Vantage Sherlock Walkthrough

Solved Vantage from Hack The Box!

Field Details
Case Reference HTB-SHRLCK-VANTAGE
Platform Hack The Box — Sherlock
Category Network Analysis — Cloud Breach (OpenStack)
Difficulty —
Date Opened 2026-01-07
Severity High
Status Closed — training scenario
Hosts controller, web-server (pcap files)
Stack Suricata, Zeek, Wireshark, tshark
Attacker IP 117.200.21.26

Scenario: A small company moved some of its resources to a private cloud installation. The developers left the redirect to the dashboard on their web server. The security team got an email from the alleged attacker stating that the user data was leaked. It is up to you to investigate the situation.


1. Executive Summary

On 2025-07-01 an attacker at 117.200.21.26 fuzzed the company’s web server with ffuf v2.1.0, discovering the subdomain cloud.vantage.tech. After 3 login attempts, the attacker authenticated to the OpenStack dashboard, downloaded the admin-openrc.sh API credentials file (09:40:29 UTC), and transitioned to direct API access (09:41:44 UTC). They enumerated the Swift object store, discovered 3 containers (dev-files, employee-data, user-data), exfiltrated user-data (28 user records, 09:45:23 UTC) and employee-data, then created a backdoor admin user jellibean (password P@$$word) for persistence. The entire intrusion — from fuzzing to data exfiltration to backdoor creation — was reconstructed from two PCAPs (web-server.pcap, controller.pcap) using tshark, Zeek and Wireshark.

1.1 Incident Summary

Field Details
Incident Type Cloud breach — OpenStack dashboard fuzzing → credential theft → data exfiltration → backdoor user
Initial Access Fuzzing the web server with ffuf, discovering cloud.vantage.tech
Discovery Security team received an email from the alleged attacker
First Interaction 2025-07-01 (fuzzing observed in PCAP)
Persistence Backdoor admin user jellibean (password P@$$word)
Overall Severity High

1.2 Key Findings

  • Fuzzing tool: ffuf v2.1.0 (User-Agent “Fuzz Faster U Fool v2.1.0-dev”), 3,695 requests from 117.200.21.26.
  • Discovered subdomain: cloud.vantage.tech (21 requests vs. 2 for others).
  • 3 login attempts before successful dashboard authentication.
  • admin-openrc.sh downloaded at 09:40:29 UTC — OpenStack API credentials (endpoint, project ID, username, password).
  • First API interaction at 09:41:44 UTC (compute/nova GET).
  • Default project ID: 9fb84977ff7c4a0baf0d5dbb57e235c7.
  • Authentication service: Keystone; object storage (Swift) endpoint: http://134.209.71.220:8080/v1/AUTH_9fb84977….
  • 3 containers discovered: dev-files, employee-data, user-data.
  • user-data exfiltrated at 09:45:23 UTC — 28 user records.
  • Backdoor admin user jellibean created with password P@$$word (plaintext in HTTP, no TLS).

2. Investigation Scope & Artifacts

2.1 Artifacts Analyzed

Artifact Format What it answers
web-server.2025-07-01.pcap PCAP Fuzzing, login attempts, subdomain discovery — Q1, Q2, Q3
controller.pcap PCAP OpenStack API interactions, Swift exfiltration, user creation — Q4–Q13
Zeek/Zui logs JSON HTTP method/URI filtering — Q4, Q5, Q6, Q10

2.2 Tools & Methods

Tool Purpose
tshark Packet capture analysis (HTTP filtering, field extraction)
Wireshark Visual inspection of HTTP requests
Zeek / Zui HTTP log querying (_path=="http")
jq JSON parsing of exported Swift container data

3. Technical Analysis

3.1 Scenario

Network pcap analysis of a cloud breach. A small company moved resources to a private OpenStack cloud. Developers left a redirect to the dashboard on their web server. The security team received an email from the alleged attacker stating user data was leaked. Investigate the situation.

