetorial-gears.000webhostapp.com HTTP request URI
5 Suspicious process PID 484 windows.pslist / pstree
6 Full path of suspicious process C:\Users\John\Downloads\Data_Recovery\Recovery_Setup.exe windows.cmdline
7 SHA-256 of suspicious executable c34601c5da3501f6ee0efce18de7e6145153ecfac2ce2019ec52e1535a4b3193 pyad1 extraction + sha256sum
8 First execution timestamp 2023-05-30 02:06:29 PECmd Prefetch
9 Total execution count 2 Prefetch Run count
10 Second .TMP file name IS-R7RFP.TMP PECmd Resources loaded
11 Malicious contacted URLs count 4 VirusTotal Relations tab
12 Binary-download C2 endpoint puk.php VirusTotal + Wireshark
13 Impersonated program name/version FinalRecovery v3.0.7.0325 innoextract + Joe Sandbox

5. Incident Narrative

On 2023-05-30 user John on DESKTOP-38NVPD0 downloaded Data_Recovery.zip from praetorial-gears.000webhostapp.com (a free WordPress hosting site). The archive contained Recovery_Setup.exe — a trojanized Inno Setup installer impersonating FinalRecovery v3.0.7.0325. The victim executed it twice (02:06:29 and 02:07:59 UTC); the installer dropped to C:\Program Files (x86)\FLSCover\Rec528\ and spawned Rec528.exe through the Inno Setup temp file is-NJBAT.tmp.

The malware then established C2 communication with 45.12.253.72 over HTTP, polling stuk.php and puk.php in pairs; puk.php served a binary payload. VirusTotal showed 4 of 8 contacted URLs as malicious (all bare-IP 45.12.253.x endpoints); the remaining 4 were legitimate Sectigo/Microsoft certificate endpoints. The true product identity survived only in help/temp files (finalrecovery.chm, is-AOCSC.tmp), while the PE metadata was overwritten by the attacker (FLSCover / Cov 1.0.5.28).


6. Attack Timeline

Timestamp (UTC) Event Artifact ATT&CK
2023-05-30 02:06:29 First execution of Recovery_Setup.exe (trojanized installer) Prefetch (PECmd) T1204.002
2023-05-30 02:06:48 Rec528.exe (PID 3068) spawned — first payload run strings on memory dump T1059
2023-05-30 02:07:59 Second execution of Recovery_Setup.exe (PID 484) windows.pslist, Prefetch T1204.002
2023-05-30 02:08:01 Rec528.exe (PID 4012) spawned via is-NJBAT.tmp (PID 5956) windows.pstree T1059
2023-05-30 06:56:04 Data_Recovery.zip downloaded from praetorial-gears.000webhostapp.com network.pcapng T1566.001
2023-05-30 06:58:43 C2 communication begins — HTTP GET to 45.12.253.72 (stuk.php, puk.php) network.pcapng T1071.001
2023-05-30 06:58:44 Binary payload downloaded from C2 via puk.php network.pcapng, VirusTotal T1105

Summary: User John on DESKTOP-38NVPD0 (Windows 10 build 19041) downloaded Data_Recovery.zip from a free hosting site. The ZIP contained Recovery_Setup.exe — a trojanized Inno Setup installer of FinalRecovery. Upon execution the malware installed to C:\Program Files (x86)\FLSCover\Rec528\ and established C2 communication with multiple servers in the 45.12.253.x range via PHP endpoints. The C2 infrastructure served additional binary payloads.


7. Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

7.1 File IOCs

Type Value Context
File Name Data_Recovery.zip Downloaded lure — Q3
File Name Recovery_Setup.exe Trojanized installer — Q5/Q6
File Name Rec528.exe Embedded payload — timeline
File Name is-NJBAT.tmp / IS-R7RFP.TMP Inno Setup temp files — Q10
File Path C:\Users\John\Downloads\Data_Recovery\ Drop location
File Path C:\Program Files (x86)\FLSCover\Rec528\ Install location
File Path C:\Users\John\AppData\Local\Temp\is-*\ Inno Setup staging
SHA-256 c34601c5da3501f6ee0efce18de7e6145153ecfac2ce2019ec52e1535a4b3193 Recovery_Setup.exe — Q7

7.2 Network IOCs

Type Value Context
Domain praetorial-gears.000webhostapp.com Download host — Q4
IP Address 145.14.144.155 Hosting server — Q3
IP Address 45.12.253.72 C2 server (stuk.php, puk.php) — Q12
IP Address 45.12.253.75 C2 server (dll.php) — Q11
IP Address 45.12.253.56 C2 server (plus.php) — Q11
IP Address 192.168.116.133 Victim machine — Q3
URL http://45.12.253.72/default/stuk.php C2 check-in endpoint
URL http://45.12.253.72/default/puk.php C2 payload endpoint
URL http://45.12.253.75/dll.php C2 DLL endpoint
User-Agent Chrome/92.0.4515.131 Download client — Q3