3.2 Q1 — What tool did the attacker use to fuzz the web server? (Format: include version)

Answer: ffuf@2.1.0

tshark -r web-server.2025-07-01.pcap -Y "http.request" -T fields -e ip.src -e ip.dst | uniq -c | sort -un
   1 10.116.0.3      10.116.0.4
   2 184.105.247.252 157.230.81.229
 302 117.200.21.26   157.230.81.229
3394 117.200.21.26   157.230.81.229
tshark -r web-server.2025-07-01.pcap -Y "http.request" -T fields -e ip.src -e ip.dst -e http.user_agent | sort | uniq -c | sort -un
      1 10.116.0.3      10.116.0.4      Fuzz Faster U Fool v2.1.0-dev
      2 184.105.247.252 157.230.81.229  Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 …
     20 10.116.0.3      10.116.0.4      Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) …
   3695 117.200.21.26   157.230.81.229  Fuzz Faster U Fool v2.1.0-dev

Notes: At first I ran tshark filtering http.request communications on the pcap. We saw 3394 http.requests from SourceIP 117.200.21.26 to 157.230.81.229 — probably fuzzing. On the second tshark command (with User-Agent), we found Fuzz Faster U Fool v2.1.0-dev — the answer is ffuf@2.1.0.

Detection angle. tshark HTTP request aggregation by ip.src/ip.dst/http.user_agent — reveals fuzzing tool and attacker IP.

3.3 Q2 — Which subdomain did the attacker discover?

Answer: cloud

tshark -r web-server.2025-07-01.pcap -Y "http and ip.src==117.200.21.26" -T fields -e http.host | sort | uniq -c | sort -n
      2 www3.vantage.tech
      2 www.blog.vantage.tech
      2 www.dev.vantage.tech
      2 www.forum.vantage.tech
      2 www.m.vantage.tech
      2 www.test.vantage.tech
      2 www.vantage.tech
     21 cloud.vantage.tech

Notes: Filtered http and ip.src and extracted -e http.host. cloud.vantage.tech has more occurrences (21 vs 2), so the answer is cloud.

Detection angle. tshark http.host aggregation — subdomain with disproportionate request count reveals the discovered endpoint.

3.4 Q3 — How many login attempts did the attacker make before successfully logging in to the dashboard?

Answer: 3

Wireshark display filter:

http && ip.addr == 117.200.21.26 && http.referer == http://cloud.vantage.tech/dashboard/auth/login/

image.png

Notes: 3 login attempts observed. The 3rd succeeded because we saw /dashboard/project/ afterwards.

Detection angle. Wireshark filter on http.referer to the login endpoint — counts failed vs. successful login attempts.

3.5 Q4 — When did the attacker download the OpenStack API remote access config file? (UTC)

Answer: 2025-07-01 09:40:29

Zeek query:

_path=="http" | id.orig_h==117.200.21.26 | cut ts, uid, method, uri, referrer, resp_filenames

image.png

Notes: Using Zeek/Zui HTTP logs, filtered by attacker IP 117.200.21.26 and inspected the resp_filenames field. At 2025-07-01 09:40:29 UTC the attacker downloaded admin-openrc.sh from /dashboard/project/api_access/openrc/. admin-openrc.sh is an OpenStack credentials file containing API endpoint URLs, project ID, username, and password. Possession of this file gives the attacker full programmatic access to the OpenStack cloud infrastructure via CLI or API, bypassing the web dashboard entirely.

Detection angle. Zeek HTTP logs with resp_filenames — identifies credential file download.

3.6 Q5 — When did the attacker first interact with the API on controller node? (UTC)

Answer: 2025-07-01 09:41:44

_path=="http" | cut ts, method, uri

Notes: After downloading admin-openrc.sh at 09:40:29, the attacker used the credentials to authenticate directly against the OpenStack API. At 2025-07-01 09:41:44 UTC the first API interaction was observed — a GET request to the compute/nova API endpoint, approximately 75 seconds after the openrc file was downloaded. This confirms the attacker transitioned from web dashboard browsing to direct API access using the stolen credentials — a significant escalation giving programmatic control over the cloud infrastructure.

Detection angle. Zeek HTTP logs — first API request after credential file download indicates API access transition.

3.7 Q6 — What is the project id of the default project accessed by the attacker?

Answer: 9fb84977ff7c4a0baf0d5dbb57e235c7

_path=="http" | id.orig_h==117.200.21.26 | cut ts, uid, method, host, uri | projects

image.png

Notes: At 09:48:01 UTC the attacker queried the Identity API: GET /identity/v3/projects?domain_id=default&name=admin. The project ID 9fb84977ff7c4a0baf0d5dbb57e235c7 was returned and confirmed visible in the PUT request at 09:49:15 UTC where the attacker used it to assign the admin role to the backdoor account jellibean.