7.3 Behavioral IOCs

Type Value Context
Process Recovery_Setup.exe → is-NJBAT.tmp → Rec528.exe Multi-stage execution chain — Q5
Registry/PE metadata File Description FLSCover, File Version 1.0.5.28 Attacker-overwritten metadata — Q13
Pattern Bare-IP C2 URLs (no domain names) Evasion of DNS-based detection — Q11

8. Detection Opportunities

Source What to look for Why it matters
Network (PCAP/proxy) Downloads of .zip from free hosting (000webhostapp.com) Initial access lure — Q3/Q4
Volatility windows.pslist/pstree Recovery_Setup.exe spawning is-*.tmp → Rec528.exe Installer-based multi-stage payload — Q5
Volatility windows.cmdline Full path under C:\Users\…\Downloads\ Confirms drop location — Q6
Disk (Prefetch) RECOVERY_SETUP.EXE-*.pf with Run count and temp file references Execution count and staging — Q8/Q10
Network (PCAP) HTTP GET to bare IPs 45.12.253.x with .php endpoints C2 communication — Q12
VirusTotal Hash lookup of unknown installer executables Contacted URLs and detections — Q11
PE metadata File Description/Version mismatch with claimed product Trojanized software detection — Q13

9. MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

TTP ID Tactic Technique Evidence
T1566.001 Initial Access Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment Data_Recovery.zip downloaded from free hosting — Q3/Q4
T1204.002 Execution User Execution: Malicious File Recovery_Setup.exe executed twice — Q8/Q9
T1059 Execution Command and Scripting Interpreter Inno Setup temp file execution — Q5
T1071.001 Command and Control Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols HTTP C2 to 45.12.253.72 — Q12
T1105 Command and Control Ingress Tool Transfer Binary payload via puk.php — Q12
T1036 Defense Evasion Masquerading PE metadata overwritten (FLSCover); FinalRecovery impersonation — Q13

10. Conclusions & Recommendations

10.1 Incident Summary

What Happened A user downloaded and executed a trojanized FinalRecovery installer; the malware installed to FLSCover\Rec528\, spawned a secondary payload, and established C2 communication with multiple 45.12.253.x servers serving binary payloads.
Root Cause Social engineering lure (data-recovery utility) hosted on a free hosting platform; no application control or reputation check intercepted the download/execution.
Impact Assessment Confidentiality: High — C2 payload delivery and potential data access. Integrity: High — unauthorized software installed. Availability: Medium — trojanized installer may disrupt legitimate recovery workflows.

10.2 Recommendations

Priority Timeframe Recommendation
Immediate Within 24h Block praetorial-gears.000webhostapp.com and 45.12.253.0/24 at DNS/proxy/firewall; hunt c34601c5…4b3193 and Rec528.exe estate-wide
High Within 7 days Remove FLSCover\Rec528\ from affected hosts; check for persistence mechanisms
Medium Within 30 days Alert on Inno Setup temp files (is-*.tmp) spawning executables; alert on HTTP to bare-IP .php endpoints
Low Within 90 days Application control (allow-list) for installers; phishing awareness for “data recovery” lures
Strategic Ongoing Multi-source forensics (memory + disk + network) as standard triage; document pyad1/PECmd workflow

11. Analyst Notes & Learning

11.1 What I Did Well

Cross-correlated three evidence sources (memory, disk, network) and verified the hash from the disk artifact (pyad1) rather than from memory (which would have produced a wrong hash). Used VirusTotal in query-only mode for reputation and contacted URLs.

11.2 Key Takeaways

  • Memory dumps are not byte-identical to disk files: windows.dumpfiles produces page-aligned reconstructions — use disk artifacts for hashes.
  • Prefetch keeps up to 8 timestamps: distinguish “Last run” from “Other run times” for first-execution questions.
  • Free hosting (000webhostapp.com) is a common malware delivery channel.
  • Trojanized software hides its identity in auxiliary files: help files (.chm), temp files (is-*.tmp) and sandbox reports retain the original product name even when PE metadata is overwritten.
  • Bare-IP C2 URLs (no domain names) evade DNS-based detection.

11.3 New Techniques

pyad1 for AD1 extraction on Linux, PECmd Prefetch parsing, innoextract for Inno Setup installers, exiftool PE metadata inspection, Joe Sandbox for behavioral analysis, multi-source correlation (memory + disk + network), and VirusTotal Relations tab for contacted-URL reputation.


12. References

HTB Sherlock · Trojan · Malware Analysis · 2023-05-30