Detection angle. Zeek HTTP logs — Identity API project enumeration reveals the default project ID.

3.8 Q7 — Which OpenStack service provides authentication and authorization for the OpenStack API?

Answer: keystone

Notes: According to documentation, Keystone is an OpenStack service that provides API client authentication, service discovery, and distributed multi-tenant authorization by implementing OpenStack’s Identity API.

Detection angle. Keystone = OpenStack Identity service — all auth flows go through it.

3.9 Q8 — What is the endpoint URL of the swift service?

Answer: http://134.209.71.220:8080/v1/AUTH_9fb84977ff7c4a0baf0d5dbb57e235c7

Notes: Swift endpoint URL found by filtering port 8080 traffic in Zui. All object storage requests used host 134.209.71.220:8080 with path /v1/AUTH_[project_id], confirming the full endpoint URL: http://134.209.71.220:8080/v1/AUTH_9fb84977ff7c4a0baf0d5dbb57e235c7.

Detection angle. Port 8080 traffic to 134.209.71.220 — Swift object storage endpoint.

3.10 Q9 — How many containers were discovered by the attacker?

Answer: 3 — dev-files, employee-data, user-data

tshark -r controller.pcap --export-objects http,./extracted/
cat ./extracted/AUTH_9fb84977ff7c4a0baf0d5dbb57e235c7%3fformat=json | jq .
[
  { "name": "dev-files", "count": 0, "bytes": 0, "last_modified": "2025-07-01T04:22:36.008860", "storage_policy": "Policy-0" },
  { "name": "employee-data", "count": 0, "bytes": 0, "last_modified": "2025-07-01T04:22:28.334080", "storage_policy": "Policy-0" },
  { "name": "user-data", "count": 0, "bytes": 0, "last_modified": "2025-07-01T04:22:07.707130", "storage_policy": "Policy-0" }
]

image.png

Notes: At 09:43:27 UTC the attacker queried the Swift storage root: GET /v1/AUTH_9fb84977ff7c4a0baf0d5dbb57e235c7?format=json. The 376-byte JSON response revealed 3 containers: dev-files (empty, never accessed), employee-data (exfiltrated at 09:45:47 UTC), user-data (exfiltrated at 09:45:23 UTC).

Detection angle. Swift ?format=json container listing — reveals all storage containers.

3.11 Q10 — When did the attacker download the sensitive user data file? (UTC)

Answer: 2025-07-01 09:45:23

_path=="http"
| id.orig_h == 117.200.21.26
| "user-data"
| cut ts, method, id.orig_h, uri, response_body_len
| sort ts

image.png

Notes: Filtered HTTP traffic from attacker IP 117.200.21.26 for all requests targeting the user-data container. The download was identified by the GET request with a non-zero response body.

Detection angle. Zeek HTTP logs filtered by id.orig_h and container name — identifies the exfiltration timestamp.

3.12 Q11 — How many user records are in the sensitive user data file?

Answer: 28

cat user-details.csv | wc -l  → 29 lines
29 - 1 (header) = 28 user records

Notes: Exported user-details.csv from the PCAP using Wireshark. Counted rows excluding the header line.

Detection angle. Exported CSV row count (minus header) — quantifies exfiltration scope.

3.13 Q12 — For persistence, the attacker created a new user with admin privileges. What is the username of the new user?

Answer: jellibean

image.png

$ grep -r "jellibean"
users(1):{"user": {"password": "P@$$word", "enabled": true, "default_project_id": "9fb84977ff7c4a0baf0d5dbb57e235c7", "name": "jellibean"}}
users(2):{"user": {"id": "c373da67a62b48f393c45dc071fa80b8", "name": "jellibean", "domain_id": "default", "enabled": true, "default_project_id": "9fb84977ff7c4a0baf0d5dbb57e235c7", "password_expires_at": null, "options": {}, "links": {"self": "http://134.209.71.220/identity/v3/users/c373da67a62b48f393c45dc071fa80b8"}}}

Notes: Ran grep -r "jellibean" against all HTTP objects extracted from controller.pcap. Found the user creation POST request body confirming username jellibean with default_project_id matching the admin project.

Detection angle. grep on extracted HTTP objects for the backdoor username — confirms user creation.

3.14 Q13 — What is the password of the new user?

Answer: P@$$word

Notes: Password found in the same POST /identity/v3/users request body extracted in Q12. Plaintext credentials in API traffic confirm no encryption was used on the internal network (HTTP not HTTPS).

Detection angle. Plaintext password in HTTP POST body — credential exposure in unencrypted API traffic.


4. Challenge Q&A Log

# Question Answer Method
1 Fuzzing tool used ffuf@2.1.0 tshark User-Agent
2 Subdomain discovered cloud tshark http.host aggregation
3 Login attempts before success 3 Wireshark filter on login referer
4 OpenStack API config download time 2025-07-01 09:40:29 Zeek HTTP logs (resp_filenames)
5 First API interaction time 2025-07-01 09:41:44 Zeek HTTP logs
6 Default project ID 9fb84977ff7c4a0baf0d5dbb57e235c7 Zeek Identity API query
7 Authentication/authorization service keystone OpenStack documentation
8 Swift service endpoint URL http://134.209.71.220:8080/v1/AUTH_9fb84977… Port 8080 traffic in Zui
9 Containers discovered 3 (dev-files, employee-data, user-data) Swift ?format=json response
10 User data file download time 2025-07-01 09:45:23 Zeek HTTP logs filtered by container
11 User records in sensitive file 28 CSV row count (minus header)
12 Backdoor admin username jellibean grep on extracted HTTP objects
13 Backdoor admin password P@$$word POST body in extracted HTTP objects

5. Incident Narrative

On 2025-07-01 an attacker at 117.200.21.26 fuzzed the company’s web server with ffuf v2.1.0 (3,695 requests), discovering the subdomain cloud.vantage.tech. After 3 login attempts, the attacker authenticated to the OpenStack dashboard, downloaded the admin-openrc.sh API credentials file (09:40:29 UTC), and transitioned to direct API access (09:41:44 UTC). They enumerated the Swift object store, discovered 3 containers (dev-files, employee-data, user-data), exfiltrated user-data (28 user records, 09:45:23 UTC) and employee-data, then created a backdoor admin user jellibean (password P@$$word) for persistence. The entire intrusion — from fuzzing to data exfiltration to backdoor creation — was reconstructed from two PCAPs using tshark, Zeek and Wireshark.


6. Attack Timeline

Timestamp (UTC) Event Artifact ATT&CK
(fuzzing phase) ffuf v2.1.0 fuzzing from 117.200.21.26 (3,695 requests) web-server.pcap T1595.002
(discovery) Subdomain cloud.vantage.tech discovered (21 requests) web-server.pcap T1595.002
(auth phase) 3 login attempts; 3rd successful web-server.pcap T1110
09:40:29 admin-openrc.sh downloaded (API credentials) Zeek HTTP logs T1552.005
09:41:44 First API interaction on controller node (compute/nova) Zeek HTTP logs T1078
09:43:27 Swift container listing (3 containers) Zeek HTTP logs T1530
09:45:23 user-data container exfiltrated (28 records) Zeek HTTP logs T1530
09:45:47 employee-data container exfiltrated Zeek HTTP logs T1530
(persistence) Backdoor user jellibean created (password P@$$word) controller.pcap T1136.003

7. Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

7.1 File IOCs

Type Value Context
File Name admin-openrc.sh OpenStack API credentials file — Q4
File Name user-details.csv Exfiltrated user data (28 records) — Q11

7.2 Network IOCs

Type Value Context
IP Address 117.200.21.26 Attacker IP — Q1
IP Address 157.230.81.229 Web server — Q1
IP Address 134.209.71.220 OpenStack controller (Swift endpoint) — Q8
Domain cloud.vantage.tech Discovered subdomain (OpenStack dashboard) — Q2
Domain vantage.tech Company domain
Port 8080 Swift object storage endpoint — Q8
User-Agent Fuzz Faster U Fool v2.1.0-dev ffuf v2.1.0 — Q1

7.3 Behavioral IOCs

Type Value Context
Account jellibean Backdoor admin user (password P@$$word) — Q12/Q13
Account admin Compromised OpenStack admin account
Project ID 9fb84977ff7c4a0baf0d5dbb57e235c7 Default admin project — Q6
Container user-data, employee-data, dev-files Swift containers — Q9
Credential admin-openrc.sh (plaintext API creds) Stolen OpenStack credentials — Q4
Protocol HTTP (no TLS) Plaintext credentials in API traffic — Q13

8. Detection Opportunities

Source What to look for Why it matters
Network (PCAP/proxy) High volume of HTTP requests from a single IP with Fuzz Faster U Fool User-Agent ffuf web fuzzing — Q1
Network (DNS/proxy) Requests to cloud.vantage.tech from unusual IPs Subdomain discovery — Q2
Network (PCAP) 3+ failed login attempts to a dashboard followed by success Credential guessing — Q3
Network (PCAP/Zeek) Download of admin-openrc.sh or *openrc.sh files OpenStack credential theft — Q4
Network (PCAP/Zeek) HTTP requests to /identity/v3/ and /v1/AUTH_* from new IPs Direct API access with stolen creds — Q5/Q6
Network (PCAP) Swift ?format=json container listing followed by bulk GETs Data exfiltration — Q9/Q10
Network (PCAP) POST to /identity/v3/users creating a new admin user Backdoor account creation — Q12
Network (PCAP) Plaintext passwords in HTTP POST bodies Credential exposure (no TLS) — Q13

9. MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

TTP ID Tactic Technique Evidence
T1595.002 Reconnaissance Active Scanning: Vulnerability Scanning ffuf fuzzing of the web server — Q1/Q2
T1110 Credential Access Brute Force 3 login attempts before success — Q3
T1552.005 Credential Access Unsecured Credentials: Cloud Instance Metadata API admin-openrc.sh downloaded (API creds) — Q4
T1078 Defense Evasion Valid Accounts Authenticated to OpenStack with stolen creds — Q5
T1530 Collection Data from Cloud Storage Swift container enumeration and exfiltration — Q9/Q10
T1136.003 Persistence Create Account: Cloud Account Backdoor user jellibean created — Q12
T1048 Exfiltration Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol Data exfiltrated over HTTP (no TLS) — Q10/Q13

10. Conclusions & Recommendations

10.1 Incident Summary

What Happened An attacker fuzzed the web server, discovered the OpenStack dashboard, stole API credentials, exfiltrated user data (28 records) from Swift storage, and created a backdoor admin account — all over unencrypted HTTP.
Root Cause Developers left a redirect to the dashboard on the web server; OpenStack API credentials were downloadable via the web UI; internal API traffic was unencrypted (HTTP not HTTPS).
Impact Assessment Confidentiality: Critical — 28 user records + employee data exfiltrated. Integrity: High — backdoor admin account created. Availability: Low — no service disruption observed.

10.2 Recommendations

Priority Timeframe Recommendation
Immediate Within 24h Disable jellibean account; revoke admin-openrc.sh credentials; block 117.200.21.26 at the WAF/firewall
High Within 7 days Enable HTTPS/TLS on all OpenStack API endpoints; remove the dashboard redirect from the web server
Medium Within 30 days Alert on ffuf User-Agent or high-volume 404s from single IPs; alert on admin-openrc.sh downloads; alert on new admin user creation
Low Within 90 days Implement rate limiting on the dashboard login; MFA for OpenStack admin accounts
Strategic Ongoing Network segmentation for cloud management plane; encrypt all internal API traffic; least-privilege for Swift containers

11. Analyst Notes & Learning

11.1 What I Did Well

Correlated two PCAPs (web-server + controller) to reconstruct the full kill chain: fuzzing → login → credential theft → API access → container enumeration → exfiltration → backdoor. Used Zeek/Zui HTTP logs for efficient filtering by id.orig_h and URI patterns.

11.2 Key Takeaways

  • ffuf’s User-Agent (“Fuzz Faster U Fool”) is a dead giveaway — trivial to detect in proxy/WAF logs.
  • admin-openrc.sh is a credential goldmine — it contains the full OpenStack auth bundle (endpoint, project ID, username, password).
  • OpenStack API access over HTTP exposes credentials and data in plaintext — always use HTTPS.
  • Swift container listing (?format=json) reveals all storage containers in one request.
  • Backdoor accounts (jellibean) with plaintext passwords in HTTP POST bodies are easy to spot in PCAPs.
  • Double-extension and masquerading apply to cloud too — cloud.vantage.tech was the hidden entry point.

11.3 New Techniques

tshark HTTP aggregation by ip.src/http.user_agent, Zeek/Zui HTTP log querying (_path=="http", id.orig_h, resp_filenames), Wireshark display filters for login referers, tshark --export-objects http for file extraction, and grep -r on extracted HTTP objects for credential recovery.


12. References

HTB Sherlock · Vantage · Network Analysis · 2026-01-07